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There is a large body of literature stressing the importance of developing financial 
markets, including stock markets, to enhance countries’ growth rates.  In the first essay, I 
argue that the relationship between stock markets and growth is exaggerated and that the 
simple act of opening a formal stock market is not a good predictor of whether a country 
will experience economic growth.  This is evaluated using two Bayesian econometric 
methods, Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) and Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) by 
regressing growth between 2002 and 2007 on stock market openings between 1960 and 
1999.  The findings indicate that the opening of a stock market does not influence 
economic growth. 
In the second essay the Schumpeterian innovation life-cycle is used to argue that 
firms will be more likely to raise funds through the stock market rather than the bond 
market if they are engaged in radically new technologies.  This argument is placed within 
the context of the dominant theories of capital structure.  Empirically, I test this 
relationship of innovative activity to equity issuance by using patents as a proxy for 
innovation from a dataset covering 1970 to 1992 regressed on whether a firm raised funds 
through the bond or stock market. I find statistically significant evidence using a 
dichotomous probit model that the industries with higher innovative/patenting activities 
are significantly more likely to raise funds through stock market issuance than firms 




The third essay evaluates the relationship between access to credit and the private 
credit to GDP ratio.  I argue that two measures of inclusiveness, total access and the 
equality of access, are positively related with private credit and financial development.  
The newly released Global Financial Index database from the World Bank allows for the 
first time the ability to effectively test the impact of access and inequality of access.   I 
find significant evidence that the total percentage of people in the financial sector is 
associated with, and unequal access to finance leads to, a lower private credit/GDP ratio.  
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A developed and efficient financial system has a number of functions through 
which financial intermediaries are able to influence growth.  According to the Levine 
(1997) classifications, these functions include allocating resources, mobilizing savings, 
reducing risks, facilitating transactions, and decreasing costs to monitor firms.  Each of 
these functions plays its part in how financial development can influence growth.  Gurley 
and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Hicks (1969) argue that an 
efficient transfer of funds from surplus units to deficit units is necessary for stimulating 
economic growth.  Without an efficient transfer of funds, entrepreneurs would be unable 
to obtain the necessary funds to expand their businesses, therefore lowering the level of 
growth.  It is from this theoretical basis that this dissertation has emerged.  The body of 
literature on the relationship between finance and growth would seem to suggest that 
financial development is the lynchpin to prosperity.  Unfortunately, developing financial 
markets has not released the floodgates of economic growth.  The essays contained herein 
evaluate the impact stock markets have as well as some specific conditions to better 
inform the development of effective financial systems. 
Empirical work on the relationship between finance and growth did not emerge in 





they found that the initial level of financial development can predict later rates of 
economic growth—a number of studies emerge confirming the results that more financial 
development is associated with (or causes) economic growth.  Within the finance-growth 
empirical literature, the research can be divided into promoting market or bank-based 
financial systems, whereby increasing either element should result in higher growth.  
Additional cross country results supporting the notion that increasing overall financial 
development include Levine (2002)—whose findings were that there is a strong 
connection between financial development and growth regardless of whether the country 
has a bank or market-based financial system—and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2002), who showed that overall financial development helps to explain the growth of 
firms.  These studies evaluated the financial system as a whole, while a number of other 
studies took a narrower approach by examining the role of stock markets.  These results 
show that stock markets are positively associated with economic growth (Atje & 
Jovanovic, 1993; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Levine & Zervos, 1998).  It is 
this last category of research that has prompted many developing countries to open a 
stock market and expect economic prosperity to follow. 
Alternatively, there exists a growing body of research questioning whether 
financial development is always and everywhere beneficial for growth.  The idea 
suggested by Robinson (1952) is not that finance leads growth, but rather that financial 
systems act in response to economic conditions.  As the economy is expanding, firms and 
households will have more demand for financial services.  Responding to the increase in 
demand, more financial intermediaries and financial services will emerge.  Outside of 





that economists tend to overstate the impact of finance, and this idea was the reasoning 
for the exclusion of all financial considerations from a theoretical growth model. 
While the dominant theme behind the relationship between finance and growth is 
of a positive causal relationship there exists a smaller, yet powerful literature contending 
that this is overstressed.  For example, Ram (1999) used a sample of 95 countries, finding 
that the correlation is weakly negative or negligible.  A number of other studies have 
been able to show that causality does not always run from finance to growth, with results 
being found that the direction of causality can also run in the reverse direction (Ang & 
McKibbin, 2007; Arestis & Demetriades, 1997; Demetriades & Hussein, 1996).  The 
results provided by Arestis, Demetriades, and Luintel (2001) of banks being more 
effective in promoting economic growth—and arguing that the effects of stock markets 
on growth have been exaggerated by cross country studies—sets the stage for the first 
essay evaluating the impact of opening a stock market. 
The three papers of my dissertation evaluate, theoretically and empirically, how 
certain elements of financial development achieve their aims.  The first essay, “Stock 
Markets and Growth: A Re-Evaluation,” fits into the literature evaluating whether stock 
markets are effective in promoting growth, finding insufficient evidence in support of the 
claims that the simple act of opening a stock market increases growth.   The second 
essay, “Schumpeterian Innovation and Equity Issuance,” furthers the first essay by 
evaluating particular circumstances where firms chose to raise funds through the stock 
market rather than bank channels.  This is completed by presenting theory and evidence 
for the hypothesis that stock markets are more often used by firms in innovative 





Credit and Unequal Access,” further evaluates the types of financial institutions most 
effective in facilitating growth.  This is evaluated by using two new variables on the level 
of access to financial services regressed on the most widely used metric of financial 
development, private credit to GDP ratio.  The robust results lend support for my 
hypothesis that higher levels of unequal access to finance leads to lower levels of private 
credit. 
 
1.1 Stock Markets and Growth: A Re-Evaluation 
Building on the large body of literature stressing the importance of developing 
financial markets, including stock markets, to enhance countries’ growth, the first essay 
of this dissertation evaluates the link between the simple act of opening a stock market 
and economic growth.  I argue that the relationship between stock markets and growth is 
exaggerated and that the simple act of opening a formal stock market is not a good 
predictor of whether a country will experience economic growth.  While it is possible that 
in some instances opening a stock market can influence growth, I do not find any 
evidence that opening a stock market will have a broad impact. 
This research uses two Bayesian econometric methods, Extreme Bounds Analysis 
(EBA) and Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), to discover if there are meaningful links 
between opening a stock market and growth in developing economies.  Superior to 
traditional cross-sectional regressions, these methodologies allow for determining the true 
impact of certain variables.  The impact of opening a stock market is tested by regressing 
growth between 2002 and 2007 on stock market openings between 1960 and 1999.  





negative, relationship between the opening of a stock market and growth in developing 
countries.   
 This essay finds that, on average, opening a stock market does not have any 
influence on growth, but does not show that stock markets will never influence growth.  
Stock markets may be more effective in countries with certain underlying characteristics.  
Intuitively, I believe that countries with higher levels of innovation will have conditions 
more amenable to an effective stock market.  As such, determining when firms use stock 
markets to finance their activities is necessary.  The second essay of the dissertation 
further evaluates this issue by positing that firms raise capital differently over the 
Schumpeterian innovation life-cycle. 
 
1.2. Schumpeterian Innovation and Equity Issuance 
I hypothesize that highly innovative firms—those with high risk, yet higher 
potential return—will be more likely to raise funds through stock markets than bond 
issuance.  Using the Schumpeterian innovation life-cycle as a theoretical framework, I 
argue that in the beginning, a company with a radically new innovation is more likely to 
raise funds through equity issuance until it becomes an acceptable loan for bankers with a 
limited return (interest rate).  This is all placed within the context of, and does not 
conflict with, the dominant theories of firms’ capital structure: the Trade-Off, Market 
timing, and Pecking Order Models. 
Empirically, I test this relationship of innovative activity to equity issuance by 
using patents as a proxy for innovation from a dataset covering the 1970 to 1992, 





market.  This independent variable is then regressed on the ratio of funds raised through 
equity to total funds raised. I find statistically significant evidence using a dichotomous, 
probit model that the industries with higher innovative/patenting activities are 
significantly more likely to raise funds through stock market issuance than firms without 
innovative activity.   
The opening of a stock market is a distinct change in development; other changes 
in financial development are much more subtle.  The measurement of financial 
development is difficult; as such, we as economists have created a number of metrics.  
The widest used variable in recent research is the private credit to GDP ratio.  This 
variable has grown to being used as synonymous with financial development when 
evaluating the impacts of financial development on economic growth and other human 
development indicators such as inequality and poverty.  Causality issues aside, it is 
important to understand the underlying elements of this widely used variable.  As such, 
the third essay of this dissertation revisits Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) on the 
determinants of private credit by evaluating the equality of access to financial services. 
 
1.3. Private Credit and Unequal Access 
Building on the numerous studies evaluating how financial development affects 
economic growth, it is then important to understand important characteristics of financial 
development.  One such characteristic of financial development is the level of access to 
financial institutions; increasing the level of access to financial institutions should 
increase the level of credit in the economy.  In addition to access’ impact on credit, the 





Global Financial Index database from the World Bank, this is able to be empirically 
tested for the first time.  An additional contribution of this piece is through the 
construction of a new variable measuring the distribution of access among income 
groups.  This differs from the traditional measurement of access as being the percentage 
of the population with accounts at financial institutions; my constructed metric is able to 
measure the percentage difference between having accounts at formal financial 
institutions between income groups. 
 The empirical section of this essay follows the model specifications as set forth by 
Djankov et al. (2007), using the same control and explanatory variables with private 
credit set as the dependent variable.  Each individual model specification is identical, 
only adding the two access to finance variables.  Essentially, I am able to replicate the 
results of Djankov et al., although the access variables begin to dominate the results of 
the other control variables, indicating that access is an important element behind the 
growth of the financial sector.  While determining the exact institutional structure to 
influence the accessibility is beyond the scope of this essay, it is evident that bringing the 
poor into the formal financial sector is an important policy choice.  The idea of promoting 
an inclusive financial sector would imply that opening a stock market would be 
unnecessary as the poor do not typically purchase common stock. 
 Within the topic of financial development, the three essays of this dissertation 
evaluate a separate issue in order to help determine the ideal policies for developing the 
financial sector of the economy.  As will be seen, each of these essays substantially 
contributes toward our understanding of macro level financial reforms in developing 





to financial services is irrelevant for an effective functioning stock market.  If opening a 
stock market was the gateway to economic growth, we would have found that 
formulating policies targeting the elite in the economy would be an ideal policy.  
However, we find the opposite result in that the equality of access matters and that simply 
opening a stock market is not enough to guarantee economic growth.  Each of these 
essays opens the door for future research into effective ways to form financial sector 
policies.  These avenues of future research will be discussed in the concluding remarks. 
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There is a large body of literature stressing the importance of developing financial 
markets, including stock markets, to enhance countries’ growth rates.  A number of 
empirical studies have come up with conflicting evidence as to how effective stock 
markets are in facilitating economic growth.  Dominant economic theory posits that a 
stock market more efficiently allocates capital to productive projects.  I argue that this 
relationship between stock markets and growth is exaggerated and that the simple act of 
opening a formal stock market is not a good predictor of whether a country will 
experience economic growth.   
This is evaluated using two Bayesian econometric methods, Extreme Bounds 
Analysis (EBA) and Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), to discover if there are 
meaningful links between opening a stock market and growth.  In light of the conflicting 
results using classical econometric techniques, these Bayesian methodologies are able to 
reduce the uncertainty inherent in estimating any relationship.  The impact of opening a 
stock market is tested by regressing growth between 2002 and 2007 on stock market 





studies. While it is possible that in some instances opening a stock market can influence 
growth, I do not find any evidence that opening a stock market has any impact. 
 
2.2. Introduction 
 There exists a large body of research on the relationship between finance and 
growth; much of this points to a positive relationship, where more developed financial 
markets are found in countries with higher levels of growth.  The McKinnon-Shaw 
(Gurley & Shaw, 1955; McKinnon, 1973) hypothesis posits that efficient financial 
markets are able to mobilize savings and allocate capital to the productive sectors of the 
economy, therefore facilitating growth.  That finance causes growth has been empirically 
displayed a number of times using different datasets and econometric methodologies 
(Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1996; Levine, 1991; Minier, 2009).  The basic policy advice 
coming from this theoretical and empirical literature is to develop financial markets and 
watch the economy grow.  However, not all researchers are convinced that the 
relationship is as clear cut or that the direction of causality is accurate (Lucas, 1988; 
Ram, 1999; Rousseau & Wachtel, 2005).  Joan Robinson posited that financial services 
act as a response to economic conditions, where markets will develop in order to 
accommodate a growing economy (Robinson, 1952).  While it is acknowledged that 
efficient financial markets help to facilitate transfers of capital to productive sectors, the 
narrower impact of stock markets is not so certain.  Stock markets facilitate funds 
transfers to a different set of companies and investors than banking channels do.  The 
operation of a stock market may not provide a net benefit if banks are able to provide the 





between stock markets and growth is exaggerated and that opening a stock market is not 
a good predictor of whether an economy will grow.   
On the heels of the financial development literature and the dominant ideology of 
the liberalization of capital and trade accounts, policy prescriptions pushed the opening of  
stock markets.  These recommendations precipitated the large number of openings during 
the 1990s, as shown in Figure 2.1.  That so many stock market openings occurred in the 
1990s out of distinct policy changes is indicative that these openings were not driven by 
economic growth.  The dominant ideology of the period was that the absence of a stock 
market hindered growth opportunities that could be partially solved by the opening of a 
formal exchange.  The number of openings during this period provides a natural 
experiment in the effect that if stock markets do cause economic growth, the periods 
subsequent to the openings should be accompanied by per capita growth.  For this reason, 
I am empirically testing whether the act of opening a stock market has had a subsequent 
impact on the economies of various countries.   
 In empirically testing whether the simple act of opening a stock market influences 
growth, I use two complimentary Bayesian methodologies—Extreme Bounds Analysis 
(EBA) and Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA).  EBA is a global sensitivity analysis able 
to determine the precise bounds a variable can take based on a given dataset.  This is a 
robustness check in that many variables can have coefficient values that are both positive 
and negative.  Knowing the bounds allows for the conclusion that, given a dataset, some 
variables will always carry a positive or negative coefficient.  If a variable has bounds 
that do not cover zero, there is no question as to its relationship.  BMA compliments this 





over use of certain variables, or combination of variables, in model specifications.  To 
alleviate some of the uncertainty, BMA computes the probability that a particular model 
will be the best model given the dataset.  Then, based on the models selected, BMA takes 
a weighted average to find the posterior distributions of the variables.  Rather than 
relying on T-statistics, BMA assigns the probabilities that variables are statistically 
different from zero.  Ranging from zero for a variable that does not appear in any model 
specification to one for a variable in every selected model, the variables considered to be 
more important in the determination of the dependent variable will have higher posterior 
probabilities.    
The empirical results of this paper are straightforward.  I find little evidence that 
the act of opening a stock market has any influence on growth.  This result holds with the 
use of each of the estimation methodologies.  The values of opening a stock market are 
fragile with extreme bounds falling on both sides of zero.  BMA finds that the two 
measures of stock markets have posterior probabilities of 0.0 and are not statistically 
different from zero.  In fact, BMA does not select either variable to be included in any of 
the top models selected. Neither methodology is able to find any evidence that the 
opening of a stock market has any influence on growth. 
The essay is organized first by discussing the theoretical and empirical literature 
on broadly measured financial development, followed by a targeted discussion on the 
impacts of stock markets on growth.  The empirical section follows with a detailed 
explanation of the Bayesian techniques used, presenting evidence that the impact of 






2.3. Finance-Growth Nexus 
Early theorists, such as Gurley and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969), and 
McKinnon (1973) (formulating what is known as the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis), 
argued that a developed financial sector is a crucial element in economic growth.  The 
process of channeling funds from surplus units with excess capital to deficit units in need 
of capital should lead to increased productivity and growth.  The McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis argues that an underdeveloped financial sector will constrain growth since 
entrepreneurs with profitable opportunities would be unable to access the capital 
necessary to grow their company, leaving numerous growth opportunities unexplored.  
Hicks (1969) argument is similar in that within development, the financing of innovative 
technologies is crucial, but requires an illiquid investment with higher risks to investors.  
The introduction of efficient financial markets has the effect of lower costs of financing 
these enterprises through increasing liquidity, resulting in higher levels of capital 
available to entrepreneurs.  Lessening financial constraints for technologically advanced 
firms will lead to increased productivity and growth. 
Extending the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, further benefits of financial 
development have been identified and synthesized into three main functions.  These are 
to allocate resources, mobilize savings, and reduce risks.  Tobin and Brainard (1963) 
argued that well-functioning financial systems will lead to a more effective allocation of 
capital.  In efficient capital markets, investors are better able to evaluate investments, 
thereby allowing entrepreneurs the ability to access capital at more favorable terms.  This 
allocative efficiency is attained through the ability of financial intermediaries to obtain 





Wicksell (1935) theorized that financial markets play the important role of matchmaker 
between savers and borrowers.  The savings of individual households are typically not 
enough to fund large projects, so financial intermediaries have the ability to pool capital, 
making the entire aggregated amount available for lending.  Many profitable investments 
require long-term commitment, but many investors are wary of tying their capital up for 
long periods of time.  Whereas an underdeveloped financial system would require 
investors to invest over the long run, developed and liquid financial markets allow 
investors the ability to liquidate their investment in the event they need cash quickly.  
Liquid financial markets allow for the long-term financing of projects with short-term 
capital. 
 Building on the early theoretical literature on the finance-growth nexus, empirical 
studies emerged in earnest in the 1990s.  Prominent work by King and Levine (1993) 
supports the view that financial development positively influences growth, controlling for 
other factors that affect long-run growth.  This study focused on banking variables, 
including credit to the private sector divided by GDP, to proxy for the level of financial 
development, and setting the dependent variable as economic growth.  Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998) extend this by showing that countries with more efficient legal 
systems will have more firms using funds from financial institutions.  In an environment 
with an effective legal system and well-functioning financial markets, the countries 
experienced higher levels of productivity of capital, facilitating firm growth.  The 
empirical work on countries’ legal origins positively influencing financial development 





(Levine 1998, 1999), time series (Djankov et al. 2007), and dynamic panel (Beck and 
Levine 2002, 2004; Levine, Loayza & Beck, 2000) methodologies. 
While the relationship between finance and growth was becoming well known, 
the early studies did a poor job of correcting for endogeneity; the assessment of causality 
was setting up cross-sectional regressions and concluding that the explanatory variables 
caused changes in the dependent variable.  Thus the need to account for endogeneity 
issues was accomplished first through the use of instrumental variables.  Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (2002) and Levine (2002) find, using legal structure as an instrumental 
variable, that the development of financial markets influences the level of economic 
growth.  Both studies’ results did not provide different results for firms’ access from 
either a bank or market-based financial system; it did not matter what the primary source 
of financing is, but rather how developed the financial systems are.  Strengthening the 
results, a number of studies assessing the causality have arisen using time series models.  
For example, Choe and Moosa (1999), using VARs and Granger causality, found that 
causality runs from financial development to Growth during the period 1970–1992 in 
Korea.  This result primarily supported the role of financial intermediaries rather than 
capital markets.   
While a large amount of literature finds a positive relationship between financial 
development and economic growth, not all researchers share this opinion.  A number of 
studies propose that there are specific conditions where financial development will 
positively influence growth.  Rousseau and Wachtel (2002), using a fixed effects panel 
model, found that in countries with high inflation, financial development does not seem 





under 8%, the effects of financial development are significantly positive; conversely, 
when inflation rates are above 13%, there does not appear to be a relationship, while 
inflation rates in between are ambiguous.  Rioja and Valev (2004) found that financial 
development’s influence depends on how developed the countries are when 
implementing the reforms.  Using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model, 
Rioja and Valev divide their sample of 74 countries into three groups based on their 
starting level of financial development.  Their findings indicate that finance has a robust 
positive impact on countries that are already well developed, while an ambiguous 
relationship exists in less developed countries.  These threshold results are also found by 
Deidda and Fattouh (2002) regarding the level of per capita income.  With the full 80 
country sample, a positive relationship between financial development and economic 
growth is found.  However, financial development appears to only influence growth in 
wealthier countries, but not in low income countries.  These results all present evidence 
that financial development is not a blanket solution that helps every country in every 
situation; they highlight that there are circumstances where financial development may be 
beneficial and others when it is not. 
In light of the studies finding that finance is not a blanket solution to development 
problems, a number of researchers contend that financial development is irrelevant, 
having no influence on growth.  A famous example is the Robert Lucas comment that 
finance is “very badly overstressed” and “is not inclined to be apologetic” for its 
exclusion from his growth model (Lucas, 1988, p. 6).  This opinion is empirically 
supported by Ram (1999) who, in using a sample of 95 countries, finds that the 





There were also similar findings when separating the countries by income cohorts as well 
as grouping the countries according to growth rates.  Extending the research contesting 
that financial development may not be the gateway to growth, Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2005) examine the relationship between financial depth and economic growth using 
cross sectional and panel data for 84 countries between 1960 and 2003.  Three different 
measures of financial depth were used, with the updated time period not presenting as 
robust of findings as earlier studies. Their principle finding is that while the relationship 
may have existed through the early 1990s, it appears to have diminished in the later 
periods.  The authors compared the relationship between finance and growth to the 
Phillips Curve, where an observed relationship was believed to be an empirical regularity 
before the relationship disintegrated.  These conclusions were to act as a reminder that 
the correlations between finance and growth may well represent cross-country differences 
rather than a causal relationship. 
Although a statistical relationship between finance and growth may exist, some 
theorists question the direction of causality.  Joan Robinson contended that finance does 
not lead growth, but rather that financial systems act in response to economic conditions 
(Robinson, 1952).  As the economy is expanding, firms and households will have more 
demand for financial services, which will be provided by profit-seeking financial 
institutions.  A number of other studies have been able to show that causality does not 
always run from finance to growth, with results being found that the direction of causality 
can also run in the reverse direction (Ang & McKibbin, 2007; Demetriades & Hussein, 
1996; Demetriades & Luintel, 1996).  Arestis and Demetriades (1997) find that causality 





runs from financial development to growth, while the opposite result was found for the 
United States for the period 1979 to 1991. 
 
2.4. Stock Markets and Growth 
Where many of the above studies evaluate the link between financial development 
and growth, our concern is specifically related to how—and whether—stock markets can 
facilitate economic growth.  The theoretical basis behind the introduction of stock 
markets largely follows the McKinnon-Shaw argument behind the development of 
financial markets.  Specifically, the opening of a stock market will increasingly allocate 
capital for long-run investments with short-run capital due to the ease with which 
investors are able to remove their investment.  This should effectively reduce transaction 
costs, increase capital accumulation, and lead to higher levels of economic growth.  
Building on the early theoretical work on the relationship between finance and growth, 
Levine (1991) expands the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis to specifically model stock 
markets’ impact on per capita growth.  This model is able to demonstrate that stock 
markets help to facilitate technological innovation and economic growth through an easy 
transfer of ownership that does not disrupt the productive capabilities or cash flows of 
firms.  Levine emphasizes the positive impact of stock market liquidity on long-run 
growth, empirically showing that taxes on stock market transactions are associated with 
lower economic growth.   
Atje and Jovanovic (1993) have similar findings in that stock markets are 
associated with higher income levels as well as positive economic growth effects.  This 





effective are stock markets as similar growth effects were not observed for bank lending.  
These empirical results were performed in a similar manner to Levine (1991), evaluating 
liquidity for a sample of 94 countries with annual observations during the period 1960–
1985.  Levine and Zervos (1998) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) expand the sample 
size of the earlier studies and, using different econometric techniques, come to similar 
conclusions as the earlier studies.  Both papers show that stock market liquidity and 
banking development can predict growth levels.  On the other hand, neither study was 
able to find evidence that stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP has a 
relationship with growth.  Levine and Zervos (1998) were also unable to find evidence 
that any of the financial indicators used had any relation with private savings rates, 
concluding that the data showed that stock markets play a different role than banks.  
Acknowledging that banks and stock markets play different roles, Arestis et al. (2001) 
finds that both stock markets and banks are able to promote economic growth.  However, 
using a time series analysis over the period 1972–1998, the authors find that the stock 
market provides relatively little impact on growth as compared to that received from 
banks.  They argue that the impact of stock markets is exaggerated by the use of cross-
country growth regressions. 
Directly assessing the possible endogeneity between stock market development 
and growth, Caporale, Howells, and Soliman (2005) found that causality runs from stock 
markets to growth.  These results were found using Vector Auto-Regression models and 
WALD tests to the effect that growth is influenced through effects on investment 
efficiency.  Bringing capital to the firms in technologically advanced industries with high 





Beck and Levine (2002) support the notion of stock markets’ principle purpose being to 
channel funds to high productivity sectors.  Empirical results showed that a more 
developed financial system is correlated with higher levels of economic growth 
regardless of whether the country’s financial system is bank-based or market-based as 
each type of financial service is designed to accommodate different sectors.  These results 
are also unable to find evidence that stock market capitalization causes higher levels of 
economic growth, concluding that it is not the number of companies listed on the stock 
exchange, but rather it is that the stock market exists.  The size of the stock market is 
irrelevant to growth so long as it is able to facilitate the transfer of capital to the high 
productivity sectors.   
The question of whether it is the size of the stock market or whether its existence 
is the important factor has begun to be addressed in recent years.  Baier, Dwyer, and 
Tamura (2004) evaluated the effect of opening a stock market on productivity growth as 
measured by total factor productivity (TFP) and its subsequent impact on economic 
growth.  They argued that the mechanism through which a stock market influences 
economic growth is not through capital accumulation, but is from changes in the growth 
rate of productivity.  Baier et al. did not find any statistical difference in economic 
growth in the periods before and after the stock market opens.  The support they found 
for opening a stock market is that productivity growth (TFP) increases in the period after 
the opening.  However, they did acknowledge that point estimates suggest that countries 
have slower economic growth after opening an exchange.  Even in the presence of 
conflicting results, they concluded that opening an exchange generates faster productivity 





stock market had on growth, showing a statistically significant positive result of growth 
in the first 5 years after opening a stock market.  This study was conducted by comparing 
growth rates for the 5 years before and after the opening of the stock market.  Enders 
(2004) has shown that such tests are poorly designed because successive values of GDP 
are serially correlated; some of the effects of a pre-stock-market economy could carry 
over to the period after the stock market is opened.  Baier et al. (2004) and Minier (2009) 
provided evidence that the opening of a stock market has a positive impact on 
productivity and growth. 
In contrast to these studies promoting the benefits of opening a stock market, a 
number of researchers have theorized and provided empirical results questioning the 
efficacy of opening a stock market.  The most prominent is that of the destabilizing 
effects of opening a stock market.  Keynes (1936) has argued that stock markets present 
too many speculative opportunities that are not complimentary to a stable, growing 
economy.  Keynes’ view was that stock markets were like a casino in which investors 
placed bets without full knowledge of the underlying components, pushing asset prices 
away from their fundamental value.  After it is realized that these prices are above their 
fundamental value, the readjustment can have serious consequences on the real economy.  
This sentiment is echoed by Kindleberger (1978) where excessive speculation and high 
levels of leverage can cause a mania to occur.  The immediate result is pushing asset 
prices up before a sudden loss of confidence causes a panic in the market where, if not 
controlled, can spiral into a crash.  The instability of financial markets, contend Keynes 
and Kindleberger, can bleed over to the real economy as investors will remove their 





investments.  As such, firms become constrained by not being able to access capital, 
resulting in depressing the economy.  Both felt as though the benefits of stock markets 
may not outweigh the costs to the economy. 
Where many of the studies pointed towards stock markets benefits being 
increased liquidity and the ease with which investors are able to remove their capital, 
Bhide (1993) found increased liquidity in stock markets holds hidden costs.  His findings 
indicated that liquidity discourages internal monitoring because of information 
asymmetry problems.  With a liquid market for a company’s stock, there is little incentive 
for stockholders to monitor the firm’s managers since dissatisfied investors have the 
ability to quickly rid themselves of their holdings at little cost.  That a liquid market 
discourages monitoring by large investors causes a societal drag in that agency costs are 
amplified.  These results were surprising to many, yet were subsequently supported.  
Harris (1997) found that the relationship between stock market activity and growth is 
weak at best for developing countries.  He did find that there is a positive and statistically 
significant result for stock market activity on growth in the developed countries, but he 
“… finds no hard evidence that the level of stock market activity helps to explain growth 
in per capita output” (Harris, 1997, p. 139) for anyone other than the most developed 
countries.  Harris’ sentiments were echoed by Singh (1997), who argued that the 
expansion of stock markets through the 1980s and 1990s in the developing world 
hindered rather than assisted growth and development.  This result insists that the 
opening of a stock market undermined the benefits accrued from removing the financial 





examples of economies that experienced high levels of growth in the absence of a 
functioning stock market.   
 In light of the conflicting evidence on the impacts of opening a stock market, the 
question of whether the simple act of opening a stock market even influences growth is 
not solved.  I hypothesize that the relationship between the simple act of opening a stock 
market and growth is overstressed.  That there was a large number of openings in the 
1990s indicates that these were not “organic” in the sense that this were distinct policy 
choices rather than emerging as Joan Robinson hypothesized that financial systems arise 
out of necessity to accommodate a growing economy.  These were distinct policy choices 
essentially saying “open a stock market, the economy will grow” rather than emerging 
out of a growing economy.  This acts as a natural experiment as we are able to test 
whether these openings have resulted in increased growth for these countries.  I am 
empirically testing whether the countries that opened a stock market had higher rates of 
growth relative to the countries without a stock market.  This will be able to effectively 
test whether it is the presence of a stock market that increases growth. 
 
2.5. Empirical Methodology 
While a number of empirical studies point to a positive relationship between 
financial development and growth, there is a sizable literature contending that the 
relationship is irrelevant at best and negative at worst.  This uncertainty is not 
unsurprising due to the numerous empirical methodologies and datasets that are used in 
the literature.  Bayesian econometric methodologies have arisen to address these issues 





estimates can change, especially considering a total of 2 different specifications are 
possible (where k is the number of explanatory variables).  Since we are uncertain of the 
specific impact of certain variables on our dependent variable, Bayesian statistics assigns 
probabilities.  Changing model specifications can lead to changes in maximum likelihood 
estimates, which is addressed through the generation of models and variables with higher 
posterior probabilities.   
In order to address this uncertainty surrounding the impact of opening a stock 
market on growth in poorer countries, I use two complementary Bayesian methodologies: 
Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) and Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA).  EBA is able 
to compute the range of possible values of maximum likelihood estimation over every 
possible model specification and all specified combinations of explanatory variables.  
Knowing that these extreme bounds (minimum to maximum) cover every possible value 
a coefficient may take, given a set of variables, is a stringent test. In order to “pass,” the 
variable’s bounds must not cover zero, being either strictly negative or positive.  The 
result is that those variables that do pass are statistically different from zero, being 
concluded that this relationship will be different from zero given the data and 
specifications.  BMA is also able to address model uncertainty by averaging over a set of 
Bayesian estimates and assigning posterior probabilities of a specific model being the 
best fit.  BMA then averages the coefficients of variables for the models they appear in.  
These estimates are a posterior distribution, with the posterior mean being the expected 
value (EV) of the variable.  BMA also relies on assessing the posterior probability that 
the variables’ impact is not zero; variables not included in any models are assumed to 





I estimate an empirical growth model paying special attention to the impact of 
stock market openings. Levine and Renelt (1992) examined the empirical work on 
growth using a new (at the time) procedure known as Extreme Bounds Analysis to test 
for robustness on the empirics of the growth literature.  Results from these estimations 
were that most variables were fragile, only finding two robust correlations with growth: 
share of investment in GDP and ratio of international trade to GDP.  Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
acknowledged the benefits of the approach, but provided strong criticisms, saying “…the 
test is too strong for any variable to pass it….Thus, giving the label of non-robust to all 
variables is all but guaranteed.”  (Sala-i-Martin, 1997, p.179) He then averaged over two 
million regressions a likelihood-weighted sum of normal cumulative distribution 
functions.  This rudimentary approach was the predecessor of Sala-i-Martin, 
Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004), which used a model averaging approach known as 
Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE).  This process takes the Bayesian 
concept of averaging across models and combines it with classical OLS estimations.  
Adding to the literature on Bayesian estimations of growth theory is Fernandez, Ley, and 
Steel (2001), who used Bayesian Model Averaging to confirm the conclusions of Sala-i-
Martin (1997) in that some variables are robust, having some explanatory power, rather 
than the limited conclusions of Levine and Renelt (1992).  Applying BMA to the Sala-i-
Martin dataset reduced much of the uncertainty of the initial estimates. Fernandez went 
substantially further as clear interpretations of the data were able to be inferred. 
This paper takes a purely Bayesian approach, combining the well-known 
techniques used by Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004).  Where my 





classical estimations with BACE, I use Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) which 
averages over Bayesian estimates.  BACE is derived from this purely Bayesian technique 
of BMA and is typically used when presenting to those not familiar with Bayesian 
techniques.  The reason for the divergence is that BMA is better equipped to handle 
model uncertainty.  Additionally, the strength of statistical packages (R) in recent years 
has allowed for the creation of detailed image plots for a more intuitive presentation of 
the results.  Given the Sala-i-Martin (1997) criticisms discussed earlier of the Extreme 
Bounds approach, it is still a useful tool and, combined with BMA, presents a compelling 
way to view the data.  If a variable is robust with bounds that do not cover zero, it is then 
absolutely certain of the direction of correlation.  This combination of techniques uses 
EBA to test for robustness and BMA for assessing “importance.”  There are numerous 
studies evaluating the determinants of growth, but I make no attempt at reconciling them.  
While some results are presented on the relationships between certain indicators and 
growth, the impact of this paper is the determination of whether the simple act of opening 
a stock market can positively influence growth.   
 
2.5.1. Extreme Bounds Analysis 
 The variations in empirical results summarized in the literature above are not 
surprising.  Econometric analyses often differ due to varying data, model selection, or 
statistical techniques.  In this paper, I begin with a global sensitivity analysis as 
introduced by Leamer (1978, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1997).   Extreme Bounds Analysis 
(EBA) is a Bayesian methodology of global sensitivity analysis able to compute the range 





computing the extreme values using maximum likelihood estimation procedures under all 
possible combinations of variables in the dataset.  EBA computes coefficients for all 
possible linear combinations for a set of variables; the extreme bounds are the maximum 
and minimum posterior mean estimates.  This methodology is a rigorous test of 
robustness as few variables are able to survive and show a definitive impact.  EBA 
computes the possible bounds for the posterior mean for a normal linear regression 
model, given by the standard equation: 
 
Y = Xβ + ε           (2.1) 
 
 In this equation, the X matrix contains the variables to be included in the model 
specification.  In EBA parlance, these variables are referred as being “free” variables.   
Free variables are those that are not properly specified and not associated with a prior 
specification.  These variables are those that would typically be included in a model 
specification.  These would be the list of variables that would be reported in the final 
results, while showing combinations within this set.  This X matrix would also 
necessarily include the variables of interest in addition to the control variables.  The 
selection of these variables would be to include those variables traditionally used in a 
classical model specification within the literature. 
As with any model specification, the selection of variables is subject to debate as 
any combination of variables (sometimes selected in a seemingly arbitrary way) can be 
used.  However, there always exist additional variables that could be included in a model 





variable on the dependent variable will be precisely zero.   In this way, all regressions use 
priors; excluding a variable from a model essentially says that the econometrician 
believes the variable is not important and will not be considered to have an impact.  The 
problem is that some of these variables can alter the impact of variables in the X matrix 
on the dependent variables.  EBA is able to account for the range of values the 
explanatory variables will have on the dependent variable.  The variables that are 
typically dropped in a model specification are referred to as “doubtful” variables and are 
added to the standard linear regression as the Z matrix. 
 
Y = Xβ + ZГ + ε          (2.2) 
 
Interest is in the set of β coefficients, but the selection of variables in the Z matrix 
are able to influence the range with which B values are able to take.  The choice of a set 
of Z variables, called “doubtful” variables, allows for the calculation of the extreme 
posterior values for the coefficients associated with the X variables. That sets of variables 
(Z) might be dropped from a regression induces a coherent prior, rather than an improper 
prior for free variables, on the coefficient vector, Г.  Whereas in traditional cross-
sectional specifications we would just drop these variables, they are still included as 
doubtful variables to see their influence on the free variables.  Setting a variable to 
doubtful is a twist on proper prior specification by setting the prior mean equal to zero, 
representing the belief that these variables could be dropped from the model 





variables’ extreme posterior means would necessarily include zero.  For this reason, the 
variables of interest must always be free; otherwise, they would never pass. 
With a large number of explanatory variables there are an exponentially large 
number of doubtful/free combinations.  As such, we group variables into various 
categories according to our prior beliefs about their impact.  The combinations would 
start with including only the variables of interest as the free variables, with all others set 
as doubtful.  This will give the widest bounds as the combination of explanatory variables 
is the greatest.  The other combinations would be to include a set of variables that are 
typically included in a classical estimation as free.  There are circumstances where debate 
about the types of variables are most important arise; a solution with EBA would be to 
use one set of variables as free, with the others doubtful in one specification and 
switching these around for the next.  Using every possible combination of variables is 
cumbersome and unwieldy, so the selection of variables must be reduced to a reasonable 
number. 
 
2.5.2. BMA Overview 
 The second estimation procedure used is Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) as 
discussed by Raftery, Painter, and Volinsky (2005) and Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, and 
Volinsky (1999).  Since EBA provides the bounds a coefficient can take, BMA quantifies 
the value of many different models to compute the posterior distributions to help select 
the best models.  These Bayesian methodologies are complementary in that one checks 
and verifies robustness, while the other ranks models according to their explanatory 





selection.  This uncertainty can lead to misspecification errors and erroneous conclusions.  
A major issue in the use of linear regression models with ordinary least squares is that the 
inclusion of additional variables is not discounted in the search for a high .  With the 
rise of high computer power and statistical software it becomes possible to run thousands 
of models while adding or subtracting variables until the desired result is discovered (as 
shown by EBA).  In BMA, however, the economist reduces this uncertainty by including 
all variables that could have an impact and allowing an established algorithm to select the 
most appropriate models. 
Utilizing the leaps and bounds algorithm developed by Raftery et al. (2005), the 
exponential number of models is reduced to a workable model space.  Leaps and bounds 
returns a set of the best models that are then ranked according to their Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC).  These models that make it in the set of best models are 
assigned posterior probabilities of being the best model out of the set.  Those ranked 
higher, with lower BIC values, receive higher posterior probabilities.  The variables 
included in these models are assigned posterior probabilities of being included in the best 
models, with coefficients being the posterior distributions.  This differs greatly from the 
traditional quest for statistical significance in that rather than arbitrarily adding or 
subtracting variables, the established algorithm chooses the most representative models.   
Underlying BMA is the desire to average over all possible models.  However, the 
computations required to perform the exponential number of computations is unwieldy 
and was long limited by computing power.  Two difficulties for the implementation of 
BMA arise; the first involves computing the integrated likelihood function, which is 





models, which is exponentially large.  The first computational problem is solved by using 
the BIC approximation that does not rely on difficulty to compute high dimensional 
integral, while the second is corrected by the leaps and bounds algorithm.  It is 
unnecessary to compute the models that stand no chance of being the best model.  Thus 
arose the need to reduce the number of models into a workable set, rather than the 
exponentially large number of models to average across.  Reducing the models is 
accomplished by the fast leaps and bounds algorithm as introduced by Furnival and 
Wilson (1974), and made applicable to BMA by Raftery (1995).   
Once the models have been narrowed down, selection of the best models comes 
by way of using the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC).  This process is similar to 
evaluation by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) but differs in that the penalty for 
adding variables under BMA is much less than under AIC.  The following equation gives 
the calculation for BIC where  is the value of the computed  and is the number of 
independent variables regressed on model k.   
 
 = 
log1 −  +	log
           (2.3) 
 
Adding variables is discounted in BMA as the models are penalized for adding 
explanatory variables and rewards models with better explanatory power.  The lower the 
value of BIC, the better the data fit, with the best model having the lowest BIC.  Ranking 
the models according to BIC solves the primary problem of computing integrals in 
multiple dimensions.  After the reduction of the model space and ranking of models 





the data the best.  For those things we are uncertain about, we assign probabilities.  As 
such, we are able to compute posterior probabilities that a particular model will be the 
best. 
In a BMA analysis, there are two posterior probabilities that are computed.  The 
first is the probability that a particular model specification will be the best, while the 
second is the probability that a specific variable will be in the model that tells the best 
story.  Posterior probabilities of being the best model are calculated as 
 
∆| = 	∑  ∆|,|    (2.4) 
 
where ∆ is the unknown quantity of our dependent variable and	 is a given matrix of 
available data.  ∆|, is the posterior distribution of ∆ given the model  and  
| is the posterior probability that  provides the best fit.  BMA determines this 
posterior distribution of ∆ as a weighted average of the posterior distributions of the 
models.  The models with the lowest BIC will have the highest posterior probabilities 
down to the lowest probabilities being assigned to the lowest ranked model in the reduced 
leaps and bounds model space. 
 Once the posterior probabilities of the models being the best fit have been 
calculated, BMA computes the posterior probabilities of the individual variables.  The 
computations are the probability that the coefficient attached to the variable is not zero.  
The higher this value is, the higher the likelihood that the variable differs from zero.  
Variables with posterior probabilities of 100% are included in every model.  The 





probabilities the variables are included in.  Variables with posterior probabilities equal to 
zero are not included in any models and, with the employed data set, cannot be concluded 
to have much of an effect on the dependent variable.  The expected values of the 
coefficients are referred to as the posterior mean, which is a weighted average of the 
posterior means from each model.  These values are weighted by their posterior 
probabilities, where those with a higher likelihood of being in the best model carry a 
higher weight on the posterior mean.  For variables with little impact, these posterior 
distributions will be centered on zero.  The lower the posterior probability, the higher the 
likelihood is that the variables impact will have no effect on the dependent variable.  For 
the variables that are statistically different from zero, the density of the coefficients 
should fall on either side of zero.  The standard deviation provides for a level of 
confidence that the distribution is significantly different from zero.  If a one standard 
deviation change from the posterior mean does not cover zero and the variable has a high 
posterior probability, it can be considered an important indicator. 
 
2.6. Data 
If stock markets are able to promote, or stall, growth, the opening of a stock 
market should see subsequent changes in growth rates.  The conditions through the 1980s 
and 1990s that saw a large number of stock markets open was a distinct change in 
sentiments rather than emerging out of a growing country’s need for additional financial 
services.  As such, this natural experiment allows for the empirical testing of whether a 
stock market impacts growth.  In formally testing my hypothesis that opening a stock 





methodologies.  I use a dataset with 82 countries and 32 independent variables that are 
typically found in the finance-growth literature.  This dataset will serve both EBA and 
BMA methodologies.  Stock markets have been hypothesized to be able to increase 
growth through a number of mechanisms and should be accompanied by a permanent 
increase in growth.  The absence of differences in annual growth rates would be 
indicative that just opening a stock market is not enough to cause growth.  Conversely, a 
negative relationship would provide evidence that the speculative costs of stock markets 
outweigh the benefits.   
The dependent variable in this study is the average annual per capita GDP growth 
rate between 2002 and 2007 as measured in 2000 US Dollars.  This time period was 
chosen to smooth any fluctuations and to give time between the last openings of the 
sample in 1999 and the start of the growth period in 2002.  The time spacing was 
necessary as there may be a lag between the time a market opens and increases in 
financial activity will extend over to economic growth.   
Using two variables—Stock.Dummy and Years.Open—I am able to estimate the 
impact of opening a stock market on growth.  Stock.Dummy is a dummy variable equal to 
one if a stock market is present and zero if not.  This simplistic measure is able to test the 
simple question of whether the existence of a stock market accelerates growth.  It is 
necessary to include countries that do not currently have a stock market as a control 
group.  There are 59 countries identified that have opened a stock market between 1960 
and 2000.  36 countries that do not currently have a stock market have been included as a 
control group, for a total of 95 countries as shown in Table 2.1. Because of limitations on 





Although the simplistic dummy variable should be enough to assess whether the 
presence of a stock market causes a permanent increase in growth, there is likely a lag 
between the time a stock market is opened and growth is impacted.  Years.Open is a 
measure counting the number of years the stock market has been open in 2010.  Countries 
without a stock market have a value of zero.  In this way, we place a higher weight on 
stock markets that have been open longer.  Of the countries with a stock market, the 
lowest number of years open is 11 since the cutoff for inclusion of opening a stock 
market was the year 2000.  The implicit assumption is that the longer a stock market has 
been open, the more of an impact it is able to have as funds get channeled through the 
real economy.  The longer the market has been open, the more time it has had to cause a 
permanent shift.  If the existence of a stock market influences growth, positively or 
negatively, one of these two variables should play a significant role in the regressions. 
The existing growth literature has discovered a large number of variables with 
significant effects on growth.  These were then narrowed by selecting the variables with 
the widest availability across countries and highest reliability, resulting in 30 control 
variables.  Variables used in this model are closely related to those used in the growth 
literature, but may be specified slightly differently.  Variable descriptions are shown in 
Table 2.2 and take into account such issues as property rights, human capital, 
infrastructure, and monetary assets and flows.   
As with any econometric exercise, there is always room for debate about whether 
the correct variables were used; it is possible there are considerations that influence 
growth that could have been excluded.   Some specific variables that have been suggested 





development that would have been able to be used, but many of these could have masked 
the effects of stock markets.   Specifically, aggregated measures of financial 
development, such as private credit/GDP or Liquid Liabilities/GDP are influenced by 
stock markets and would be inappropriate for use because of the possibility of masking 
the effects of stock markets.  It was also decided not to use any of a number of metrics on 
bond markets because of the purpose of this study being to evaluate the impact of 
opening a stock market.  While tempting to use variables related to stock market 
development (liquidity or stock market capitalization), the choice was made to exclude 
these as they would detract from the purpose of defining the contribution of opening a 
stock market.  If the existence of a stock market is what is important, as argued by Beck 
and Levine (2002), the opening of a stock market should be accompanied by 
subsequently higher levels of growth.   
 
2.7. Results 
2.7.1. EBA Results 
 The combinations of free and doubtful variables have been broken into: a 
social/political set where these social and political effects can be captured as free 
variables; a financial set that sets the financial variables as free with the others as 
doubtful; and one with both the stock market dummy and years open set as free with the 
others set as doubtful.  The reason for running multiple EBA estimates is to check for 
robustness and to address the possibility of not including adequate variables.  In our 
search for the value of a particular parameter, we first wish to know the direction of 





arises as to the value generated.  The free variables whose bounds do not cover zero are 
robust in that the coefficient will always have the same sign regardless of how the model 
is specified. 
 The EBA model uses all 32 of the independent variables as discussed in the above 
section and summarized in Table 2.3.  Where there is not an entry in the table the variable 
was set as doubtful, while each value reported is set as a free variable.  Those variables 
that are robust and do not cover zero have bolded results in the table.  These variables 
include: GDP in 1992, life expectancy, rural population, government effectiveness, 
export index, expected levels of schooling, and the Human Development Index.  To 
development scholars, the fact that these variables are robust should not be a surprise.  
What may be surprising to some is the direction of these coefficients.  Life.Expect and 
Exp.School are both negatively robust; indicating that as schooling and life span increase, 
growth is expected to decrease.  Additionally, percentage of population living in rural 
areas (Rural.Pop) carries a positive value, indicating that highly urbanized countries have 
lower growth rates. 
One interpretation behind these results is that controlling for the level of HDI, the 
negative coefficients attached to education and life expectancy could indicate an 
unbalanced HDI.  For example, if HDI remains constant and education levels were to 
rise, life expectancy would necessarily drop.  In economies with unbalanced HDIs one 
indicator would be significantly larger than the others.  When a scenario where education 
is outstanding, but with lackluster per capita income and life expectancy, the economy 
would be unable to leverage the higher levels of education and face bottlenecks from the 





of study and with more data availability in the future, research could further address and 
quantify the discrepancies between human development and growth. 
Outside the explanation given by the individual factors of HDI being included in 
the same models, there is the possibility of poorer countries “catching up.”  This would 
provide support for convergence as theorized by Solow (1956) and supported by Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992).  These theories posit that poorer countries will have faster 
growth rates because they have the ability to use production techniques pioneered in the 
developed world and that diminishing returns to capital and labor are not as strong as 
they are in rich countries.  The coefficients attached to education, life expectancy, and 
rural population are characteristics of poor countries and can be attributed to this catching 
up factor. 
Each of the models shows that while the bounds may vary, they will always cover 
zero.  Although fragile, the maximum likelihood estimate for both is negative, indicating 
a weak result that opening a stock market is associated with lower levels of economic 
growth.  This is especially evident in Model 2 as the positive values are only generated 
far into the tail.  Knowing that these variables can generate a coefficient in any direction 
warrants a fuller investigation into their effect on growth; Bayesian Model Averaging is 
able to quantify the impact. 
 
2.7.2. BMA Results 
The 32 explanatory variables included in this model can yield 2 
(4,294,967,296) total models.  Even having the “right” dataset may not yield an accurate 





economists are unsure of other economists’ results and why procedures such as BMA 
have arisen.  The model presented in this paper attempts to objectively quantify the 
elements important in accelerating growth.  The results of BMA return the top 73 models 
narrowed by leaps and bounds; Table 2.4 displays the top five models.  The p!=0 column 
is the posterior probability of that variable being included in the model, EV is the BMA 
posterior mean, and SD is the posterior standard deviation of each variable.  The values 
for , BIC, and the posterior probability for each model being the best model are shown 
on the bottom of Table 2.4.  The higher the posterior probability, the higher the likelihood 
the impact of the variables is not zero.  The coefficients on each model can vary widely, 
and therein lies the averaging portion of BMA; the expected value of the mean (EV) is 
computed by a weighted average of each coefficient and the posterior probability when 
the variable enters into a model.  When a variable carries a posterior probability of zero, 
this indicates that it was not included in any of the models and is not statistically different 
from zero.  Therefore, their expected value is equal to zero, having no impact on growth. 
 Figure 2.2 shows selected variables’ posterior distributions.  The vertical black 
line at zero is the probability of the variable not being in a model with the curve being the 
coefficient’s model averaged posterior density given that the variable is included in a 
model.  This curve has been scaled such that the height is the probability of being 
included in a model; the heights of both the model averaged posterior density and 
posterior probability will equal one.  The plots without a vertical black line are those 
considered to be included in a model 100% of the time according to posterior 
probabilities.  Charting this output of the BMA posterior distribution provides slightly 





should be immediately noticed is that both stock market variables have large spikes at 
0.0, indicating that these variables are not included in any of the models and are not 
statistically different from zero.  On the other hand, there are a number of variables that 
show posterior distributions that are significantly taller than the spike indicating that their 
likelihood of being included is greater than being excluded. 
 Another feature of the BMA statistical package in R is the ability to produce an 
image plot as shown in Figure 2.3.  This output is easier to understand for those not 
familiar with the procedure.  Variables are listed on the vertical axis with the rankings of 
the models along the horizontal axis.  The variables selected are shown in their rows by 
being either red or blue.  Red indicates a positive influence while blue indicates a 
negative correlation.  Variables included in a particular model (1–73) are highlighted in 
either red or blue while those not included are not highlighted.  The width of the column 
is proportionate to its posterior probability for each model; higher ranking models have 
higher posterior probabilities and wider columns.  The total width of all columns is equal 
to the cumulative posterior probability as reported in Table 2.4.  The image plot (Figure 
2.3) is quite influential in showing which variables are important indicators due to the 
abundance of color associated with these variables.  The variables with high posterior 
probabilities—GDP.1992, Avg.Infl, Life.Exp, RQ, nrbloan, Exp.Index, Exp.School and 
HDI—appear prolifically in the image plot with signs consistent with theory.  The 
exceptions are Exp.School and Life.Exp for the reasons discussed above. 
Comparing the EBA results to BMA is a two-stage process in verifying the 
importance of certain variables.  If a variable has bounds that do not cover zero and high 





ambiguity as to the direction of correlation.  This dataset has four variables that are robust 
with high posterior probabilities; these are Exp.Index, HDI, Exp.School, and Life.Exp.  
Each of these variables is robust as measured by EBA and important as indicated in 
BMA. 
Exp.Index is an index of exports with the base year set at 100.  Countries that have 
imported more than they exported have a value less than 100, while countries with a trade 
surplus have values greater than 100.  Exp.Index has a posterior probability of 100, is 
included in every model, and has a positive correlation with an expected value of .043.  
As confirmed by EBA, this variable is robust in that it does not cover zero and is an 
extremely important indicator of growth in my sample of countries.  This provides the 
expected result that countries with higher levels of exports will tend to grow faster. 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite statistic of life expectancy, 
education, and income computed by the United Nations Development Programme.  This 
variable has a posterior probability of 100.0 and carried the largest coefficient with an 
expected value (EV) of 25.68 and Maximum Likelihood (from EBA) of 32.443.  The size 
of the coefficient is indicative of the weight this variable holds, the other part being due 
to the small size of the HDI variables (between 0 and 1).  Two other variables deemed 
important are Exp.School and Life.Expect, which are used in the computation of HDI.  
Exp.School is a measure of the expected years of schooling.  This variable proxies for 
human capital as the assumption is that higher levels of education lead to a more 
productive workforce and higher rates of growth.  Importantly, the posterior probability is 
64.5 with an expected value of -0.347, and this variable was found to be robust by EBA.  





explanation is in regards to the collinear aspects as described above.  The same negative 
relationship is observed between Life.Expect and growth.  Life.Expect is the life 
expectancy at birth in number of years.  It would be expected that this variable would 
have a positive effect on growth due to this variable being a component of human capital.  
A healthier society should be more productive over the long run as there is less time spent 
away from work because of personal illness or an illness of a family member.  The 
posterior probability of being included is 83.3 with an EV of -0.16 and a robust 
Maximum Likelihood -0.1995.   
Because Life.Expect, Exp.School, and HDI are highly collinear, it is challenging 
to derive individual conclusions on these variables.  Possible explanations discussed 
above regarding the directions of correlation are that an unbalanced HDI results in slower 
growth or that the poorer countries with lower values on the individual components are 
“catching up.”  One question that arises is how BMA handles multicollinearity issues.  
The collinearity is handled in the model because they are not perfectly collinear and by 
the fact that multicollinearity does not reduce the predictive power of the model as a 
whole.  Multicollinearity only affects calculations of individual variables as it may not 
give valid individual results.  However, when the collinear variables are bundled 
together, the aggregate effects estimate is reliable and adequate for my purposes.  Since I 
am not attempting to quantify the individual effects, the best way to deal with this 
multicollinearity issue is to leave the model as is.   
 GDP.1992 captures the absolute level of GDP in 1992 and exhibits a posterior 
probability of inclusion at 18.6.  This variable captures the size of the economy, and since 





expected value of 1.166e-11, it has an extremely small coefficient due to scaling as GDP 
is measured in billions.  With a standard deviation of 1.018e-11, the majority of this 
variable’s distribution is robust; it is only in one tail that it becomes negative.  Because of 
the small size of the coefficient, EBA was unable to give bounds on this variable, but 
when combining the methodologies, absolute size of GDP is an important determinant of 
per capita GDP growth. 
GE and Rural.Pop are special cases: they have robust values as shown by EBA 
but are not important as shown by BMA.  Just knowing that a particular variable is not 
fragile does not necessarily mean that it has much of an impact, as shown for these two 
variables.   These variables, for the subsets of free/doubtful combinations, were not 
fragile.  However, that these variables did not show high posterior probabilities is 
indicative that these variables are not an element of the top models.  The most plausible 
explanation for this phenomenon is that these variables are reacting with other variables, 
where the results are skewed.  Variables need to be able to pass both methodologies in 
order to be certain of the direction of correlation and that the impact differs from zero. 
Avg.Infl, nrbloan and offdep had fragile extreme bounds, but were shown to be 
important by the BMA methodology.  Inflation’s (Avg.Infl) impact on growth has been 
well documented in the literature.  My results show that it is important (posterior 
probability equal to 71.8) and most likely has a positive correlation (EV of .02 and a SD 
of .015), meaning that higher levels of inflation indicate higher levels of growth.1  Non-
resident bank loans (nrbloan) was also fragile, carrying a negative coefficient (-0.229), 
                                                           
1
 This is an interesting result as this relationship is surely not linear, nor always positive.  One explanation 
behind this result could be that it is an artifact of the time period examined where there was a high level 
of relative stability with only three outliers—Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia—
experiencing extremely high inflation (above 200% annually).  Angola was actually one of the faster 





yet was included in 31.5% of the narrowed models.  This result implies that higher levels 
of offshore bank loans to GDP correlate with lower levels of per capita growth.  The 
offshore deposits to domestic deposits ratio (offdep) follows the same traits with a 
posterior probability of 40.3, yet has a standard deviation that covers zero (EV of -0.033 
and a SD of 0.044).  These three variables appear important but offer low levels of 
certainty as to their sign because the extreme bounds cover zero. 
 RQ, regulatory quality index computed by the World Bank Governance 
Indicators, has fragile extreme bounds but entered into the BMA output as reasonably 
important with a posterior probability of 29.5.  The expected value coefficient for RQ is   
-0.519, yet it has a standard deviation of 0.88.  This places a significant portion of the 
coefficient distribution on the other side of zero, effectively questioning its robustness.  
The less stringent checks for robustness as provided by BMA are able to question, and 
probably discard, this variable as an important determinant of growth.  Rule of Law, RL, 
was another variable that did not pass the weaker robustness check in BMA but is of less 
concern because its posterior probability of 10.0 barely registers. 
 The most interesting thing to note, and the focus of this paper, is that the variables 
Years.Open and Stock.Dummy show a posterior probability of being included at exactly 
zero—meaning that neither of these variables is important in explaining growth.  Other 
financial and social considerations appear to be more important in understanding growth.  
This means that both measures of stock markets do not display any explanatory power 
and, therefore, cannot be concluded to be an important indicator of growth. The reliability 









In light of the large body of literature that has arisen as to the benefits of financial 
development on growth, this paper empirically evaluates the relationship between 
opening a stock market and growth.  Basic economic theory posits that effective, 
functioning financial markets will lead to more projects to be funded and fuel economic 
growth.  However, a small number of theorists believe that the rapid expansion of 
financial services may not be the gateway it was hoped.  When evaluating whether a 
stock market is beneficial, the benefits must be weighed against the costs.  The first 
argument questioning the effectiveness of stock markets is that active stock markets can 
lead to instability, causing a drag on long run economic growth.  The second argument 
that carries merit is that developing countries are unable to fully leverage the benefits to 
be gained from an active stock market, so they will have little to gain from one opening.  
It is this second argument that I have argued is the limit to the effectiveness of opening a 
stock market. 
In formally testing my hypothesis that stock markets are irrelevant for growth, I 
use two Bayesian econometric methods: Extreme Bounds Analysis and Bayesian Model 
Averaging.  EBA is a global sensitivity analysis able to compute the extreme bounds with 
which a variable is able to take.  EBA results show that the opening of a stock market, 
and the number of years that market has operated have fragile and nonrobust effects on 





and determine the probabilities with which variables are different from zero by averaging 
over a reasonable subset of possible models.  Both the stock market variables exhibited 
posterior probabilities of being included in the models with the best fit of 0.0, showing 
that the simple act of opening a stock market is not indicative of growth (in either 
direction) in this sample of countries.  The results from this study provide significant 
evidence that opening a stock market has little, if any, influence on growth.   
While there are certainly cases where stock markets can be beneficial to an 
economy, there is insufficient evidence that stock markets on the whole are able to 
promote growth.  That some countries may be able to better leverage the use of a stock 
market deserves more attention in the literature.   Individual characteristics of the 
instances where stock markets deliver societal benefits are likely the most important 
determinant of whether a stock market will influence growth.  Further research is needed 
to evaluate the specific conditions where opening a stock market and other elements of 
financial development are beneficial for human development. 
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Table 2.2: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Name Description Mean Std Dev 
Avg Growth Dependent variable – average growth of per capita GDP from 2002-
2007, expressed as percentage. 2000 constant dollars (World Bank) 
4.305 4.104 
Years.Open Number of years stock market has been open. Equal to 0 if no stock 
market 
12.93 12.3 
Stock.Dummy Dummy equal to 1 if country has stock market, 0 otherwise n/a n/a 
Low.Mid Dummy variable equal to 1 if lower middle quartile country, 0 
otherwise (as defined by the World Bank) 
n/a n/a 
Upper.Mid Dummy variable equal to 1 if upper middle quartile country, 0 
otherwise (as defined by the World Bank) 
n/a n/a 
Low.Income Dummy variable equal to 1 if lowest income quartile country, 0 
otherwise (as defined by the World Bank) 
n/a n/a 
Per.Cap.GDP Per capita GDP in 1992, 2000 constant dollars (World Bank) 1946.3 3785.79 
GDP.1992 Absolute level of GDP in 1992, 2000 constant dollars (World Bank) 19.2 bil 70.54 bil 
Avg.Infl Average Inflation for period 1997-2002, expressed as percentage 
(World Bank) 
24.54 79.25 
Tax.Rate Total amount of taxes payable by businesses after accounting for 
deductions and exemptions as a percentage of profits, 2007 – 
chosen for completeness of data. (World Bank) 
57.36 54.76 
FDI.Flow Absolute value of foreign direct investment flows (UNCTAD) 1082.62 5415.99 
Paved.Road Percent of roads in country that are paved, average from 1995 - 
2005 (World Bank) 
37.99 29.93 
Adj.Savings Adjusted gross savings – difference between Gross National 
Income and public and private consumption, 2002 (World Bank) 
16.55 14.34 
Ag.Land Percent of land area dedicated to agricultural produce, 2002 (World 
Bank) 
41.53 22.45 
Ag.Value.Added Total amount of agricultural value added per worker, constant 2000 
dollar (World Bank) 
3082.25 9314.6 
Life.Expect Life Expectancy at birth in years, 2002 (UNESCO) 62 10.46 
Pop.Growth Average population growth 1997-2002 expressed as a percentage 
(UNESCO) 
1.64 1.21 
Cell.Phone Number of cell phones per 100 people, 2002 (World Bank) 12.44 18.02 
Curr.Acct Current account balance, BOP, 2002 (World Bank) 0.62 5.23 
Rural.Pop Rural Population as percent of total population, 2002 (World Bank) 54.87 20.6 
CC Control and Corruption Index, 2002 (World Governance Indicators, 
World Bank) 
-0.48 0.67 
RL Rule of Law Index, 2002 (World Governance Indicators, World 
Bank) 
-0.5 0.73 
RQ Regulatory Quality, 2002 (World Governance Indicators, World 
Bank) 
-0.39 0.74 
GE Government Effectiveness, 2002 (World Governance Indicators, 
World Bank) 
-0.45 0.72 
VA Voice and Accountability, 2002 (World Governance Indicators, 
World Bank) 
-0.41 0.79 
Nrbloan Offshore bank loans relative to GDP, 2002 (BIS Statistical Index 
via Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2009) 
0.49 2.99 
Exp.Index Export index with 2000 as base year set at 100, 2000 (UNCTAD) 107.95 27.92 
Exp.School Expected years of schooling at birth (UNDP Human Development 
Index Report) 
10.66 3.05 
Fertility Total fertility rate (births per woman), 2002 (UNESCO) 3.8 1.78 
HDI Human Development Index, 2000 (UNDP Human Development 
Index Report) 
0.55 0.17 
Dbacba Deposit money bank assets / (deposit money + central bank) assets, 
2002 (IMF International financial statistics via Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2009) 
0.75 0.24 
Bcbd Private credit by deposit money banks as a share of demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money banks, 2002 (IMF 
International financial statistics via Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
2009) 
0.81 0.49 
offdep  Offshore bank deposits relative to domestic deposits, 2002 (BIS 











Table 2.3: EBA Results 
Variable Name Maximum Likelihood 
Point Estimate 
Model 1 
    Low                High 
Model 2 
    Low                High 
Model 3 
    Low                High 
Constant (Int) 2.1857 -29.308 28.4340 -7.6931 9.3720 -38.4143 44.3200 
Years.Open -0.0125 -0.099 0.0780 -0.0692 0.0728 -0.1827 0.1961 
Stock.Dummy -0.6104 -2.467 1.8001 -1.8219 0.5597 -3.8707 3.6396 
Low.Mid -3.0917       
Upper.Mid -2.6088       
Low.Income -2.5896       
Per.Cap.GDP 0.0000       
GDP.19922 0.0000       
Avg.Infl 0.0283       
Tax.Rate -0.0038       
FDI.Flow 0.0000 -0.00051 0.00038     
Paved.Road 0.0086   -0.0074 0.0408   
Adj.Savings -0.0450 -0.08878 0.08054     
Ag.Land 0.0135       
Ag.Value.Added -0.0001       
Life.Expect -0.1995   -0.0729 -0.3587   
Pop.Growth 0.6186   -0.6322 1.1535   
Cell.Phone -0.0296   -0.1075 0.0695   
Curr.Acct -0.1970 -0.94909 0.13024 -0.7776 0.5806   
Rural.Pop 0.0341   0.0011 0.0654   
CC -0.4090   -2.1138 1.7308   
RL -0.8849 -5.9948 4.412 -2.4408 0.2125   
RQ -0.8106   -2.9101 0.0887   
GE* 1.9580   0.1727 3.9121   
VA -0.5770   -1.4836 0.6655   
Nrbloan -0.6539 -3.8377 3.8902 -3.4009 2.7470   
Exp.Index 0.0520 0.01331 0.0844 0.0267 0.0680   
Exp.School -0.5328   -0.9953 -0.1850   
Fertility -0.7244   -1.1120 0.4108   
HDI 32.4433   11.7857 54.1040   
Dbacba -2.1391 -5.2162 3.3638     
Bcbd 1.1509 -0.7079 2.6319     
offdep  -0.0106 -0.4708 0.0364     








                                                           
2
 Rounding to only four decimal places generates a 0.0000 Maximum Likelihood estimate.  The current 








Table 2.4: BMA Summary Output 
  73  models were selected. Best  5  models (cumulative posterior probability =  0.1767 ):  
                  p!=0     EV          SD              model 1               model 2                   model 3                model 4               model 5    
Intercept       100.0  -1.463e+00   4.225e+00   5.833e-01   2.477e+00  -1.157e+00   3.753e-01  -2.579e-01 
Years.Open         0.0   0.000e+00   0.000e+00       .           .           .           .           .     
Stock.Dummy        0.0   0.000e+00   0.000e+00       .           .           .           .           .     
Low.Mid            0.0   0.000e+00   0.000e+00       .           .           .           .           .     
Upper.Mid          0.0   0.000e+00   0.000e+00       .           .           .           .           .     
Low.Income         0.3   4.632e-03   1.080e-01       .           .           .           .           .     
per.cap.GDP       21.1  -5.490e-05   1.180e-04       .           .      -2.808e-04       .      -2.702e-04 
GDP.1992          18.6   2.275e-12   5.234e-12       .           .           .       1.197e-11       .     
Avg.Infl          71.8   2.017e-02   1.507e-02       .           .       3.028e-02       .       2.976e-02 
Tax.Rate           0.0   0.000e+00   0.000e+00       .           .           .           .           .     
FDI.Flow          78.4   1.365e-04   9.202e-05   1.657e-04   1.693e-04   1.749e-04       .       1.663e-04 
Paved.road        22.1   6.308e-03   1.373e-02       .       2.956e-02       .           .           .     
Adj.Savings       19.7  -1.062e-02   2.504e-02       .           .           .           .           .     
Ag.Land            0.0   0.000e+00   0.000e+00       .           .           .           .           .     
Ag.Value.Added    16.7  -1.464e-05   3.674e-05       .           .           .           .           .     
Life.Expect       83.3  -1.626e-01   1.027e-01  -2.276e-01  -2.473e-01  -1.569e-01  -2.172e-01  -1.629e-01 
Pop.Growth         0.0   0.000e+00   0.000e+00       .           .           .           .           .     
Cell.Phone        12.9  -8.133e-03   2.334e-02       .           .           .           .           .     
Curr.Acct          0.0   0.000e+00   0.000e+00       .           .           .           .           .     
Rural.Pop          4.4   1.759e-03   9.491e-03       .           .           .           .           .     
CC                 4.3  -6.466e-02   3.323e-01       .           .           .           .           .     
RL                10.0  -1.604e-01   5.256e-01       .           .           .           .           .     
RQ                29.5  -5.186e-01   8.766e-01  -1.938e+00  -1.835e+00       .      -1.860e+00       .     
GE                 0.0   0.000e+00   0.000e+00       .           .           .           .           .     
VA                10.0  -1.172e-01   3.920e-01       .           .           .           .           .     
nrbloan           31.5  -2.286e-01   3.661e-01       .           .           .           .           .     
Exp.Index        100.0   4.332e-02  1.306e-02   4.189e-02   3.905e-02   3.935e-02   4.348e-02   4.051e-02 
Exp.School        64.5  -3.477e-01   3.210e-01  -5.769e-01  -6.250e-01       .      -6.098e-01  -4.448e-01 
Fertility          0.0   0.000e+00   0.000e+00       .           .           .           .           .     
HDI              100.0   2.568e+01  1.006e+01   3.364e+01   3.193e+01   1.974e+01   3.313e+01   2.711e+01 
dbacba             0.0   0.000e+00   0.000e+00       .           .           .           .           .     
bcbd               1.4   1.397e-02   1.455e-01       .           .           .           .           .     
offdep            40.3  -3.286e-02   4.371e-02       .           .      -8.733e-02       .      -7.810e-02 
                                                                                                         
nVar                                             6           7           7           6           8       
r2                                             0.465       0.492       0.489       0.459       0.513     
BIC                                           -2.485e+01  -2.471e+01  -2.419e+01  -2.392e+01  -2.376e+01 







































SCHUMPETERIAN INNOVATION  
AND EQUITY ISSUANCE 
 
3.1. Abstract 
I hypothesize that highly innovative firms—those with high risk, yet higher 
potential return—will be more likely to raise funds through stock markets than bond 
issuance.  Using the Schumpeterian innovation life-cycle as a theoretical framework, I 
argue that that in the beginning, firms with radically new innovations are more likely to 
raise funds through equity issuance until it becomes an acceptable loan for bankers with a 
limited return (interest rate).  This is all placed within the context of, and does not 
conflict with, the dominant theories of firms’ capital structure: the Trade-Off, market 
timing, and Pecking Order Models. 
Empirically, I test this relationship of innovative activity to equity issuance by 
using patents as a proxy for innovation from a dataset covering 1970 to 1992, 
encompassing 25,064 instances where firms raised funds through either the bond or stock 
market.  This independent variable is then regressed on the ratio of funds raised through 
equity to total funds raised. I find statistically significant evidence using a dichotomous, 





significantly more likely to raise funds through stock market issuance than firms without 
innovative activity.   
 
3.2. Introduction 
Do firms care about their capital structure? Do investors? With the introduction of 
the Modigliani and Miller (1958) Irrelevance Proposition, it was argued that in perfect 
capital markets, firms will be indifferent to their capital structure.  Competing theories of 
capital structure emerged in light of the restrictive assumptions imposed by Modigliani-
Miller and the difficulties in empirically testing this idea.  One aspect of capital structure 
literature that does receive attention from any of the dominant theories is that firms have 
different capital requirements over their life cycle.  These financing requirements and 
constraints will influence whether firms will raise capital through debt or equity. 
I hypothesize that firms’ external capital decisions change depending upon where 
they fall within the innovation life cycle as conceptualized by Joseph Schumpeter in 
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Schumpeter, 1942).  I argue that in the beginning 
of the life cycle, firms that are highly innovative will be more likely to raise funds 
through the stock market than mature firms that are further into the life cycle.  This is 
based around the argument that banks ration credit, limiting the amount of funds to newer 
industries with higher levels or risk, even though there is a high potential return.  Even in 
the presence of a high risk premium, banks have asymmetric returns as they are exposed 
to losing their entire investment in the event of default while returns are limited to a fixed 





Along the innovation life cycle, the industries emerging are classified as being 
radically innovative because they products or processes they are promoting are radical 
departures from those currently seen.  This period is marked by large amounts of 
innovation, which steadily decreases as the industry reaches stagnation.  Innovations tend 
to be clustered in the beginning of the innovation life cycle (Keklik, 2003).  Competition 
intensifies as the product makes it to market, causing less innovative firms to drop out.  
After the weaker firms fall, successful firms become more attractive for debt financing.  
During the time when there is a large amount of competition to “produce or perish,” 
radically innovative firms have large capital requirements and do not have access to the 
same financial instruments that mature firms traditionally use.  The supply constraints 
imposed by lenders does not reduce these firms’ requirements for capital.  They will 
continue to seek capital and will have a larger portion of equity to debt in their capital 
structure.  I posit that stock market issuance is used more by firms during the early stages 
of the life cycle because of constraints on their ability to use debt. 
My theory as to choices made by radically innovative firms does come into 
conflict with any of the dominant theories of capital structure—Trade-Off, Pecking 
Order, and market timing.  The Trade-Off theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) posits 
that firms will balance the tax advantages of debt with the increased probabilities of 
bankruptcy as they become more leveraged; it is postulated that there is an optimal level 
of leverage that maximizes the firm’s value, and taking on more debt than the optimal 
will result in a lower valuation.  My theory states that radically innovative industries are 
more likely to default and will result in a lower optimal level of leverage.  If the firms 





all additional funds through equity/stock markets.  Myers and Majluf (1984) introduce 
the Pecking Order theory as the main competitor to the Trade-Off theory.  Rather than 
concerns over balancing costs and benefits, Myers and Majluf introduce asymmetric 
information, positing that investors believe firms’ managers hold more information and 
would not be issuing stock unless they believe it to be overvalued.  Because of the 
information problem (perceived or otherwise), Myers (1984) hypothesizes that adverse 
selection will occur, resulting in investors discounting the stock offering.  Because of the 
discount placed on equity, stock market financing is only used as a last resort by firms 
unable to raise capital from any other source.  Being constrained by debt markets, 
radically innovative firms are then more likely to need to use stock markets for capital 
because of the lack of options.   
I am able to empirically show how firms in innovative industries have a higher 
likelihood of raising funds through the stock market, controlling for portfolio returns and 
other market conditions.  While the data do not allow for a precise positioning of firms 
within the life cycle, I provide empirical results in support of my theory that firms at the 
beginning of the innovation life cycle will be more likely to raise funds through equity 
than firms at the end of the life cycle.  This is performed using patents as a proxy for 
innovation, operating on the assumption that more innovation occurs in the early stages 
of the life cycle.  Probit estimation methods with clustered standard errors are used to 
estimate this relationship between innovation and firm choice as to whether debt or 
equity financing is used.  The results are straightforward; I find significant evidence that 





when it is seeking external capital.  These results are consistent with most of the literature 
on capital structure. 
 
3.3. Theories of Capital Structure 
 As the first widely accepted theory of capital structure, Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) showed that the value of the firm is not affected by how the firm is financed.  The 
theory is that firms will raise external capital through whichever avenue is the least 
expensive, bringing the most capital at the lowest cost.  The implication is that it does not 
matter what the underlying capital structure is; whether firms raise funds through equity 
or debt and how they pay dividends is irrelevant to firm value.  Modigliani and Miller 
reached this Irrelevance Proposition under some crucial assumptions: perfect capital 
markets in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information, adverse 
selection, and agency costs.  While a ground breaking piece of research, the introduction 
of various market imperfections has given rise to a number of competing theories as to 
why firms finance themselves the way they do.     
 
3.3.1. Trade-Off Theory 
 The basic arguments behind which theory of capital structure is ideal are derived 
from disagreements over which imperfections are most important.  These imperfections 
include agency costs, asymmetric information, bankruptcy costs, and taxes.  Following is 
a discussion of the dominant theories of capital structure: Trade-Off, market timing, and 
Pecking Order.  Modigliani and Miller (1963) acknowledged that the benefits gained 





are the only permanent advantage” (Modigliani and Miller, 1963, p. 434).  This is 
concluded by a reaffirmation of the 1958 hypothesis with the conclusion that these tax 
benefits are still small and, once investors’ personal taxes are factored in, there are 
circumstances where other forms of finance may be cheaper for the firm than pure debt 
issuance.  Empirically, Modigliani–Miller is difficult to test with many researchers 
unable to find reasonable evidence that it holds up using modern statistical methods 
(Frank & Goyal, 2007).  Although it has long since been realized that perfect capital 
markets with perfect information do not exist, understanding Modigliani–Miller can help 
an understanding of how imperfections can distort markets.   
Arguing that taxes are an important factor in how firms finance themselves, Kraus 
and Litzenberger (1973) introduced the Trade-Off Theory of capital structure. The mix of 
financing depends on the tax savings and the states in which a firm would become 
insolvent.  There is significant tax advantages for firms that are gained by issuing debt 
that far outweigh any of the costs incurred by investors’ personal taxes.  Paying interest 
on outstanding debt is tax deductible and lowers the cost to service the debt.  On the dark 
side of leverage, Kraus and Litzenberger introduce bankruptcy costs into consideration.  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) assumed that firm value does not depend on how certain 
they are to repay their debt obligations; the value of a firm is not affected by its leverage 
since bankruptcy penalties do not exist in perfect capital markets.   However, under the 
Trade-Off theory, as the leverage ratio increases, the value of a firm begins to fall 
because of the increased probability of becoming insolvent.   
The basic Trade-Off models predicted much higher debt levels than were actually 





costlessly restructure their debt at any given time.  Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1984) 
and Brennan and Schwartz (1984) separately developed continuous time models 
incorporating the imperfections of uncertainty, taxes, and bankruptcy costs, but ignoring 
transactions costs.  Modeling uncertainty reduced the optimal leverage ratio, but still 
predicted values that were much larger than were actually observed.  These models were 
still unable to explain the stickiness of restructuring their leverage ratio.  Introducing 
transactions costs, Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) found that even in the presence 
of small transactions costs, firms allow their leverage ratio to “float” within certain 
bounds, only adjusting when the ratio moves outside those bounds.  That small 
transaction costs will lead to stickiness in adjustments of the leverage ratio makes it more 
difficult for smaller, less liquid firms to raise capital through the market.  Investors 
purchasing a firms’ bonds or stocks in the market from an illiquid company will face 
greater transactions costs, thus reducing the desire to purchase these securities.  
Discussions surrounding whether the Trade-Off theory can predict leverage ratios, and 
whether firms attempt to reach them, are relevant as a test of predictive power.   
Henessey and Whited (2005) and Strebulaev (2007) dispute that firms are 
underlevered relative to the predictions of the Trade-Off theory.  These results present 
new estimates of the bankruptcy costs and tax benefits, providing leverage ratios that are 
consistent with current corporate debt levels.  Other considerations have arisen out of the 
behavioral finance literature around confidence levels of company managers.  Hackbarth 
(2008) presented a theoretical model, concluding that overconfident managers will raise 
more debt, carrying a higher leverage ratio.  This is backed by Malmandier and Tate 





overconfident tended to raise more funds from debt relative to equity and had higher 
leverage ratios.  Essentially, the overconfident managers discounted their bankruptcy 
costs and carried more leverage.  While Malmandier and Tate were unable to assess the 
magnitude of the effect, these behavioral models have definitively shown there are a 
number of different elements behind why certain firms select equity or debt.  Within all 
the Trade-Off models, the idea still holds that the optimal leverage ratio is the point with 
which tax benefits are maximized subject to bankruptcy costs, although changing 
assumptions can alter where the optimal leverage point is.  
 An illustrative, stylized model of the Trade-Off theory is shown in Figure 3.1.  
The total value of the firm on the vertical axis is plotted against the leverage ratio, Debt 
to Assets (D/A) on the horizontal axis.  The intercept,  , is the value of a firm with no 
leverage and funded purely by equity or retained earnings.  When a firm is at this point, 
they are not maximizing the value of the firm as borrowing would allow the firm to 
pursue additional profit opportunities.  , nd subscript indicating “no default,” shows 
what a firm’s value would be in the absence of any costs associated with increased 
leverage.  With no chance of default, a firm could theoretically borrow unlimited funds, 
invest them, and watch the value of the firm grow.  The flip side of the leverage is that 
while leverage can multiply profit rates, it can also multiply losses.  The more leverage a 
firm maintains, the higher the probability a shock or poor investment will leave the firm 
insolvent.   
  ′ is the firm value that incorporates bankruptcy costs and additional borrowing 
costs imposed by lenders to cover a higher risk of default.  Eventually, there becomes a 





firm’s value to drop.   ′ would be close in value with  up until a point, / ′, 
because at low levels of leverage, the probability of default is negligible.  Firms, as profit 
maximizing entities, will attempt to maximize their value and select the optimal leverage 
ratio at / ∗ where the marginal benefits of debt equal the marginal costs of bankruptcy.  
At leverage levels between / ′ and / ∗, the costs of leverage are nonnegligible, but 
increasing at an increasing rate.  Until / ∗ is reached, the benefits still exceed the costs; 
at leverage levels greater than / ∗, bankruptcy costs exceed the tax benefits.  If a firm 
has additional profitable opportunities and is in need of more capital than it would receive 
at the optimal leverage ratio, the firm would then turn to equity markets.  The Trade-Off 
theory maintains that firms will reach their optimal leverage ratio in order to maximize 
their value.  The only circumstances where they would raise equity is if capital in excess 
of the optimal level was needed. 
 
3.3.2. Market Timing 
 As a descendant of the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition in that firms 
seek external capital through the least expensive method, Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
formalized a theory of market timing.  While there may be costs associated with 
whichever form of capital is used, firms are essentially indifferent to their capital 
structure and will raise external capital through whichever avenue offers the lowest cost 
to the firm.  These costs change over time with firms using whatever carries to lowest 
cost to the firm.  This differs from the Modigliani-Miller assumption that market 
characteristics remain constant, whereas market timing theorists postulate that market 





During bull markets, firms will be valued higher by the market and should issue 
more equity.  In contrast, as interest rates rise, firms will be less likely to borrow because 
of the higher borrowing costs.  There have been a number of econometric studies finding 
evidence of firms raising funds through the different avenues depending on market 
conditions (Dittmar & Dittmar, 2008; Dong, Loncarski, Horst, & Veld, 2012; Elliot, 
Koeter-Kant, & Warr, 2008; Lowry & Schwert, 2002).  Each finds evidence that firms 
with overvalued equity are significantly more likely to issue equity than those that are 
undervalued.  Current market conditions prove to be at least a minor consideration for 
firms when raising external capital. 
 
3.3.3. Pecking Order 
 Myers (1984) contends that the Trade-Off theory suffers from the classic “horse 
and rabbit stew” problem.  Myers argues that tax benefits of debt (horse) greatly 
outweigh the small probability event costs of bankruptcy (rabbit), and that the majority 
component of capital structure (stew) is debt.  Since bankruptcy is a low probability 
event, Myers concludes that firms would be financed solely through debt, in contrast to 
what is actually observed.  The Pecking Order theory of capital structure was introduced 
by Donaldson (1961) in response to Modiglini-Miller.  This was greatly expanded by 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) introduction of asymmetric information, contending that 
firms will use funds according to a pecking order, where internal funds are the first to be 
depleted.  Only after internal funds are exhausted will they seek external financing; the 
next source of funds would be debt, only using equity as a last resort.  Debt is placed last 





than they do.  Asymmetric information forces adverse selection in that a rational investor 
believes that firm managers will only raise funds through the stock market when they are 
overvalued.  Outside investors must assume that the company must be overvalued or the 
firm would not issue equity.  Therefore, the only time investors would purchase stock 
from the company is when it is obviously undervalued, with firms only issuing 
undervalued stock when there are no other options.  Formal models of adverse selection 
and equity selection can be found in Cadsby, Frank, and Maksimovic (1990), Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992), Eckbo and Norli (2004), and Noe (1988). 
Empirical studies such as Rajan and Servaes (1997) find that firms are more likely 
to issue equity when analysts have more optimism about the offering, thus having higher 
values and allowing firms to raise more capital.  Firms traditionally attempt to present 
themselves in as positive manner as possible in order to persuade potential investors to 
purchase their offerings at the highest possible price.  Myers and Majluf (1984) have 
argued that investors are aware of the selectivity of information release and are likely to 
discount the offering.  Rajan and Servaes contend that it is driven by the opposite; firms 
will not issue equity unless investors have similar expectations about future profits and 
values of the IPO.  In the same light, Dittmar and Thakor (2007) contribute to the stylized 
fact that firms issue more equity when their stock prices are high, positing that managers 
of companies are more likely to finance their operations through equity issuance when 
they believe investors’ views about projected payoff are aligned with the firm.  Firms are 
aware of information problems, attempting to avoid problems of adverse selection by 





argue that investors are not subject to asymmetric information problems to the extent 
theorized by Myers and Majluf (1984), resulting in higher levels of equity issued. 
As seen above, the basis of much of the discourse in the capital structure literature 
is based around a debate over which imperfections are most important.  Within the 
literature, the majority has concentrated on how firms will restructure their leverage 
around the optimum ratio as well as the determination of the optimal leverage ratio.  
What none of these theories do is differentiate financing decisions according to where the 
firms fall within the innovation life cycle.  I contend that firms have different desires and 
constraints on their fund raising activity depending on how innovative they are.  This is 
shown by discussing the Schumpeterian innovation life cycle, how firms finance 
themselves throughout this life cycle, and how it all fits within the capital structure 
models.   
 
3.4. Innovation Life Cycles in the Vein of Schumpeter 
Innovations that precipitate the decline of the stagnant industries are envisioned 
by the concept of Creative Destruction (Schumpeter, 1942) and generate a radical shift 
from the existing economic system to a new and more efficient one.  Schumpeter 
believed that the business cycle was driven by technological innovation.  The 
introduction of new, major technological innovations alters old economic routines; the 
rise of new products and industries forces out stagnant firms in industries that are no 
longer innovating.  Accordingly, firms in the early stages of the life cycle will have 





Schumpeter saw competitive markets not as sending price signals for the 
allocation of scarce resources, but rather as forcing firms to innovate in order to capture 
profits.  It was felt that entrepreneurs were the drivers of economic growth since in order 
to be successful they must bring new ideas, products, or processes to the market.  Without 
new ideas an entrepreneur would lack any competitive advantages and, due to the 
substantial barriers of entry created by mature industries, would have a slim chance of 
success.   The typically small size of the new firms erodes the power held by the mature 
and dominant firms, challenging and disrupting existing production routines.  Unless the 
mature firm is able to effectively transition to a technology in a newer industry, the firm 
will become stagnant with eventual death.  The spirit of innovation is that it is used by 
producers to gain or maintain market share.  I define innovation as any improvement over 
old products, processes, or ideas.  There are two basic types of innovations that are 
included in my definition: product and process.  Product innovations are those that either 
introduce a new product or change it in some way while process innovations are those 
that make production less expensive to produce.  Naturally, there are innovations that are 
more important than others.  The innovations earlier in the life cycle are larger departures 
from those currently seen, while those towards the end do not have much of an impact.   
 Derived from Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction, Mensch (1975) 
expands the innovation life cycle, expanding and classifying innovations into three basic 
stages.  In the first stage, a product is considered a radical innovation—one that radically 
changes a production process or changes how people live their daily lives.  After a period 
of time these radical innovations become more accepted as the industry moves into the 





in output as the product is rapidly adopted by consumers.  This phase has the fiercest 
competition as there are high numbers of firms, each making incremental improvements 
to the initial innovation.  Firms are forced to raise large sums of funds during this time 
period because of the rapid expansions in output and to survive the brutal competition for 
survival.  It is in the third stage (pseudo innovation) that substantive changes to a product 
cease and firms begin to lose their competitive advantages.  According to Mensch, the 
rise of stagnant industries is what is known as a “technological stalemate,” where pseudo 
innovations become the norm.  Stagnant industries’ production tapers off as radically new 
innovations begin to emerge, competing within the same market space.  The demise of 
old and stagnant industries, accompanied by new innovative industries, completes the 
cycle of Creative Destruction. 
 As an illustrative example of the stages of innovation with the life cycle, we will 
evaluate the replacement of the traditional film camera by digital cameras.  The 
traditional film camera was a great idea and one that had a large impact.  In its infancy, at 
the beginning of the life cycle, the cameras were cost-prohibitive for most people to 
purchase and output was low.  As time moved on, more and more people were 
purchasing the cameras, yet there was still significant innovation in the industry as new 
features were released.  The digital camera was based off the same basic idea as the film 
camera, but the finished product was a radical departure from the film camera.  In the 
early stages, before the digital camera caught on, digital and film were able to coexist.  
Once prices started falling for digital cameras, there was a large surge in output at the 
expense of film cameras, which then became a stagnant industry.  Some film companies 





either went out of business or were forced to sell their assets to one of the successful 
companies. 
 Keklik (2003) postulated that the innovation life cycle possesses a logistic S-
shaped curve over the long run.  Figure 3.2 displays this S-shape curve divided into the 
three innovation stages as discussed by Mensch (1975).  Radical innovations and very 
important innovations are those that occur in the first stage, important innovations in the 
second, and pseudo innovations in the third.  This logistic S-shaped curve graphically 
shows how output is related to the life cycle.  The slope of the curve implies that the first 
stage (radical innovations) initially has low output but accelerating growth with constant 
growth in the second (important innovation stage) as the industry is taking off.  As the 
industry enters the third stage (pseudo innovation), firms’ output is increasing at a 
decreasing rate until absolute stagnation is reached.  In the latter parts of the third stage, a 
standardized product emerges with known production costs and established sales.  At this 
point, a dominant design has become widely accepted and any innovation that arises will 
not be anywhere near revolutionary.  This reduction of output in the third stage is 
attributed to the rise of new industries that have moved into the same market space as the 
outgoing product. 
 Schumpeter’s innovation life cycle posits that radically new industries replace 
stagnant industries.  The introduction of the new technologies is not immediate, but once 
it grabs a foothold, there exists significant competition as the weaker, less innovative 
firms are weeded out.  As firms move through this innovation life cycle, the ways in 





earlier stages because of the higher possible returns to compensate for increased risk, 
while lenders will prefer firms with established credit histories and cash flows. 
 
3.5. Financing 
While many firms’ financing comes from internal funds, such as retained 
earnings, this research is driven by decisions firms make when seeking external capital in 
the form of debt or equity.  This is because in the earlier stages of the innovation life 
cycle, radically innovative firms typically have little retained earnings.  I hypothesize that 
in the radical innovation stage, a company will not be able to raise capital through debt 
markets and are more likely to rely on equity markets for external capital.  I argue that 
this is primarily a supply constraint because the level of risk to lenders is too high given 
the expected return.  Bankers, while they may be able to see the venture as being 
profitable, have a limited upside in the form of an interest rate, yet will lose their entire 
investment if the firm fails.  I propose that in order to raise funds, these radically 
innovative firms have a higher reliance on equity in order to be able to compensate 
investors for the additional risk and return volatility. 
Established firms that are constantly innovating are treated in the same manner as 
brand new firms if the radically innovative activities consume a large portion of their 
activities.  The main distinguishing feature is that established firms may have more 
retained earnings to fall back on. Under the assumption that firms will use internal funds 
before seeking external capital, firms entering new industries will exhaust their retained 
earnings, and will be more likely to raise funds through equity than firms still engaged in 





radically new technology consumes of a company.  If a massive company engaged in 
various activities like General Electric began operating in a radically new innovation it 
may only be a small portion of their portfolio and would not have much influence on their 
external capital needs.  On the other hand, a small company shifting their entire focus 
toward a radical innovation would be treated similarly to a brand new firm.  Regardless 
of whether it is a new firm or established firm engaged in the radically innovative 
activity, their external capital decisions will be similar if the innovations pertain to a large 
percentage of their activity.   
Traditional theory suggests that increases in the interest rate are compensation for 
holding risk, known as the risk premium.  Charging higher interest rates on loans for 
riskiness is a common practice.  However, high risks, like those found in radically new 
industries, would require interest rates that would be higher than normal rates and make it 
difficult for lenders to price.  Merton (1974) presented the first comprehensive theory on 
the risk structure of interest rates.  He found that bonds are more difficult to price when 
there is significant risk of default, and therefore, investors find these bonds less desirable 
in spite of the higher interest rates received.  Not only do firms in new industries have 
higher probabilities of default, they also have large amounts of intangible capital that is 
difficult to price.  When an asset is difficult to price, investors will discount the price.  
Investors will not be satisfied with the current risk premium and either i) demand a higher 
interest rate or ii) not lend at all.  Additionally, Fisher (1959) theorized that the risk of 
default is a function of a firm’s net past income; firms with little or no past income have a 
much more difficult time borrowing funds.   Firms in radically new industries typically 





problem as Merton (1974), firms will have less access because of investors’ reduced 
preference for holding bonds in young industries with more risk. 
 While difficulties in pricing risk do exist, once interest rates rise above a point, 
banks will no longer lend funds out of fears of adverse selection where the only firms 
accepting high interest rate loans will be bad risks.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
conceptualized this with the introduction of credit rationing.   Basic economic theory 
posits that market equilibrium is where supply meets demand; as prices rise, suppliers 
will produce more.  However, debt markets act differently with credit being rationed and 
investors retaining their excess funds rather than lending them out.  Banks care about two 
things: risk and return; as risk increases, the banks are induced to loan at a higher interest 
rate in order to compensate for the risk.  The problem arises when interest rates rise as the 
rate increase itself may influence the riskiness of the project.  Increased rates make debt 
service more expensive, making margins tighter and threatening the likelihood of 
repayment.  Banks, therefore, are aware of the “lemons” problems where those who 
would borrow at the highest interest rates may be worse risks; the interest rates would be 
able to act as a screening device, keeping bad investments out.  Banks may interpret the 
radical industries’ willingness to accept high interest rates as a signal that they are poor 
investments, thereby rationing credit. 
Over the life cycle, stock market issuance should follow a skewed distribution, as 
shown in Figure 3.3.  At t=0, there is precisely zero stock market financing when the 
innovation is in its infancy.  As time goes on, the likelihood of raising capital through the 
stock market begins to increase as the innovation appears to have a higher probability of 





steady cash flows with little need for external capital.  When they do require capital, it 
will come through debt financing.  At the time of an industry’s death, there will be zero 
innovation, need for capital, or stock market activity.  The distribution of stock market 
issuance is skewed to the left since most of the innovations occur relatively early in the 
innovation life cycle and, during the time when competition amongst firms is greatest, 
there will be higher activity in the stock market.   
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) argue that new businesses must finance themselves 
and bear the risk of failure; if they are starting a new venture without an adequate pool of 
retained earnings, they must find a partner with the available funds.  The earlier a firm 
with an innovation seeks financing, the higher the return must be for the investor as 
compensation for the high levels of risk.  It is not likely that at the earliest stages those 
firms would seek to raise funds through the stock market.   Most of this can be attributed 
to information costs; in the beginning when there are higher levels of uncertainty, 
investors would have high relative costs of obtaining the necessary information to make 
an investment decision.   
After a company has a viable prototype ready for production, firms will require 
more funding in order to scale up the production.  At this time, there are high capital 
requirements and since this radical innovation is new and lacks retained earnings, firms 
only options are equity and debt to provide the necessary capital.  Barnhart and Dwyer 
(2012) found that firms in new industries have a much higher volatility in their returns, 
but have a much higher expected return compared to the rest of the market.  Their 
findings indicate that a small number of companies generate outstanding stock market 





potential return, but fear volatility.  The firm’s need for capital allows speculative 
investors to reap the benefits of higher risk through the stock market, allowing for the 
ability to diversify their investment while delivering the necessary capital to innovative 
firms.  Into the third stage, the innovations are not substantial departures from previous 
innovations.  This does not lend itself to high rates of return, yet presents lower risk to 
investors.  At this time, firms still have requirements for capital, but now have the ability 
to raise capital through debt and retained earnings to expand production.  These options 
allow for more flexibility in choosing the lowest cost of capital as they can attract bank 
financing.  The difference from stage two in relation to bank financing is that the firms 
are able to receive a lower interest rate because of a low, measurable risk.  Firms will 
choose the cheapest way to raise the necessary capital and with interest rates being lower 
than the cost of equity, the firms will choose significantly more debt financing.   
 To simplify, these firms involved in more innovation are considered to be in 
“new” industries, while firms in mature industries in the latter stages of the life cycle can 
be considered “old.”  This simplification is done for illustrative reasons as well as 
because of the empirical difficulties in determining firms’ precise position in the life 
cycle.  With this simplification, it can be conceded that new industries will be more 
innovative that those in the old industries.  Since firms at the very beginning of the life 
cycle are required to finance themselves and bear the risk of failure, while at the end of 
the life cycle firms have no need to raise any funds, there will be less innovation 
occurring at either end of the life cycle.  It is somewhere in between that innovation 





more innovation will occur earlier in the innovation life cycle and should be indicative 
that firms in innovative industries will raise more funds through the stock market. 
 
3.6. The Life Cycle and Capital Structure Theories 
As shown above, the placement of firms within the innovation life cycle has 
important implications for how they will raise funds.  Each of the theories on capital 
structure address different imperfections in capital markets.  The market timing theory 
seems to ignore the issue of whether or not a firm has the ability to raise funds through 
debt; the main consideration is determining which avenue will be the least expensive at 
that particular time.  This theory would first require that the firms have access to market 
rates for both stock and bond issuance.  The life cycle addresses the Trade-Off theory’s 
“horse and rabbit stew” problem by making the “rabbit” larger, meaning that changing 
the probability of default and bankruptcy costs can alter the composition of the capital 
structure (stew).  The life cycle fits neatly into the Pecking Order theory in that the closer 
to the beginning of the life cycle a firm is, the lower the probability of them being able to 
secure bond financing, leaving radically innovative industries with the only option being 
to raise funds through the stock market. 
 
3.6.1. Market Timing 
 Derived from the premise of firms seeking to raise capital through whichever 
avenue is the least expensive at that particular time, the market timing theory of capital 
structure assumes that firms have access to both markets.  Ceteris paribus, when equity is 





market.  Conversely, when equity is undervalued or interest rates are low, firms will be 
more likely to borrow to fund their activities.  For radically new industries, equity will be 
a more attractive option even in the absence of credit rationing.  With an appropriately 
priced interest rate on a new firm without large amounts of cash flow, high costs of debt 
service may be a breaking factor.  However, with equity, the firm is not responsible for 
making payments to their investors until they are profitable.  Even at the rates these firms 
would be able to obtain, the firms would prefer to use the stock market to ease cash flow 
pressures.  When the firm moves into the later stages and has steady cash flow, they will 
use less equity and transition to more debt.  If debt or equity prices are out of line and a 
firm sees their value increasing by using one form or another, they will use whichever 
method costs the least. 
 
3.6.2. Trade-Off 
 Adjusting the level of bankruptcy costs and tax benefits has important 
implications for the Trade-Off theory of capital structure. Tax benefits are relatively 
constant and easily measurable; the recent reevaluation of bankruptcy costs has brought 
the Trade-Off theory back into favor as the measurement allows for a direct comparison.  
While most of these studies attempt to quantify these costs, no unifying model of 
bankruptcy cost shocks has emerged.  This is perhaps because these costs are expected to 
be quite small in relation to firm value (Warner, 1977) and that assets tend to be shuffled 
between firms so as to reduce the direct bankruptcy costs (Maksimovic and Phillips, 
1998).  However, when we alter the probability of default, the Trade-Off theory would 





the probability of default is endogenous to the leverage decision; bankers will realize that 
increasing debt levels can influence the probability of default.  As such, Molina was able 
to estimate the level of financial distress by modeling different probabilities of default.  
Changing these probabilities brings the costs of financial distress into being comparable 
with estimates of the tax benefits of debt, being consistent with current leverage rates.   
Additionally, Graham and Tucker (2006) show that firms with subsidiary tax shelters use 
less debt, providing support for the Trade-Off theory.  Effectively, these firms transfer 
their tax benefits to their tax shelters, removing the tax benefits from the parent company.  
What this does is make bankruptcy costs larger in proportion to tax benefits, shifting 
where the firms’ optimal leverage ratio would be.  Their empirical study was naturally 
limited in scope as data on tax shelters are kept confidential by the IRS.  The literature on 
estimating bankruptcy costs remains limited, but what does exist shows that changing 
bankruptcy can alter the optimum leverage ratio. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates how the Schumpeterian innovation life cycle fits within 
Trade-Off theory. It is assumed there are two firms: one in a “new” industry and the other 
in an “old” industry.  The distinction between the two firms is that the firm in the new 
industry has a higher probability of default, yet higher potential return due to a product in 
the beginning of the life cycle; this is contrasted by the firm in the old industry that has a 
standardized product and concrete forecasts of future profits.  Both firms enjoy the same 
tax benefits of debt and will both have a “no default” value curve at  and an 
unlevered value at the intercept,  .  Incorporating different probabilities of default gives 
two separate FV functions, " and , where the subscripts respectively indicate old 





ratio, / "∗ , to the left as the bankruptcy costs become greater than the tax benefits at a 
lower leverage ratio.  Firms in radically new industries still have significant profit 
opportunities and will turn to equity markets for the large amounts of capital they require.  
Firms in old industries, on the other hand, do not have as many profit opportunities or 
capital requirements above their optimal leverage ratio and are less likely to seek equity 
financing.  Firms in stagnant industries with few profitable growth opportunities are not 
expected to even reach the optimal leverage ratio as the tax benefits of borrowing are 
insignificant compared to profitable investments. 
It should also be noted that increasing the costs of bankruptcy also leads to a 
lower market value of the firm;  is the market value for new industries while " shows 
the higher market value for old, established industries.  The market value of new firms 
would have to be lower in order to compensate investors for the increased risk and should 
be associated with higher expected returns.  The firms will seek to bolster available debt 
funds with equity.  Hsu (2009) proposes that technological innovations increase returns 
on stocks, finding that firms with more technological innovations (as proxied by 
patenting activity) are typically assigned higher risk premiums, in keeping with market 
valuations for firms in new industries as shown by .  New and radically innovative 
industries are associated with higher volatility and higher probabilities of default; 
therefore, they should also have higher expected returns.  Empirical results show that 
firms involved in innovative industries have a higher likelihood of failure (Eisdorfer & 
Hsu, 2012) and there is an inverse relationship between leverage and volatility (Bradley, 
Jarrell, & Kim, 1984).  These results are consistent with the reduced leverage ratio and 





3.6.3. Pecking Order 
A strict interpretation of the Pecking Order models insists that firms only issue 
equity when they have no other options.  With restrictions in place as to what sources of 
funds are available, the entrepreneur that has highly profitable projects in the works will 
raise funds whichever way possible.  Lacking any internal funds, he will seek financing 
from anywhere possible.  Supply constraints from bankers and other lenders (bond 
holders) will lock the entrepreneur out of debt markets.  The only other option would be 
to raise funds through equity markets.  The relatively higher costs of equity are worth it 
to the entrepreneur trying to bring their product to the market.  In empirically testing for 
the Pecking Order theory of capital structure, Lemmon and Zender (2010) primarily 
found that firms do prefer internal funds before going to the market for external funds. 
Additionally, they empirically evaluated the consideration of debt capacity, finding that 
when firms are unconstrained by debt they will issue debt, but when constrained by debt 
will issue equity.  This is in accordance with the theory along the innovation life cycle, as 
radically innovative firms face larger constraints to debt financing and will typically lack 
retained earnings.   
Also showing a similar result, Frank and Goyal (2003) and Fama and French 
(2002) were able to show that firms without a debt rating are typically small, high growth 
companies that tend to finance more of their activities with equity.  Rather than arguing 
this phenomenon is driven by debt capacity, both studies argued that this is due to 
asymmetric information; debt investors will not be forthcoming with funds if they are 
unable to accurately assess the risks of default.  Firms in the earlier stages of the 





bankers to assess the risks.  This, therefore, limits the firms’ abilities to use debt, turning 
to equity.   
To restate, I hypothesize that firms in the earlier stages of the innovation life cycle 
will be more likely to raise funds through the stock market than firms in the later stages.  
In the earlier stages of the innovation life cycle, when firms are engaged in radically new 
technologies, they will have high capital requirements and be a questionable risk for 
bankers.  Because of the limited upside in the form of an interest rate and a reasonable 
likelihood of default, debt will be less of an option; these highly innovative firms are then 
left with equity as a more viable option.  Due to data limitations on pinpointing where 
firms fall within the innovation life cycle, it is also difficult to track firms’ specific 
financing choices over the life cycle.  Because of this, empirically testing the direct 
relationship between firms over the life cycle and their stock/bond choice is not possible.  
It is, however, possible to test whether firms engaged in highly innovative industries are 
more likely to raise funds through the stock market rather than the bond market.  Since 
more innovative activity will occur at the beginning of the life cycle, this will be an 
acceptable way to show support for the idea that firms in the earlier stages of the life 
cycle will be more likely to raise capital through the stock market. 
 
3.7. Empirical Methodology 
 Difficulties with pinpointing where firms fall in the innovation life cycle make it 
infeasible to directly test for what kinds of financing decisions firms will use over the life 
cycle.  What we are able to test for is whether firms in innovative industries are more 





earlier in the life cycle, showing that firms in industries with higher levels of innovation 
raise more funds through the stock market will be able to lend evidence to the life cycle 
financing hypothesis.  The empirical section presents an unbalanced panel of stock/bond 
issuance, patent activity, and various control variables for the time period 1970 to 1992. 
1970 was selected as the beginning of the time period because of the reliability of data on 
stock and bond issuance before that time is questionable.  Having the observed time 
period stop at the end of 1992 was to exclude the wave of stock offerings in the mid-
1990s as it could skew the results.  As most observers are aware, the mid-1990s saw an 
incredible number of technology companies issue IPOs.  Since most of these companies 
were in brand new industries, this time period was marked predominately by firms in 
radical industries issuing equity, supporting my hypothesis.   
The set up of the empirical models is performed as is standard in the literature, 
following the basic specifications of Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993).  In this case, the 
dependent variable is firm level stock market decisions, with the important explanatory 
variable being industry patenting while controlling for other industry, market, and time 
conditions.  Considering the two types of financing in each time period, firms had an 
option of financing their operations by using debt, or equity.  The dichotomous 
relationship of choosing to raise funds through equity or debt financing makes using a 
simple linear regression a potentially hazardous method of estimation.  For this reason, I 
am using a probit model estimating the probability of raising funds through the stock 
market relative to bond financing based around the simplified regression equation: 
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Where #$%&'(	)*+(,%-,.,/ is the probability of firms raising capital through 
the stock market, and is defined at firm level, f, in i industry in the time period t.  Since 
we are interested in the instances where firms are seeking external capital and there are 
only two options, bond and stock, the probabilities of raising funds through the bond 
market, #&
2	)*+(,%-,.,/, must be equal to 1 − #$%&'(	)*+(,%-,.,/.  

234%+5.,/ represents the industry level variables for all firms, f, within the industry, i.  
The industry level contains the important explanatory variable of industry 
innovation/patenting activity.  An additional industry-level control of returns will also be 
included.  I am controlling for various time variant market conditions with )*+(,%/; 
within this are a number of market factors traditionally in the literature and discussed in 
detail in the section below.  The 67, variable is a time trend controlling for controls for 
varying conditions over time.  
 Because of the possible presence of intra-industry and time correlations in the 
error terms, it is important to cluster standard errors. Within my data, there are industry 
and time variant effects.  I am treating heterogeneity bias by removing the interindustry 
effects and time (year) effects.  As such, I am clustering the standard errors at the 
industry/time level.  Within the dataset, there were 25,064 instances of firms raising 
capital across 71 industries and 46 time periods; clustering at the industry/time level 
results in a maximum possible 3,266 observations.  However, there were periods where 
no fundraising activity occurred for a specific industry, leaving 2,106 total independent 








 The dependent variable is this model is the ratio of stock market financing to the 
total amount of financing received in each time period.  The dataset incorporates all stock 
and bond issuance occurrences in the United States between 1970 and 1992 as reported in 
the Thomson Reuters SDC Database.  The dependent variable, SB.Ratio is given as: 
 
$. *%7&/ =	 :/";	<=>?/	@.=;.AB:/";	<=>?/	@.=;.ABCD"	@.=;.AB	  (3.2) 
 
Fund raising activity has been organized into 6-month time periods in order to 
gather a complete picture of their total external fund raising activity.  Firms may have 
large capital requirements and raise funds from numerous sources.  Each time period is 
organized as January through June and July through December, for a total of two time 
periods in each year between 1970 and the end of 1992 for a total of 46 time periods.   
For example, when t=1970, it indicates the first 6 months of 1970; t=1970.5 indicates 
July through December of 1970; etc.  These time designations are used for every variable 
in this model; firm fundraising, industry patenting, and market considerations are all 
factored over the 6-month time periods. 
The value of the dependent variable for a firm that raises capital only through the 
bond market would equal zero, while a firm who raised all their funds through the stock 
market would equal one.  As can be seen from firm’s actions in capital markets, it was 
unusual for a firm to raise capital through both stock and bond issuance in the same time 
period.  Of the 25,153 fund raising instances, there were only 89 where a firm raised 





These 89 instances present an interesting anomaly as the only plausible explanation as to 
why a firm would seek both bond and stock market issuance in the same time period 
would be that the costs/benefits were exactly identical.  This rare occurrence, 0.3%, 
demonstrates that firms are unlikely to seek funds through both avenues simultaneously.  
These are dropped from my analysis and will allow for the use of binomial regressions, 
leaving 25,064 instances of firm level fund raising.  This leads to a simpler dependent 
variable, where: 
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 Table 3.1 shows the total number of stock and bond issuances by year along with 
a simplified ratio of instances of stock financing to total financing activities; this is 
computed as IPO/(Bond + IPO).  There is significantly more activity in the bond market 
relative to the stock market, with minimal activity from the mid- to late 1970s.  The total 
dollar value of the bond market issuances is substantially larger than the fundraising used 
through stock issuance; the ratio of funds raised through the stock market is in the 
column labeled SB.Ratio.  Figure 3.5 shows the total number of fundraising instances 
graphically across time and Figure 3.6 displays the total dollar value of the fundraising 
activities.  It becomes evident that fundraising activity significantly increases beginning 
in the early 1980s after being stagnant through the 1970s.  After the change around 1980, 
the number of instances where firms have gone to the bond market for financing has been 
increasing at a relatively steady pace in contrast to the instances where firms raise funds 





but exhibits far more variation than the bond market.  This variation is indicative of 
underlying elements driving stock issuance. 
 Figure 3.7 displays the distribution of how many times a firm enters the market 
for external capital.  The horizontal axis displays the number of time a firm appears in the 
sample while the vertical axis is the number of firms that are included in each group.  Of 
the 12,131 firms that raised capital through either the bond or stock market in the time 
period the vast majority, 8,571, only went to the market a single time.  Firms that raised 
capital less than five times between 1970 and 1992 represent 93.5% of the observed 
firms.  The large number of firms with limited observations precludes the ability to use a 
dynamic panel or fixed effects model.  For example, the use of a fixed effects model 
would result in the dropping of 96.7% of observations. 
 
3.7.2. Industry Level Variables 
These data include all patents issued by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) and compiled by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001).  The relationship 
between where a firm is in the life cycle is as follows: stock market issuance correlates 
with patenting, innovative industries patent more, and more innovation occurs at the 
beginning of the innovation life cycle.  The empirical estimations of this paper are 
focused specifically on the relationship between patents and stock market issuance.  
Griliches (1998) acknowledged some of the difficulties in using patents as a proxy for 
innovation.  He argued that in spite of their difficulties, they are still quite useful; they are 
freely available, based on an objective and slow-moving standard, and are by definition 





of standards and whether conclusions can be drawn from across time.  The second issue 
of patent standards not being consistent across countries is not a relevant concern in this 
paper as only United States patent data are examined. 
 The patent data used in this analysis includes only utility patents granted in the 
United States as these are issued for the invention of “any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or a new and useful improvement 
thereof…” (Patent Laws and Regulations, 2000, p. E-25) and are generally referred to as 
“patents for invention.”  Since these patents are intended for new inventions, they proxy 
rather well for radical and important improvement innovations.  This data set excludes 
plant and design patents as these patents cannot be considered radical innovations as 
creating a plant with a higher yield, or that is more pest resistant, is not a radical 
departure from previous plants; design patents are a similar case as they only apply to 
“new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture” and are, therefore, 
more akin to pseudo-innovations.  
Industry level patenting is important; path-breaking innovations generated by 
innovation come in clusters, providing more opportunities for innovation by others in the 
industry.  While one firm in an industry might be the leader in patenting activity, there 
will be a large number of other firms attempting to bring the product to market.  
Industries with higher levels of patenting will contain more innovative firms.  
Information as to which firms are going to survive and succeed is not known with any 
level of certainty, but accurate forecasts of the success of the wider industry is known by 
most investors.  Pastor and Veronesi (2005) found that during technological revolutions 





because some will be winners, others losers, and it cannot be known a priori who will be 
the winners.   
Patent data from the USPTO are classified by internal codes that are not relatable 
to other variables.  Hall et al. (2001) were able to relate the internal USPTO codes to 
industries and other outside factors through a 3-digit US Patent class.  This US Patent 
class is assigned to the appropriate 2-digit SIC industry codes; the broader 2-digit codes 
were chosen because of the necessity to incorporate the spillover effects on closely 
related industries.  Due to the way assignments are referenced by the USPTO, some 
patents were referenced in a number of industries.  When this occurred, patents with 
applicability in multiple industries were included with the total count of patents for each 
industry they referenced; this results in total patent counts being overestimated.  During 
the time period, the total amount of actual patents was just under 1.9 million while my 
assignments resulted in just over six million assigned patents.  This is the optimal 
practice as there are innovations that have a wider application, and attempting to select a 
single industry for these would result in subjective assessments of the data.  Patents are 
reported according to the year they were received; the time periods, however, are every 6 
months.  To reconcile this, the way the patents are assigned was to place the half of the 
yearly number of patents in the first half of the year (e.g., 1970, 1971, etc.) and then 
assign the second half of the year as the average of the two surrounding time periods 
(e.g., 1970.5 = (1970 + 1971)/2).  Assigning patents in the manner allows for continuous 
patenting data.  A summary of the patents received by industries with the aggregate 





In all industries with 2-digit SIC codes above 57, there are zero patents granted; 
this represents 27 of the 71 industries without patent activity.  After excluding design and 
plant patents, these industries did not have any utility patents; the majority of these 
industries are involved in the service sectors where product and process innovations 
would be rare.  Due to the possibility of skewing the model results, a secondary model 
excluding all industries above 57 will be estimated alongside the original model, and their 
estimates will be compared.  Removing these industries results in a reduction of sample 
size from 2,106 to 1,442 observations.  Although this is a large reduction in sample size, 
it is not expected that any significant changes will occur.   
 Following the market timing literature, when stock values are higher, firms are 
more likely to raise funds through equity.  While market returns are also included, 
industry returns are also necessary to control for since individual industries do not 
necessarily correlate with the wider market.  One of the main considerations for the 
inclusion of industry controls is that if an asset price bubble is emerging in a specific 
industry, the valuations a radically new firm would receive could be greatly overvalued.  
These high valuations could be an easy decision for a firm to raise capital through equity.  
Time-variant stock returns for industries are included to pick up the industry level 
variation that could be overlooked by returns from the entire market.  It is expected that 
as industry returns rise, there will be more stock market issuance because of the higher 
valuations associated with the industry. 
 Industry returns data are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
and incorporates all publicly listed stocks in the United States on NYSE, AMEX, and 





index according to the 2-digit SIC codes.  This computation is accomplished by 
computing the return accrued from the overall industry.  The returns over the period were 
computed as a simple percentage change from the beginning of the period to the end of 
the time period based on the cumulative industry prices of publicly traded stock.  In some 
of the smaller industries where there is less external capital raised, there were not any 
publicly traded stocks.  This was the case for 59 of the fund raising instances; these 
without any corresponding public stocks were discarded from the analysis.   
 
3.7.3. Market Control Variables 
 In order to control for hypotheses proposed by market timing theorists I use a 
number of variables to proxy for market conditions.  These are time variant and include: 
the business cycle, interest rates, market return, and other constructed variables 
commonly used in the literature.  Complete data descriptions can be found in Table 3.3.   
The business cycle plays a key role in the fundraising decisions surrounding firms 
due to its effects on both investor and company expectations.  The expected impact of the 
business cycle on SB.Ratio is ambiguous.  It could be negative since when the economy 
is in an expansion, equity tends to receive a higher market value, leading to more stock 
issuance relative to bonds.  It is also possible to be positive since in times of economic 
expansion lenders typically assign lower probabilities of default and bankruptcy.  
Supporting this idea, Choe, et al. (1993) found evidence that common stock offerings are 
positively correlated with the business cycle.  With a positive correlation, supply 
constraints placed on innovative firms will be lessened and firms will raise more funds 





I am controlling for the business cycle using the official estimates of US Business 
Cycle Expansions and Contractions as released by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER).  The NBER defines a contraction as significant declines in a number 
of factors: real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-
retail sales. The subjectivity of these measurements is used alongside the traditional 
definition of a recession as two consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP in order to 
more accurately date the peaks and troughs in the changes of economic activity. 3   The 
time between the trough and the peak was considered to be a time of economic 
expansion, while contraction was the time following a peak until the trough was reached 
again.  I fashioned a simplistic dummy variable with expansions equal to one and 
contractions equal to zero.  Since the exact peak and trough are not likely to be assigned 
on exactly January 1 or July 1, they are going to fall somewhere within the 6-month time 
periods.  For this reason, the 6-month time periods that included a peak were assigned the 
expansion value of one, while those including the trough received the contraction value 
of zero.   
To account for changes in interest rates, I use the rates on 1-month and 10-year 
treasury bills.  The reasoning for including interest rates is that there is a positive 
relationship between interest rates and costs to service debt; when these costs rise, firms 
should be more likely to look to equity financing since the costs of stock market 
financing have become less expensive relative to debt.  It is expected that the coefficients 
attached to the different interest rates is positive.  The short-term and long-term are both 
used in order to be inclusive of the decisions firms may make.  While long-and short-term 
                                                           
3
 For a complete description of how the NBER dates the business cycle, please see the most recent NBER 





interest rates typically move together, we expect that the long-term interest rates will 
have more of an impact on stock market issuance since most future projects are based off 
long term debt contracts.   
The “risk free rate” (one month T-Bills) is also included in order to assess the 
difference in market returns to the risk free rate.  Most of the market timing literature 
posits that there is a positive relationship between short-term interest rates and stock 
issuance.  It is purported to exist for the same reason as long-term interest rates; increased 
interest rates raise borrowing costs which make equity relatively cheaper.  However, 
there exists the possibility of a negative relationship.  One month T-Bills, considered 
“risk free,” is the reference rate all other investments are compared to.  When this rises, 
investors will require higher expected returns from any other investments that carry risk, 
thereby discounting any equity issues.  The costs imposed by a lower valuation could be 
greater than any incremental increase in debt service. 
The other factor of stock/bond issuance is the current market return; if the market 
seems to offer a higher return on stocks, investors will pay more for a stock offering; the 
higher valuation means the firm has a higher likelihood of being overvalued and, 
therefore, is going to be more likely to raise funds through the stock market.  This 
variable, Mkt Return, is measured as the weighted average equity return of the Standard 
& Poor’s 500 Index over the 6-month time periods.  The S&P 500 is used because it is 
one of the most followed indexes of equity returns, and its diversity makes it an indicator 
of the health of the United States economy.  The expected coefficient of market return 
should be positive; when the stock market is booming and there are high returns, firms’ 





An additional variable used for determining relative returns to both investors and 
firms is MKTRF, which is the difference between the market return and the risk free rate.  
The measurement of market return under this variable differs from the variable Mkt 
Return in that it is the value-weight return of all firms in the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database incorporated in the United States and listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ rather than the more narrow S&P 500.  For consistency, 
this definition of market return is used because MKTRF is a component of the Fama-
French model discussed in the below section.  It is expected that there will be a positive 
relationship between MKTRF and SB.Ratio.  The intuition is that when MKTRF is higher, 
equity is receiving a greater return relative to debt, and there is a reasonable likelihood 
that equity is overvalued by the market.  Perhaps one of the most important single 
variables, this difference is a direct test of the difference between returns to equity and 
debt.   
The basis of many portfolio theories is the Fama–French and Carhart models of 
portfolio returns.  The variables from these models will act as important controls since 
rational investors will evaluate a variety of portfolio choices, making their investment 
decisions based on the underlying factors.  For this reason, the variables included in these 
models make good control variables.  Since my contention is that increased innovation 
should lead to higher incidence of stock market issuance due to higher risk, investors 
must be compensated for this additional risk.  Some of the underlying factors of returns 
are also included as control variables; in a perfect capital market these additional factors 
would add nothing to the analysis.  The Fama–French Three Factor Model (Fama & 





In addition to CAPM’s accounting for nondiversifiable market risk, Fama–French 
incorporates the observation that small caps and value stocks (high book to market value) 
tend to do better than the market as a whole.  Additionally, returns must be corrected for 
the risk associated with holding the particular stocks.  This relationship between returns 
above the risk-free-rate can be defined as: 
 
ER = Return – Risk-Free-Rate = a + B*Mkt + B*SMB + B*HML + e  (3.4) 
 
Small-Minus-Big (SMB) is a measurement of the percentage of small cap versus 
large cap stocks within a portfolio.  A higher SMB indicates that the market has a higher 
proportion of small companies than large.  Since small firms are more likely to require 
equity financing, the expected correlation between SMB and SB.Ratio is positive.  The 
other variable in this model, High-Minus-Low (HML), is a portfolio measurement of the 
percentage of value stocks (high book to market value) relative to growth stocks.  
Radically innovative firms fall under the growth category because they do not have as 
many assets as the old industries and much of their value lies in intangible assets.  It is 
expected that the correlation between HML and SB.Ratio is negative since a higher 
proportion of value stocks precludes that the industries have less intangible assets and 
more access to debt markets. 
Expanding the Fama–French Three-Factor Model is the Carhart Four-Factor 
Model (Carhart, 1997).  This asset pricing model adds an additional variable known as 
momentum (UMD); this variable is derived from the idea that stocks have “memory,” 





those currently doing poorly will continue on their current trend.  Each of these variables 
is used by many fund managers to assist in their decisions for building a diversified stock 
portfolio.  The basic Four-Factor Model is represented by: 
 
ER = a + B*Mkt + B*SMB + B*HML + B*UMD + e          (3.5) 
 
Substantial debate has arisen in the literature as to whether a momentum strategy 
is actually profitable, with a number of empirical studies arising to test whether there is a 
basis for it.   Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document a simplistic trading strategy of 
buying stocks that performed well in the past and selling those with poor past 
performance, finding profitable strategies in holding these stocks for 3- to 12-month time 
periods.  Momentum could influence strategies based around market timing, in that if 
firms are accurately able to time the market, they would be closely following the market.  
If issuing stock, the firms would seek to issue at precisely the right time.  The expected 
direction of correlation would be positive as momentum in the positive direction would 
imply a higher valuation for the stock.  Conversely, Conrad and Kaul (1998) find no 
statistical difference between using a momentum or contrarian strategies.  A contrarian 
strategy is the exact opposite of a momentum strategy; it is based upon the premise that 
markets overreact to news events and that the most appropriate trading strategy would be 
to purchase those with recent losses and short the stocks with recent gains.  Furthering 
this result is the finding that the large cross-sectional variation could account for the gains 





between two polar opposite trading strategies makes it questionable whether they will 
enter significantly into any of the estimations. 
 Although the unbalanced nature of the sample makes using a dynamic panel 
model suboptimal, it is still necessary to control for changes across time.  The time trend 
is controlled for by transforming the years into an index beginning at 1.  This is 
accomplished by subtracting 1969 from each time period, resulting in a range of time 
periods from 1 to 23.5.  It is expected that the direction of correlation will be positive as 
firms seem to be much more open to financing through the stock market due to the 
observation of more financing beginning in the early 1980s.  It is also possible that there 
is not any relationship since bond financing was also increasing throughout the period at 
a similar rate. 
 
3.8. Results 
There were four basic cohorts of models with eight individual models within 
each, for a total of 32 estimations.  In each of these, evidence in support of my hypothesis 
that innovative firms are more likely to pursue financing from the stock market relative to 
the bond market is found.  The first of these cohorts directly tests the market timing 
variables to control for market circumstances and is shown in Table 3.4.  Industry returns 
are added and presented in Table 3.5.  Table 3.6’s results are based around the Fama-
French and Carhart models, incorporating the business cycle and industry controls.  The 
eight individual models that generate the best fit from the above cohorts are reported in 
Table 3.6 and incorporate the additional time trend variable.  Table 3.7 then presents 





provides coefficients, standard errors, statistical significance, and the marginal effects at 
the median for each variable, along with Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) testing for 
multicollinearity. 
 Testing the hypothesis that more innovative firms are more likely to raise funds 
through stock market issuance uses the number of patents granted (PGrant) as a proxy for 
innovation.  As such, we expect that as more patents are granted, firms should become 
more likely to raise funds through equity issuance.  PGrant enters into every estimation 
highly significant, effectively showing that firms in industries with large amounts of 
innovative activity will be more likely to raise funds through the stock market than those 
in industries without technological innovations.  PGrant was significant at least at the 
0.1% level in every estimation.  The marginal effects did not vary much, and a one 
standard deviation increase from the median4 in granted patents ranges between a 1.27 
and 1.62% increase in probability of raising funds through the stock market with an 
average of 1.42%. Considering that the probability of raising funds through the stock 
market remained around 8.4%, a one standard deviation change from patent grant’s 
median of 1.42% is substantial.  Regardless of which controls were added to the model, 
there were only small changes in coefficients, p-values, or marginal effects observed for 
PGrant, resulting in strong support for my hypothesis. 
 
3.8.1. Base Model 
 The basic model estimating the effects of innovation on stock market issuance is 
based around the market timing literature with results presented in Table 3.4.  Controls 
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used in this model include estimating the influence of the business cycle (Bus.cycle), 
short-term and long-term interest rates (RF and 10.YrT-Bills respectively), and return on 
the market (Mkt.Ret).  Because of the relationship between short-and long-term interest 
rates and the perceived importance of market returns, model selection includes a number 
of combinations. 
The important, explanatory variable, PGrant, did not face much variation within 
the results from the models included in the first estimations.  Results from these 
estimations show coefficients for innovation (PGrant) in a tight band from 0.044 to 
0.046, with statistical significance at the 0.1% level in every estimation.  Where this 
becomes important is to determine the changes in the likelihood of raising funds through 
the stock market relative to the bond market.  An increase in one standard deviation 
change in patenting activity from the median will result in a higher likelihood of raising 
funds through the stock market between 1.29 and 1.47%.  The differences between the 
least innovative industries are a significant number of patents; the difference between the 
most and least patenting industries results in the most innovative being 14.25% more 
likely to raise funds through stock market issuance.   
 The business cycle (Bus.Cycle) plays an important role in the decisions firms 
make when they are seeking external capital.  Bus.Cycle enters significantly (at the 5% 
level) into three out of seven regressions it is included in, with one of those being 
significant at the 1% level.  Computing the  change in the likelihood of raising stock 
versus bonds on the models where Bus.Cycle is significant, a discrete change results in a 
change in the likelihood ratio between -2.00 and -2.74%.  Effectively this means that 





market; the intuitive explanation for this is that lenders assign a lower probability of 
default when the economy is expanding and will ration credit less. 
The inclusion of the two interest rates (10YrT-Bill and RF) provided some 
surprising results.  Where we would have traditionally thought that increases in the 
interest rate (in both the short and long term rates) would lead to higher borrowing costs 
for the firm, creating an incentive to seek equity financing, we actually see the opposite.  
Sign flipping can be viewed on 10YrT-Bill when short-term interest rates (RF) are 
included, yet are still statistically significant in every model it is included in.  The 
interaction of these two interests rates are expectedly related and show some collinearity 
between them.  On the two models where they are both included (5 and 6), the mean VIF 
jumps to 2.25 and 2.07.  Using the rule of thumb that VIF values above 5 needs to be 
reevaluated, these models would be acceptable.  However, individual VIF values for 
10YrT-Bill and RF are both around 3.5 and tolerance values below 0.3, meaning that 
these variables show some collinearity.   Even though these two variables are collinear 
with each other, no adjustments to the model are made as they are not collinear with or 
change the variable of interest, PGrant.  If it were attempted to quantify the individual 
impact of these variables out of collinear estimations, confidence in my estimates would 
arise.  Since I am not attempting to quantify the impact of these interest rates and am only 
using them to control for external factors, it is acceptable to leave the model as is, report 
the results, and acknowledging the limitations.  This decision was made because the 
inclusion of the variables provides a better fit as both interest rates can influence the costs 





RF displays strongly negative coefficient values between -40.408 and -108.048, 
and they are significant at the 1% level.   The one standard deviation change in the 
likelihood ratio from over 2% when 10YrT-Bills are included drops to under 1% when it 
is excluded.  This negative coefficient indicates that as the risk free rate increases, 
investors will require a higher return on any other investments since the risk premium is 
indexed off the risk free rate.  These higher returns must come from a lower valuation 
assigned to firms looking for capital through equity issuance.  The strength of the 
coefficient indicates that the effects on the costs of debt service are far outweighed by 
investor requirements for equity returns. 
The relationship between 10YrT-Bill and RF shows the possibility of joint effects.  
The interesting thing to note is that the only time the coefficients attached to T-Bills are 
statistically significant is when both variables are included in the same model.  By itself, 
X has a negative, insignificant coefficient while the inclusion of Y turns it into being 
positive and statistically significant.  The coefficient for Y also changes as X are both in 
the same model as Y’s coefficient increases in magnitude.  A possible explanation of this 
phenomenon is that financing decisions are sensitive to the spread between the interest 
rates.  These coefficients support the notion that as the spread widens between interest 
rates, firms would be more likely to raise funds through the stock market.  The intuition 
would be that since investments are risk adjusted to the risk free rate, that as the spread 
widens between the variables, long-term debt becomes more expensive relative to other 
avenues of financing.  Under the assumptions of the market time theorists, this could 





Past market returns (Mkt Return) are strongly associated with stock market 
issuance.  The average coefficient of 9.8 is in keeping with the predictions of theory.  As 
the market return rises, firms’ valuations rise with it; at higher valuations, firms will be 
more likely to raise funds through equity issuance.  Highly statistically significant at the 
0.1% level, this variable has relatively high marginal effects, with a one standard 
deviation change from the median changing the likelihood of raising funds through the 
stock market between 1.31 and 1.45%.  Even controlling for interest rates, high past 
market returns are a significant indicator that firms will be more likely to issue equity. 
 
3.8.2. Industry Returns Cohort 
 The second cohort of models on the determination of the stock/bond choice 
includes industry controls (Ind.Returns), with model selection being identical to the first 
cohort; results are reported in Table 3.5.  Controlling for industry returns should pick up 
any industry factors that went excluded in the first cohort of models as those controls 
were purely based off the market.  There are only minor changes for PGrant and the 
other control variables; this variation is subtle enough to not question the results from the 
first models. 
 According to VIF tests, the only models with elevated VIF levels are 13 and 14, 
which include RF and 10YrT-Bills as the collinear factors, discussed in the base model 
cohort section.  Including the industry return control variable should pick up any inter-
industry variation.  The results from this variable are insignificant in every model.  It was 





debt/equity decisions.  The dominance of market returns seem to point to the wider 
market as being more important in determining capital decisions than industry returns. 
 
3.8.3. Fama–French Cohort 
 Model selection on the third cohort is based around variations of the Fama–
French and Carhart models with the addition of business cycle factors and industry 
controls.  Results from these Fama–French estimations can be found in Table 3.6.  
PGrant remains statistically significant at the 0.1% level and displays little change from 
the earlier models.  Even though there exists the possibility of multicollinearity for these 
variables because of the inclusion of variables from the model on both sides of the Fama–
French model formulation, according to the VIF tests, multicollinearity does not appear 
to be a problem that needs correction. 
As MKTRF rises, there is a greater disparity between returns and the reference of 
the risk free rate.  This implies a higher market value, on average, for equities.  When 
investors in the market place higher values on equities there is a higher likelihood that a 
new issue will be overvalued and bring firms more funds.  This is evidenced by positive 
coefficients ranging between 7.254 and 7.962 with a one standard deviation change in the 
likelihood ratio from 1.92 to 2.10%.  MKTRF’s coefficients and statistical significance 
remain relatively constant with a considerable impact, indicating that the difference 
between the returns and the interest rate is an important factor.  One interpretation is that 
as the gap rises, there is the potential of a bubble emerging; when a bubble has emerged, 
there is the possibility of having IPO waves like what were seen in the dotcom bubble 





The inclusion of all the Fama–French variables can be troublesome within the 
regressions because as specified by Fama–French, MKTRF is set up on the left side of the 
equation with the factors on the right side.  This is noticed by the elevated mean VIF in 
models 22–24, but is not significant enough to warrant adjustment of the models.  Since 
SMB, HML, and UMD are expected to be some of the underlying factors on increases in 
the return to a portfolio, it is expected that MKTRF will dominate the results obtained for 
the individual components.  The dominance of MKTRF explains some of the sign 
switching experienced by SMB, with the remainder being attributed to the collinearity.  
The inclusion of all variables in model 23 shows statistical significance only for PGrant, 
Bus.Cycle, and MktRF.   
SMB only becomes significant in one of the estimations—when MKTRF and 
HML are not included.  As SMB, the percentage of small cap to large cap stocks, rises, 
there is the expectation that returns to the portfolio will also rise.  Knowing that as 
investors’ portfolios become more loaded with small cap stocks, the market should have 
higher valuations and enable more firms to raise more external funds through the stock 
market.  HML, high book-to-market to low book-to-market values, is traditionally a good 
metric to use when forecasting future returns to a portfolio.  Falling into a similar 
collinearity problem as SMB, HML is highly correlated with MKTRF.  As such, both 
HML and SMB are insignificant when MKTRF is included in the same estimation.  
However, HML appears to be more significant than SMB as it is statistically significant at 
the 5% level whenever MKTRF is not included, even though the marginal effects are not 





is not significant at any level and displays large standard errors.  UMD was not expected 
to show any level of importance due to the averaging over the 6-month time periods.   
 
3.8.4. Time Trend Cohort 
 Results from the inclusion of the time trend are reported in Table 3.7.  Model 
selection was based on selecting the models with the best fit from the above cohorts.  The 
inclusion of the time factor does not alter the estimates on PGrant; the coefficients and 
statistical significance remain at similar levels.  Using the models with the best fit 
tightens the band within which a one standard deviation change in the likelihood of 
issuing stock ranges between 1.37 and 1.41%.  Within these models, the only Fama–
French variable to remain included is MKTRF; it also excludes Ind.Returns as it does not 
appear to be an important indicator of decisions regarding stock market decisions.   
Over time, increases in stock market issuance are viewed so the inclusion of the 
time trend provides the expected positive, statistically significant relationship in half of 
the models.  In these, Time was significant at the 5% level and has a one standard 
deviation move in Time results in marginal changes at the median of between 0.73 and 
1.05%.  Three of the models display significance at the 10% level, and are when 
Mkt.Returns and MKTRF are included.  With an average marginal effect at the median of 
0.77%, meaning that every 5.66 years there is an increase in the probability of raising 
funds through the stock market of 0.77%. 
When the controls are included, they present the expected signs and statistical 
significance.  Immediately evident, the exception to this is 10YrTBills which loses its 





significant at the 0.1% level and dominates the results from the other control variables.  
Secondarily, when this variable is included are the only times when Bus.Cycle enters 
significantly.  The inclusion of these two variables appears to be important indicators of 
whether a firm will raise funds through stock and would lend some evidence to the 
market timing theories of capital structure. 
 
3.8.5. Reduced Sample 
 As noted in the data section above, after the exclusion of design and plant patents, 
there was no patenting activity reported for 2-digit SIC codes 59 and above.  Due to 
possibility that these nonvalues could skew the results, the models were then rerun 
including only the industries with utility patent activity reported; this reduces the sample 
size by 32%, from 2,106 in the full sample to 1,442 in the reduced sample, clustering for 
industry/time.  Results are reported in Table 3.8 with the model selection identical to the 
time trend cohort of models.  
Excluding a significant chunk of the observations without patenting activity could 
produce drastically different results for PGrant than for the models, including the full 
sample as this is excluding industries without any patent activity.  However, this sample 
size reduction does not greatly affect the coefficients and statistical significance attached 
to PGrant.  PGrant is still significant at the 0.1%, with standard errors widening slightly 
from 0.009 to 0.011.  Of note is that even with removing a large portion of the sample 






Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of these regressions is that Bus.Cycle is 
no longer statistically significant in any model.  The only plausible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that this expansion/contraction variable is not as important in the reduced 
sample and that changes influenced by the business cycle are picked up by other market 
factors.  The risk free rate also is not significant in the reduced sample models, yet market 
returns and MKTRF retain their earlier results.  The end result of the reduction in sample 
size is that the relationship between PGrant has been strengthened, yet some of the other 
market variables become less significant.  Some of this can be an artifact of removing a 
substantial portion of firms and industries in the sample.  However, this analysis provides 
substantial evidence that firms with higher innovative activity/patenting will be more 
likely to raise funds through the stock market than less innovative firms while controlling 
for potentially confounding variables. 
 
3.9. Conclusion 
 In answering the question of when firms seek equity financing over debt financing 
when searching for external capital, it was hypothesized that radically innovative firms at 
the beginning of the Schumpeterian innovation life cycle will be more likely to look to 
equity than firms at the end of the life cycle with less innovative activity.  The primary 
contribution of this paper was linking this life cycle to firm capital structure and decisions 
firms make when attempting to raise external capital through the bond and stock 
channels.   
 As shown in the above analysis, firms in radically innovative industries are more 





in mature industries.  Strongly significant results are obtained for PGrant when 
controlling for time, industry returns, the Fama–French factors as well as a variety of 
market factors, including short-and long-run interest rates, returns on the market and 
business cycle factors.  Future research would seek to incorporate some of the additional 
considerations firms make when seeking external capital.  This research added the 
element of innovation within the Schumpeterian innovation life cycle to the dominant 
theories of firm capital structure.  While each of the capital structure theories is explained 
in a different way, radically innovative firms, having lower leverage, are consistent 
across models. 
 By using patent activity as a proxy for innovative activity I find statistically 
significant evidence that innovative firms are more likely to raise capital through equity 
issuance than firms without innovative activity. By using patents as a proxy for 
innovation, I am able to show that firms with more patent activity have a higher 
likelihood of raising funds through the stock market using probit estimation procedures 
and clustered standard errors.  The impact of patents was far from insignificant and 
appeared as a much stronger predictor of firm financing than some of the other prominent 
variables in the literature.  A limitation of this study is the inability to pinpoint where in 
the innovation life cycle firms are when they are seeking external capital.  This is an 
avenue in which future research would be able to contribute; the determination of where 
the transition points occur and at what point firms begin searching for equity financing 
through the stock market would be of significant value.  The other path in expanding this 
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Figure 3.2: Output Over the Life Cycle 
Source: Keklik (2003) 






Figure 3.3: Stock Issuance Over Time 





Table 3.1: Data Summary 
 IPO Bond IPO/Total  IPO ($ Mil)   Bond ($ Mil)  SB.Ratio 
1970 16 187 0.079                 48              9,397  0.005 
1970.5 8 240 0.032                 25            13,778  0.002 
1971 22 251 0.081              109            13,686  0.008 
1971.5 21 184 0.102              104              9,505  0.011 
1972 34 225 0.131              118            10,336  0.011 
1972.5 27 157 0.147              158              8,829  0.017 
1973 14 140 0.091              727              7,118  0.085 
1973.5 2 125 0.016                   6              8,491  0.001 
1974 1 169 0.006                   2            13,170  0.000 
1974.5 0 168 0.000                  -             14,414  0.000 
1975 0 252 0.000                  -             22,073  0.000 
1975.5 1 183 0.005                 17            11,961  0.001 
1976 6 181 0.032                 72            16,374  0.004 
1976.5 4 166 0.024                 66            13,050  0.005 
1977 5 147 0.033                 80            12,747  0.006 
1977.5 2 163 0.012                   5            12,111  0.000 
1978 1 154 0.006                 26            10,947  0.002 
1978.5 3 122 0.024                 12              9,302  0.001 
1979 6 129 0.044                 38            13,077  0.003 
1979.5 7 138 0.048                 43            12,213  0.004 
1980 8 206 0.037                 63            21,710  0.003 
1980.5 31 163 0.160              398            15,067  0.025 
1981 40 423 0.086              360            25,063  0.014 
1981.5 33 441 0.070              360            22,637  0.015 
1982 8 402 0.020                 52            20,109  0.003 
1982.5 15 582 0.025              228            42,632  0.005 
1983 57 552 0.094           1,553            38,240  0.038 
1983.5 121 507 0.193           1,894            33,857  0.050 
1984 40 422 0.087              673            34,487  0.019 
1984.5 35 629 0.053              730            60,809  0.012 
1985 36 684 0.050              692            58,270  0.012 
1985.5 58 911 0.060           2,638            92,647  0.027 
1986 83 931 0.082           2,573          124,712  0.020 
1986.5 130 1087 0.107           5,764          148,183  0.036 
1987 108 1023 0.095           8,652          127,891  0.060 
1987.5 88 982 0.082           4,489          131,663  0.032 
1988 57 1072 0.050           7,185          164,414  0.040 
1988.5 55 1148 0.046           4,851          168,924  0.027 
1989 54 1016 0.050           4,057          188,098  0.021 
1989.5 67 1088 0.058           4,521          203,971  0.021 
1990 66 857 0.072           4,870          160,651  0.029 
1990.5 31 796 0.037           1,902          149,075  0.012 
1991 76 878 0.080           4,063          227,327  0.017 
1991.5 132 896 0.128           8,075          229,081  0.033 
1992 160 951 0.144         11,220          334,536  0.031 
1992.5 137 1089 0.112           6,246          307,170  0.020 



































































































































































































Figure 3.5: Bond and IPO Activity Over Time: Total 
instances 

































Number of Instances a Firm Raises External Capital
Frequency





Table 3.2: Industry Fundraising and patenting 
2 Digit Description 2 Digit SIC N - Fundraising Total Patents SB.Ratio 
Metal Mining 10 72                27,446  0.0452 
Coal Mining 12 55                25,163  0.0000 
Oil and Gas Extraction 13 712             169,446  0.0161 
Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 14 32                77,015  0.1317 
Building Cnstrctn - General Contractors & Operative Builders 15 115                65,057  0.0476 
Heavy Cnstrctn, Except Building Construction - Contractors 16 35             188,841  0.1692 
Construction - Special Trade Contractors 17 31             165,873  0.0254 
Food and Kindred Products 20 451             117,569  0.0084 
Tobacco Products 21 45             303,144  0.0262 
Textile Mill Products 22 95                66,542  0.0810 
Apparel, Finished Prdcts from Fabrics & Similar Materials 23 102                57,895  0.0898 
Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 24 87             107,909  0.0084 
Furniture and Fixtures 25 46             121,546  0.0361 
Paper and Allied Products 26 286             181,111  0.0098 
Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 27 238             184,377  0.0433 
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 717             154,852  0.0426 
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 29 141             255,432  0.0164 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 30 129             303,486  0.0443 
Leather and Leather Products 31 40                95,174  0.1583 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 32 188             127,107  0.0249 
Primary Metal Industries 33 284             165,381  0.0491 
Fabricated Metal Prdcts, Except Machinery & Transport Eqpmnt 34 174             140,079  0.0192 
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 35 594             181,631  0.0450 
Electronic, Elctrcl Eqpmnt & Cmpnts, Excpt Computer Eqpmnt 36 516             178,845  0.0842 
Transportation Equipment 37 452             182,126  0.0095 
Measuring, Analysing and Control Instruments 38 364                91,135  0.0920 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 39 105             118,926  0.0934 
Railroad Transportation 40 476             165,350  0.0001 
Local, Suburban Transit & Interurbn Hgwy Passenger Transport 41 31                60,309  0.0000 
Motor Freight Transportation 42 85                94,728  0.1057 
United States Postal Service 43 1                             -   0.0000 
Water Transportation 44 219             161,412  0.0484 
Transportation by Air 45 472             142,258  0.0057 
Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 46 82             140,025  0.0243 
Transportation Services 47 132                35,600  0.0090 
Communications 48 1159             183,199  0.0086 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 49 3516                70,720  0.0025 
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 50 269                95,887  0.0374 
Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 51 197                73,732  0.0384 
Building Materials, Hardwear and Garden Supply 52 54                90,321  0.0300 
General Merchandise Stores 53 260                51,825  0.0156 
Food Stores 54 244             102,351  0.0097 
Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 55 48             404,268  0.0296 
Apparel and Accessory Stores 56 79             350,850  0.1713 
Home Furniture, Furnishings and Equipment Stores 57 69                             -   0.1759 
Eating and Drinking Places 58 158                             -   0.0504 
Miscellaneous Retail 59 204                             -   0.0485 
Depository Institutions 60 3802                             -   0.0075 
Nondepository Credit Institutions 61 2019                             -   0.0005 
Security & Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges & Services 62 367                             -   0.0107 
Insurance Carriers 63 500                             -   0.0628 
Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service 64 46                             -   0.0417 
Real Estate 65 887                             -   0.0021 
Holding and Other Investment Offices 67 1691                             -   0.2494 
Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 70 234                             -   0.0366 
Personal Services 72 28                             -   0.1038 
Business Services 73 673                             -   0.0751 
Automotive Repair, Services and Parking 75 140                             -   0.0066 
Miscellaneous Repair Services 76 3                             -   0.5210 








Table 3.2 continued: Industry Fundraising and patenting. 
Amusement and Recreation Services 79 53                             -    0.0452 
Health Services 80 379                             -    0.0652 
Legal Services 81 18                             -    0.0063 
Educational Services 82 37                             -    0.0452 
Social Services 83 14                             -    0.4453 
Museums, Art Galleries and Botanical and Zoological Gardens 84 1                             -    0.0000 
Membership Organizations 86 49                             -    0.0000 
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management & Related Svcs 87 212                             -    0.0909 
Services, Not Elsewhere Classified 89 3                             -    0.0000 
Administration of Environmental Quality and Housing Programs 95 1                             -    1.0000 
National Security and International Affairs 97 1                             -    0.0000 





Table 3.3: Data Description 
Var 
Name 




Ratio of stock issuance to bond issuance for all public issuance 1970-
1992.  Computed as: total proceeds of stock issuance to proceeds from 
bond issuance plus stock issuance for each 6 month period.  Binomial 
variable equal to one when the firm raises funds through stock market 
issuance and zero when through the bond market.  Bond classifications 
included:  Asset Backed, Convertible, High-Yield Corporate, 
Investment Grade Corporate, and Mortgage Backed.   
Source: Thomson Reuters SDC Database 
n/a n/a 
PGrant Granted patents over The six month time periods.   
Source: NBER Patent database, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg(2001) 
1.838 2.336 
Time Time factor; used to control for the time trend of stock market issuance.  
Calculated as time period minus 1969, resulting in time periods ranging 




Industry returns computed as a market return average 2-digit SIC 
industries over the six month time periods.  Includes returns on all 
publicly held stocks in the United States listed on the NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ stock exchanges. Values listed as percentage. 




Dummy Business Cycle Variable equal to one when economy is in 
expansion and zero when a contraction. 




Average 10 year T-Bill rate over each 6 month period and acts as the 
long run interest rate 
Source: WRDS 
8.94 1.98 
RF Risk Free Rate (1 Month T-Bill), averaged over the six month time 
periods. 




Average market (S&P 500) return over the 6 month period. 
Source: S&P 500 
0.0095 0.0113 
MKTRF Excess return on the market as measured by a value weighted return of 
all securities minus the rate of return on one month T-Bills.  Averaged 
over the 6 month period. 
Source: Fama French, WRDS 
0.006 0.021 
SMB Small Minus Big = 1/3(Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth) 
        - 1/3(Big Value + Big Neutral + Big Growth) 
Measured on the market averaged over the 6 month period. 
Source: Fama French, WRDS 
-0.0004 0.013 
HML High Minus Low = ½(Small Value + Big Value) - ½(Small Growth + 
Big Growth) 
Measured on the market averaged over the 6 month period. 
Source: Fama French, WRDS 
0.004 0.015 
UMD Momentum Indicator, averaged over the six month time periods.  
Higher value indicates that stocks are on the upward swing while lower 








Ratio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
PGrant 0.046 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.045 0.044 0.046
0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
1.47% 1.38% 1.38% 1.31% 1.29% 1.35% 1.35% 1.38%
Bus.Cycle -0.110 -0.097 -0.135 -0.197 -0.140 -0.098 -0.146
0.067 0.066 0.070' 0.072** 0.068* 0.066 0.068*
-1.55% -1.36% -1.85% -2.74% -2.00% -1.36% -2.11%
10Yr T-Bill -0.015 0.055 0.077 -0.008
0.014 0.028* 0.028** 0.014
-0.38% 1.33% 1.83% -0.20%
RF -88.419 -108.048 -40.408 -40.492
29.0** 29.53*** 14.99** 14.47**
-2.01% -2.38% -0.96% -0.97%
Mkt Return 10.766 9.145 8.981
2.46*** 2.43*** 2.41***
1.45% 1.33% 1.31%
Constant -1.526 -1.446 -1.323 -1.397 -1.550 -1.281 -1.217 1.441
0.039*** 0.067*** 0.143*** 0.144*** .149*** .120*** 0.118*** 0.148***
Mean VIF 1.00 1.00 1.03 2.25 2.07 1.03 1.00 1.06
*** significant at 0.1%
** sig at 1%
* sig at 5%
 'at 10%
Table 3.4: Base Model
Bolded value is coef, 2nd is SE with stat significance, 3rd is 1 StDev change
Ratio 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
PGrant 0.047 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.044 0.044 0.045
0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
1.47% 1.39% 1.39% 1.31% 1.27% 1.33% 1.35% 1.36%
Ind.Return 0.058 0.029 0.023 0.032 -0.135 -0.141 0.019 -0.140
0.066 0.071 0.073 0.068 0.127 0.128 0.073 0.132
0.20% 0.10% 0.08% 0.10% -0.41% -0.46% 0.06% -0.46%
Bus.Cycle -0.107 -0.095 -0.133 -0.215 -0.159 -0.096 -0.165
0.068 0.067 0.070' 0.075** 0.071* 0.067 0.071*
-1.50% -1.33% -1.81% -3.01% -2.29% -1.34% -2.41%
10Yr T-Bill -0.015 0.055 0.077 -0.008
0.014 0.028* 0.028** 0.014
-0.38% 1.35% 1.81% -0.21%
RF -88.712 -107.734 -40.640 -40.396
29.01** 29.37*** 15.01** 14.49**
-2.02% -2.36% -0.96% -0.97%
Mkt Return 11.690 10.125 9.971
2.677*** 2.656*** 2.663***
1.57% 1.46% 1.45%
Constant -1.529 -1.449 -1.327 -1.404 -1.538 -1.270 -1.220 -1.430
0.040*** 0.068*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.147***
Mean VIF 1.00 1.02 1.04 2.01 1.95 1.08 1.02 1.11
*** significant at 0.1%
** sig at 1%
* sig at 5%
 'at 10%
Table 3.5: Base plus Industry Returns
Bolded value is coef, 2nd is SE with stat significance, 3rd is 1 StDev change
Table 3.4: Base Model 






Ratio 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
PGrant 0.047 0.047 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046
0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
1.38% 1.39% 1.36% 1.38% 1.37% 1.36% 1.36% 1.37%
Bus.Cycle -0.206 -0.122 -0.135 -0.110 -0.143 -0.154 -0.223 -0.212
0.072** 0.068' 0.069* 0.068 0.069* 0.071* 0.074** 0.072**
-3.04% -1.71% -1.92% -1.54% -2.03% -2.20% -3.34% -3.14%
MktRF 7.254 7.962 7.924
1.467** 1.850*** 1.850***
1.92% 2.12% 2.10%
SMB 5.093 4.420 3.443 -3.071 -1.917
2.392* 2.403' 2.586 2.980 2.816
0.82% 0.71% 0.55% -0.49% -0.31%
HML -4.676 -4.177 -5.670 -1.764 -0.123
1.979* 1.973* 2.437* 2.677 2.214
-0.92% -0.81% -1.10% -0.34% -0.02%
UMD 0.189 -2.224 -2.450
1.836 2.352 2.383
0.04% -0.45% -0.50%
Constant -1.435 -1.440 -1.412 -1.447 -1.410 -1.380 -1.403 -1.435
0.067*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.019*** 0.078*** 0.068***
Mean VIF 1.07 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.03 1.36 1.62 1.41
*** significant at 0.1%
** sig at 1%
* sig at 5%
 'at 10%
Table 3.6: Fama-French Estimations
Bolded value is coef, 2nd is SE with stat significance, 3rd is 1 StDev change
Ratio 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
PGrant 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.046
0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
1.48% 1.41% 1.41% 1.38% 1.37% 1.40% 1.40% 1.40%
Time 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008
0.0049** 0.005* 0.005* 0.0047* 0.005 0.005' 0.005' 0.005'
1.05% 0.90% 0.87% 0.73% 0.51% 0.63% 0.63% 0.61%
Bus.Cycle -0.079 -0.070 -0.072 -0.117 -0.175 -0.172 -0.178
0.066 0.066 0.066 0.068' 0.072* 0.073* 0.072*
-1.13% -1.00% -1.02% -1.68% -2.59% -2.54% -2.63%






Mkt Return 8.623 1.760
2.479** 3.045
1.28% 0.26%
MktRF 6.960 6.924 6.414
1.478*** 1.505*** 1.815***
1.90% 1.89% 1.74%
Constant -1.750 -1.667 -1.560 -1.427 -1.430 -1.599 -1.570 -1.605
0.081*** 0.095*** 0.159*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 0.098*** 0.161*** 0.100***
Mean VIF 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.06 1.08 1.09 1.30
*** significant at 0.1%
** sig at 1%
* sig at 5%
 'at 10%
Table 3.7: Results Including Time Trend
Bolded value is coef, 2nd is SE with stat significance, 3rd is 1 StDev change
Table 3.6: Fama-French Estimations 






Ratio 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
PGrant 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.046 0.046 0.050 0.051 0.049
0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010***
1.61% 1.61% 1.62% 1.56% 1.53% 1.61% 1.63% 1.60%
Time 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
0.006* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005' 0.005' 0.005' 0.006'
1.28% 1.31% 1.31% 1.22% 0.93% 0.96% 0.95% 0.91%
Bus.Cycle 0.013 0.010 0.017 -0.034 -0.090 -0.103 -0.094
0.074 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.080 0.080 0.079
0.20% 0.16% 0.26% -0.53% -1.44% -1.63% -1.50%






Mkt Return 8.705 2.626
2.831** 3.504
1.57% 0.47%
MktRF 6.761 6.899 5.933
1.680*** 1.704*** 2.071**
2.20% 2.21% 1.92%
Constant -1.762 -1.774 -1.803 -1.615 -1.621 -1.703 -1.800 -1.710
0.093*** 0.107*** 0.184*** 0.160*** 0.164** .112*** 0.186*** 0.113***
Mean VIF 1.10 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.10 1.15 1.15 1.36
*** significant at 0.1%
** sig at 1%
* sig at 5%
 'at 10%
Table 3.8: Reduced Sample
Bolded value is coef, 2nd is SE with stat significance, 3rd is 1 StDev change









Following the established relationship between financial development and 
growth, it is important to understand the elements that influence the efficiency through 
which capital is allocated.  One such widely used measure is the private credit to GDP 
ratio; a higher number is indicative of more financial development and typically higher 
economic growth.  The positive impact of information sharing and legal reforms on 
private credit is well established.  I propose an additional element that influences the 
level of private credit—inclusive access to financial services.  This can be measured in 
two ways: the first is the traditional definition as the percentage of the adult population 
with an account at formal financial institutions while the second is distribution of access 
among income groups 
The newly released Global Financial Index database from the World Bank allows 
for the first time the ability to effectively test the impact of access; previous studies were 
forced to rely on crude measures of access as complete cross-country data were 
unavailable.   I argue that these two measures of inclusiveness, total access and the 
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equality of access, are positively related with private credit.  I find significant evidence 
that the total percentage of people in the financial sector is associated with, and unequal 
access to finance leads, to a lower private credit/GDP ratio.  
 
4.2. Introduction 
 The literature on the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth is vast, with many studies finding evidence that more financial development leads 
to faster growth.  Because of the difficulty of directly measuring financial development, 
private credit/GDP ratio has emerged as the dominant proxy when estimating the 
relationship between finance and growth.  This variable encompasses a number of 
different reforms that facilitate expansion of the level of credit within the economy.  
Addressing some of these reforms, Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer (2007) evaluate how 
information sharing and creditor rights affect private credit.  They make a compelling 
case for increasing the strength of these institutions as priorities when contemplating 
policy reforms.  I contend that in addition to these institutions, reforms should also target 
a more inclusive financial sector.  There is a growing body of research that sees inclusive 
financial markets as being a critical element to economic development (Claessens, 2006;  
Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch, 2013), positing that without access to financial 
institutions, income inequality will persist and result in slower economic growth.   
 An inclusive financial sector is one that services all members of society, not just 
the wealthy.  The basic definition of access is whether people have the ability to open an 
account at a formal financial institution.  There is a large and growing body of literature 





contributing to the ideas of reducing income inequality, thus causing a country to grow 
faster.  Without inclusive financial services, poor households are forced to rely on 
personal savings or kinship networks in order to become entrepreneurs or invest in 
household expenditures such as education, health care, and other emergency expenses.  
At the same time, small businesses are forced to rely on retained earnings if they are 
unable to raise funds using external capital.  Most of the literature on inclusive finance 
focuses on increasing the total number of people in the financial sector.  However, 
increasing the number of people with accounts does not necessarily mean inclusivity as 
the increases in accounts could purely belong to the wealthiest, excluding those at the 
bottom.  For this reason, I have created an additional measure of inclusiveness that is 
defined as being a more equal distribution of access across income groups.  Higher levels 
of inequality across income groups are indicative of higher barriers for the poor to have 
access to financial services.   
The element of interest in this essay is related to the question of access.  I 
hypothesize that inclusive financial sectors will increase the total amount of credit 
availability.  I evaluate this based on two dimensions of access:  the total amount of 
people involved in the formal financial sector and the equality of access to credit 
institutions.   Increasing access is an element of financial development, with distinct 
policy changes that can be made just as for any other policies regarding other aspects of 
financial development.  I empirically assess the relationship and will argue that the 
distribution of access among income groups is just as important as total access.  Higher 
inequalities of access will lead to a lower level of credit in the economy, thus hindering 





including the groups traditionally locked out of credit markets will lead to higher private 
credit.   
Previously, these theories were not able to be tested as there was not adequate 
cross-country survey data on the number of people in the financial sector, and researchers 
were forced to rely on proxies that were admittedly crude.  The recent emergence of the 
Global Financial Inclusion Database from the World Bank takes a step forward with 
detailed survey data on 158 countries.  These data detail the percentage of people in the 
economy with an account at a formal financial institution.  This paper is the first to use 
this complete dataset to evaluate the impact of access on financial development.  I also 
contribute to the literature with the construction of an index of financial access inequality 
as a better measure of inclusiveness of financial markets.   
This question of the relationship between access and private credit empirically 
follows Djankov, McLeish, and Schliefer’s 2007 paper titled “Private Credit in 129 
Countries.”  In that paper, the authors evaluate the traditional determinants of the 
effectiveness of financial markets: legal rights, legal origins, and information sharing.  
Their results suggested that private credit levels were higher in countries with more 
effective transfers of information and legal systems that provided more rights to creditors.  
These results suggested that financial systems were more effective in the landscapes 
providing these elements, encouraging those with capital to increase their supply of funds 
to the market.  My estimations use the same model specifications and data as Djankov, 
McLeish, and Schliefer, with the only difference being updated data and the inclusion of 
the two measures of financial inclusiveness.  The private credit ratio is regressed on the 





institutional and market factors.  The econometric results are straightforward; I find 
significant evidence that inclusive financial systems are associated with increasing 
private credit ratios.  These results hold for both the total amount of access and the 
distribution of access across income groups.   
 
4.3. Theory and Review of Literature 
A large and thorough literature has emerged on the abilities of financial 
development to promote economic growth; while there is a substantial amount of 
literature countering that financial development exhibits negative effects on growth, the 
majority of existing literature finds a positive relationship.  Some of the more recent 
literature on financial development evaluates its effects on poverty and inequality.  
Within financial development a number of different types of reforms can be 
implemented; determining which of these reforms have the greatest impact on the 
efficient allocation of capital will shed light on helping some countries institute the most 
appropriate policies in their individual circumstances.   
 Building on the early theoretical literature on the effects of financial development 
and growth, a number of empirical studies have emerged beginning in the early 1990s.  
One of the earliest and most prominent is that of King and Levine (1993), which supports 
the view that financial development positively influences growth, controlling for other 
factors that affect long-run growth.  This study focused on banking variables, including 
credit to the private sector divided by GDP, to proxy for the level of financial 
development, and setting the dependent variable as economic growth.  These early 





way cross-sectional regressions were set up and concluding that the explanatory variables 
caused changes in the dependent variable.  In order to correct these endogeneity issues, 
the use of instrumental variables opened the possibility of testing for endogeneity.  These 
took the form of a country’s legal origins as introduced by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Schliefer, and Vishny (1997).  Using a two-stage regression, legal origins are an ideal 
instrumental variable since they are uncorrelated with growth, yet have a defined impact 
on financial development; these legal origins and the laws associated with them have 
shown to be influential in explaining a portion of the variation in financial development 
between countries.  When using these instrumental variables, Levine, Loayza, and Beck 
(2000) argue for the use of the variable we now know as private credit/GDP ratio.  This 
measurement is the total value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private, 
removing all other credits issued by the monetary authorities as used by King and Levine 
(1993).  Levine, Loayza, and Beck estimate the relationship between private credit and 
growth using a panel model, finding that stronger creditor protections can boost financial 
development and economic growth.  Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) extend this work 
attempting to determine the relationship between private credit and other sources of 
growth, including capital accumulation and productivity growth.  Their findings show 
similar results to those used in pure cross-country regressions.  A complete survey of the 
finance-growth literature can be found in either Ang (2008) or Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2008).  
While the majority of literature finds a positive relationship between financial 
development and economic growth, there exists a substantial amount of literature 





that the correlation is weakly negative or negligible.  A number of other studies have 
been able to show that causality does not always run from finance to growth, with the 
direction of causality also running in the reverse direction (Demetriades and Hussein, 
1996; Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Ang and McKibbin, 2007).  These results provide 
support for Joan Robinson’s contention that finance does not lead growth, but rather that 
financial systems act in response to economic conditions.  As the economy is expanding, 
firms and households will have more demand for financial services, which will be 
provided by profit-seeking financial institutions (Robinson, 1952).  Extending the 
research contesting that financial development may not be the gateway to growth, 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2005) examine the relationship between financial depth and 
economic growth using cross-sectional and panel data for 84 countries between 1960 and 
2003.  The three different measures of financial depth used (including credit to the 
private sector as a percentage of GDP) did not present as robust of findings as those from 
the 1980s and 1990s. Their principle finding is that while the relationship may have 
existed through the early 1990s, it appears to have diminished in the later periods; their 
conclusions were to act as a reminder that the correlations between finance and growth 
may well represent cross-country differences rather than a causal relationship. 
One of the few variables to provide a conclusive relationship with growth is the 
proxy private credit to GDP.  On the heels of the studies finding that private credit is 
positively associated with growth, a number of other studies have emerged to determine 
the impact of financial development on other factors.  Beck et al. (2007) find that 
financial sector development reduces poverty and inequality, using private credit as their 





evident, yet the estimations performed by Beck et al. do not adequately control for 
endogeneity, nor do they control for levels of development.  Other studies on inequality 
and financial development include Nikoloski (2012) that uses private credit to proxy for 
financial development to test for the presence of a financial Kuznets curve.  Outside of its 
association with growth, private credit also has been used to test the impact of increased 
development on industry level investment.  Wurgler (2000) finds that when the level of 
credit increases, higher levels of industry investment occurs than countries with less 
developed financial markets are able to deliver.  This result holds when controlling for 
legal rights, information transfers, and the extent of state ownership in the economy.  
Private credit is also used for evaluating the relationship between liberalization and 
financial development.  Proponents of liberalization contend that foreign banks are better 
able to take advantage of economies of scale and geographically diversify their risks, 
leading to higher societal well-being.  However, in one such study, Detragiache, Gupta, 
and Tressel (2006) contend that local banks are better able to assess the risks of marginal 
investment opportunities and will lend more.  Empirical results show that, ceteris paribus, 
countries with more foreign bank penetration will have lower levels of private credit.  As 
each of these studies should make clear, the use of private credit to proxy for financial 
development is widespread, but they do not address the underlying conditions that 
improve or weaken private credit.  The determination of these underlying institutional 
factors is what is important in order to effectively implement financial reforms. 
 Of the specific financial reforms that influence private credit, information sharing 
and creditor rights’ impacts are the two to receive the most attention.  Their impacts on 





statistical significance on each. Information sharing is based on the idea that without 
adequate information, lenders are unable to adequately assess risk and will ration credit.  
Creditors’ rights is an evaluation of how easy it is for creditors to be able to get their 
funds back in the event of default.  The theory postulates that the easier it is for creditors 
to seize their collateral, the more likely they will be to make loans, thus shifting the 
supply schedule to the right.  The third factor they do not discuss, and the focus of my 
research, is access to credit.  Creating an inclusive financial sector will lead to higher 
levels of credit in an economy.  A theoretical exposition of the information sharing, 
creditor rights, and access to credit follows. 
 
4.3.1. Information Sharing 
 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) present the first theoretical justification for credit 
rationing.  Basic economic theory posits that market equilibrium is where supply meets 
demand; as prices rise, lenders should supply more funds at a higher interest rate.  
However, within financial markets, there exists an excess supply of loanable funds as 
lenders ration credit.  Banks care about two things: risk and return.  As risk increases, the 
banks are induced to loan at a higher interest rate in order to compensate for the risk.  A 
problem arises when interest rates rise for risky projects as the rate itself may influence 
the riskiness of the project.  Banks, therefore, are aware of the “lemons” problems in 
which those who would borrow at the highest interest rates may be worse risks; the 
interest rates would not be able to act as a screening device, keeping bad investments out.  
Without adequate information as to the riskiness of borrowers, lenders will ration their 





 Stiglitz (1990) presents a theory on the effectiveness of peer monitoring in credit 
markets.  Following the theory that information problems prevent lenders from 
distributing funds, Stiglitz suggests that the idea behind peer monitoring is that others are 
required to pay a penalty in the event that the borrower defaults.  This is the basic 
function of, and premise behind the use of, microfinance institutions.  Traditional lenders 
will typically not extend credit in small amounts because the cost of acquiring 
information is too high relative to the return received; peer monitoring is a situation 
where a certain amount of funds are allocated to a defined group who are responsible to 
determining the credit worthiness of a borrower.  In the event that the borrower defaults, 
the rest of the group are penalized, which is adequate incentive for the members of the 
groups to do their due diligence.  Loan repayment under peer-monitoring appears to be 
successful in terms of repayment with loan repayment rates near 100% in Bangladesh 
(Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, and Ruthven, 2009).  The model presented by Stiglitz 
shows that peer monitoring leads to a transfer of risk and that this is, effectively, a net 
benefit to the borrowers.  Transferring the risk removes some of the elements of adverse 
selection and should lead to a more efficient and effective financial sector. 
 Some of the adverse selection problems can be alleviated through government 
intervention, as argued by Stiglitz (1994).  He posits that effective government regulation 
can reduce market failures and the problem of credit rationing.  One such policy 
advocates for the government to keep interest rates low and, if necessary, below the 
market determined price as this can raise the average quality of borrowers; lowering 





credit rationing.  Increasing government oversight in this manner would necessarily 
increase the private credit ratio. 
 
4.3.2. Creditor Rights 
 The existence of the creditor power is based on a set of policies determined to 
contribute to credit market development.  Poor countries tend to have poor legal systems 
and protections for creditors, thereby lowering the desire to make their capital available.  
Supporting the notion that investor protections are key to effective capital markets, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1997) introduce a possible explanation of 
why some countries have larger capital markets than others.  This hypothesis is based on 
the legal origins of countries; countries with French civil law origins have fewer investor 
protections than countries with English common law origins.  Much of the data on 
investor rights can be traced back to this influential work on financial development.  
Lopez de Silanes, La Porta, Schleifer, and Vishny (1998) expand these classifications by 
including the Scandinavian and German legal origins and find a strong relationship 
between these legal origins and depth of the financial system.  Levine (1998,1999) 
evaluates the impact of these legal origins on the level of bank development as 
constructed by Levine and Zervos (1998); this measure was the precursor to the private 
credit variable by the value of loans to the private sector divided by GDP and is a 
narrower variable focused primarily on the banking sector.  Levine finds that stronger 
legal protections are associated with a deeper banking sector, which is then associated 





 Expanding the legal system argument, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) 
find that in countries with efficient legal systems, as identified by an index of legal 
efficiency, a larger number of firms use long-term external capital.  Extrapolating from 
these findings, firms are able to grow faster since they had more access to capital than 
they otherwise would have been able to do if they had to rely solely on retained earnings.  
These results are robust and lend credence to the idea that efficient creditor laws promote 
increased credit expansion.  A stronger legal system is associated with more rights 
afforded to creditors and typically means more efficient financial services.  Djankov, 
McLeish, and Schliefer (2007) find substantial evidence that the level of creditor rights 
are positively associated with the level of private credit in the economy.  Explanatory 
variables in this study are a constructed index of creditor rights, the number of days it 
takes for a payment contract to be settled by the courts, and a country’s legal origins. 
 
4.3.3. Access to Credit 
The early theoretical research on financial markets posited that their purpose was 
the efficient transfer of funds from savers to borrowers (Gurley and Shaw, 1955; 
McKinnon, 1973).  In order to increase investment, the contention is that it is necessary 
to increase the amount of savings that could then be channeled into productive projects.  
Part of the theory of finance is that increasing the number of participants in the financial 
sector promises to increase capital stock; the policy advice extended from this is that 
increasing access to financial services will attract more individuals to place their savings 
in banks.  This influx of funds would then be able to be lent out, increasing the rate of 





Increasing information and creditor rights are policies targeting increasing the 
supply of loanable funds in order to entice those with surplus funds to save, thus 
discouraging credit rationing.  Information and legal constraints have been discussed 
widely in the literature as to their impacts on access.  One of the most pressing obstacles 
for individuals and firms to overcome is due to the cost of financial services being too 
high.  The costs to financial institutions to administer their services does not change 
much between servicing poor or wealthy households; as such, the poor are faced with a 
higher percentage of costs for using the bank services.  Because of the low amount of 
funds deposited or withdrawn by the poor, banks are reluctant to provide the services 
needed by some segments due to low levels of profitability.  Attempting to lower the 
costs of administering financial services to the poor, a consortium of banks in South 
Africa created a new type of account with fewer services, yet much lower cost, than a 
traditional account (Napier, 2006).   
Because of the need to reduce the costs of administering traditional bank 
accounts, services like these are effective in increasing the number of people in the 
financial system.  Another obstacle to providing services at a low cost is related to 
geographical concerns; banks are especially reluctant to expand financial services into 
areas with low populations or are difficult to access as they would face high transactions 
costs for small volumes of loans.  The rise of smartphones across the globe has given rise 
to providing mobile banking services.  Mallat, Rossi, and Tuunainen (2004) present a 
convincing argument for the deployment of mobile banking services that would allow 
people the ability to use banking services without ever setting foot into a bank by using 





automated and that throughout the developing world, even in the sparsely population 
regions, cell phones have had widespread penetration.  The widespread impact of mobile 
banking has yet to run its course, so only time will tell if this is an effective means of 
reducing access problems.   
Another significant obstacle to finance include burdensome documentation 
requirements; these are especially prevalent in poor countries as banks will typically 
require state issued documentation in order to open an account and many of the poor 
citizens of the country not employed by the formal sector lack any such papers.  Other 
barriers include lack of trust in financial services and religious considerations.  A review 
of the access to finance literature can be found in Claessens (2006).  These problems are 
able to be overcome although it may take some governmental programs to create 
incentives for banks to pursue the poorer populations. 
Attempting to overcome the barriers to finance identified above, the advent of 
microfinance has become an important mechanism through which many have been 
brought into the formal financial sector.  Within microfinance (and more specifically 
microcredit), banks will transfer some of their monitoring and information costs to a 
defined group of members; in these groups, penalties are assessed on individuals if other 
members of the group default on a loan.  Therefore, it is in the groups’ best interest to 
monitor others in order to continue to be able to receive loans for their purposes and 
reducing the costs to the banks.  This is one scenario within a number of other structures 
of providing small loans.  The hope was that providing these financial services to the 
poor is a win-win scenario in that the poor will be able to access financial services to help 





loans.  Microfinance has had its successes and failures, as highlighted early on by 
Morduch (1999) where he shows that loan repayments were above 95% in many 
localities, but that bureaucratic expansion and corruption dampen the progress that could 
be made.  What is undeniable is that large percentages of the population considered 
unbankable have been provided an avenue for entrance into the formal financial sector.  
De Aghion, Armendariz, and Morduch (2007) provide a thorough examination of the 
microfinance revolution, the widespread hope of poverty alleviation, and a series of 
puzzles often overlooked.  Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2013), using data 
from a randomized evaluation of slums in India, find significant results that once 
microfinance institutions entered slums, the percentage of people using the loans rose 
dramatically and that loan sizes were larger.  Their results also suggested that while 
access to finance rose, there was no difference in household consumption and that the 
average business was no more profitable.  The result that microfinance does not appear to 
influence any of the development indicators are in line with much of the recent literature 
on microfinance; some of this can be attributed to the sentiment that many microfinance 
organizations are no better than the village loan sharks, making large profits off the poor 
(Bannerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan, 2013). 
It is also important to distinguish between access and use.  Access is typically 
defined as the availability of a supply of quality financial services, while use refers to 
actual consumption.  The difference between access and use is attributed to voluntarily 
excluding themselves from financial services because of not having a need or costs being 
too high.  Because of the great difficulties in empirically separating those who voluntarily 





regard.  For our purposes, the distinction between the two is not important; any situation 
that inhibits the poor’s ability to open an account is akin to access limiting.   
 
4.3.4. Total Access 
Creating an inclusive financial sector by expanding access is applicable for all 
economies, rich and poor; having more widespread access to financial services increases 
opportunities and helps a country to realize its full potential.  There are two trains of 
thought in regard to financial markets in modern development theory.  The first addresses 
the abilities of financial markets to fund the poor’s profitable projects.  The second is the 
capital accumulation theory in which increased access brings more people/firms into the 
formal financial sector; without their inclusion in financial markets, there is less 
borrowing for increasing households’ human or physical capital.  When people save 
through a formal institution rather than putting the excess under their mattresses, the total 
amount of loanable funds will rise.  In addition to this, the ability to earn an interest rate 
on their savings (even though it might be small) can entice savers to hedge against some 
inflation risk, giving another boost to lendable funds.  Without access, less savings get 
mobilized for productive uses. 
Whether potential entrepreneurs will leave their current employment is dependent 
on their abilities to save and their access to external capital.  Financial market frictions 
can contribute to projects never being funded, reduce private credit, and help to 
perpetuate continuing inequalities.  Galor and Zeira (1993) evaluate the link between 
frictions and investments in human capital with findings that the poor are unable to, or 





credit are both reduced even in the presence of a positive present value of investing in 
future benefits such as education.   
The question arises as to whether the optimal policy is to increase access to firms 
or to households.  One of the critics of the microfinance movement, Karnani (2007), 
posits that while microfinance may bring more people into the financial sector, targeting 
larger enterprises is a more effective policy for eradicating poverty.  Karnani 
hypothesizes that these large enterprises are better job creators and will help the plight of 
the poor better than extending credit to the poor for consumption or entrepreneurial 
purposes.  However, as Yunus (1999) contended when introducing modern microfinance, 
enabling the poor to finance themselves has immediate positive welfare implications that 
do not rely on jobs “trickling down.”  Setting aside welfare for a moment and looking 
exclusively at the impact of access on private credit, it should be evident that increasing 
access at any level will result in higher levels of credit.  Attracting more firms and/or 
households and bringing them into the financial sector will increase both the supply and 
demand for credit.  The only situation where increasing access might not increase credit 
is if one group’s increase came at the expense of another.  An example would be a policy 
that shifted incentives from providing large firms with credit to providing loans to the 
poor, which was accompanied by a significant drop in the availability of funds for larger 
firms.  This would result in the costs of expanding access coming at the expense of 
established firms, which would result in a net loss to society.  In this case, careful 
evaluation of policies is paramount. Well-intentioned policies may actually hurt those 





Attempting to answer some of the questions surrounding access, Honohan (2006) 
produces new estimates for the level of access to financial services, finding that across 
countries access is negatively correlated with poverty.  Honohan posits that the relevant 
concern for poor households is not how many financial assets are held, but rather whether 
they have access to financial products at all.  Conclusions of this research are that deposit 
products are used first as a country develops; after that, more sophisticated credit 
instruments have the potential for helping.  This would imply that it is important to 
develop wider availability of credit instruments first. 
 Combined with efficient information transfers, financial intermediaries’ ability to 
evaluate firms’ investment projects can lead to higher growth as entrepreneurs are able to 
expand through lower interest rates and better terms.  Tobin and Brainard (1963) provide 
a theoretical basis for this proposition in that when there is adequate information, more 
capital is available and the available funds can then be channeled into the most 
productive projects.  When there are larger inequalities of access, those in the higher 
income groups may have better credit terms while the lower income groups are still 
constrained by high information costs and are forced to accept worse terms—if they are 
even able to receive credit. 
 The differences in terms afforded to prospective borrowers can result in a number 
of profitable and socially beneficial projects to never be funded.  High returns are typical 
of many of the poor’s entrepreneurial decisions, yet represent relatively small 
investments that are not attractive to those with higher income/wealth.  That many of 
these projects get funded with incredibly high interest rates is indicative of these high 





projects will return more than the interest rate.  If the poor had the same level of access to 
financial services and terms as those in the upper income groups, there would be 
significant increases in private credit.   
 
4.3.5. Unequal Access 
 Apart from increasing the total level of access to financial services, there exists 
the notion that the distribution of financial services between income groups is also 
important.  In societies with a larger dispersion of financial services between the rich and 
poor, there will be larger disparities of income and wealth, upon which the level of 
financial development also depends.  Distribution matters; there are distinct policy 
decisions made that influence who has access to finance.  Some financial services, such 
as derivatives, are not directly useful for the poor whereas other financial services, such 
as microcredit, have no relevance for the wealthy. 
 One train of thought is that distribution among income groups does not matter; the 
only thing that matters is that those in need of the largest amounts of capital have access 
as they are the drivers of growth which would then trickle down to the poor. This would 
be an argument for first targeting the wealthy; they have the wealth that can be used as 
capital by those who require it.  Following this, it would then make sense to increase 
access from the top down.  Setting welfare aside for a moment and assuming that 
increasing the level of credit is the only goal, it would make no sense to even target the 
poor.  This would presuppose that credit is supply driven and that the goal is to increase 
the amount of funds deposited in the financial system.  This supply of funds argument 





middle class, and on down.  The only time to bring the poor into the formal financial 
sector would be after everyone above them has had access.  This argument would 
necessitate that the distribution of access among income would be highly unequal—all at 
the top and nothing at the bottom. 
My position is the exact opposite; higher inequality of access leads to a lower 
level of private credit.  While this analysis does ignore welfare implications of access to 
credit, a total exclusion of the poor can contribute to persistent income inequality and 
poverty.  From a supply perspective, it is important to increase access at the top to take 
advantage of wealth holders, but I argue that the distributional effects on demand are just 
as important.  Bringing the lower income groups into formal financial services opens up a 
number of possibilities.  Because the poor by definition have little income and savings, 
when they want to engage in entrepreneurial activities, they need access to credit.  
Locking them out of credit markets will eliminate many of the potential loans and 
productive projects being undertaken.  Even if they are not output increasing, these loans 
to the lower income groups will add to private credit.   
 There has been a shift in the literature from the label “microcredit” to 
“microfinance” in response to expanding financial services outside of only providing 
credit to businesses.  Providing microfinance in the form of credit, savings, and insurance 
to poor households is also affected by the level of access they have to financial services.  
Regardless of whether the poor live in a rich or poor country, they can have erratic 
income and consumption.  This is especially true in developing countries where there is a 
high dependence on agricultural products.  Rosenzweig (2001), in examining savings 





smooth their consumption.  Although it might not be output increasing, credit is largely 
used to smooth consumption over the year rather than over the lifetime; most of this 
saving is precautionary in order to pay for unexpected events.   
 On top of this is the idea that poor households engage in borrowing in order to 
handle emergencies.  As an illustrative example, suppose there are two individuals in the 
same country, one poor and one wealthy, and they both experience a medical hardship.  
The wealthy person may be able to fund the entire medical procedure out of personal 
savings while the poor person with inadequate savings would be resigned to borrow to 
finance the emergency.  If there is access to formal financial systems, the poor person’s 
medical expenditures will increase private credit while the wealthy person’s will have no 
impact.  Conversely, if the poor person is locked out of formal credit, he or she might 
look to kinship networks to borrow the necessary funds; this borrowing is outside the 
formal measure of credit and would not be counted as lending.  The interesting result of 
this is that kinship network borrowing will not increase the private credit/GDP ratio.  In 
fact, it is actually more likely to reduce private credit.  This is the case if the informal 
borrowing results in lenders removing funds from their savings account, which leads to a 
reduction in supply of loanable funds. 
 Among income groups, there are differing times an entrepreneur will seek 
external capital.  Lower income groups have a higher marginal propensity to invest where 
there are a number of projects that would be left untouched by the wealthy because of 
their low absolute returns, yet are, I postulate, an inverse relationship between income 
and the propensity to invest.  Galor and Zeira (1993) present a theoretical macroeconomic 





of wealth can have serious repercussions for growth.  These capital market imperfections 
are attributed to the poor not undertaking investments with high MPIs due to the inability 
to obtain capital.  When people become wealthier, they are more likely to not undertake 
projects with low absolute returns or to finance them solely out of pocket, not even 
seeking external capital.  If there is a project with a low initial investment, the wealthier 
person will be able fund it out of pocket but the poorer person will require external funds.  
In the first instance, funding out of pocket, this activity will reduce private credit as it is 
taking money out, whereas the second instance necessarily means an increase in private 
credit. 
 Entrepreneurial activities are not constant across income groups.  The projects 
undertaken by the poor are typically too small for the wealthy to concern themselves 
with.  The financial return for these small projects, however, is quite large as displayed 
by the extremely high rates of interest paid by the poor to get their projects off the 
ground.  The size of the investment typically will be much too small for the wealthy 
given the number of headaches associated with a project of that size.  Wealthier people 
typically will engage only in activities that have higher absolute payoffs and may eschew 
some higher rates of return because the absolute return is not worth their time.  Where 
this might be too small for the wealthy, the absolute return may be high enough for those 
in lower income groups.  In the poorest groups, enterprising individuals will borrow 
small amounts to give themselves a job, such as for basket weaving materials; in a 
wealthier bracket, the entrepreneur will either not bother with this investment because of 
its small size or will finance it through savings.  It is then expected that bringing more of 





increasing private credit.  If this is the case, the distribution of credit access should be 
geared more toward bringing the poor access and reducing unequal access.  
 I hypothesize that inclusive financial sectors will lead to higher levels of credit in 
the economy.  Within an inclusive financial system, I propose that there are two ways in 
which to measure access.  The first is the traditional definition as the percentage of the 
adult population with an account at formal financial institutions, while the second is 
related to the distribution of access among income groups.  If the level of account holders 
between groups is the same, the financial system can be regarded as being inclusive, 
regardless of the total access within the economy, as people are able to engage in 
financial services if they so desire.  I argue that these two measures of inclusiveness, total 
access and the equality of access, are positively related with private credit. 
 
4.4. Data 
In order to test for the impact of access and the distribution of access on private 
credit, a dataset has been assembled to control for other confounding factors of financial 
development.  The structure of the estimations contained herein directly follows the 
specifications as set forth in Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer (2007).  The only 
difference in my model is that I am inserting variables on access to financial services.  
These data include a newly constructed variable on the distribution of access.  Control 
variables include proxies on creditor rights, information sharing, and other market 
factors.  There are 120 countries included in my sample, 64 of which are classified as 
“rich” and 57 as “poor” according to World Bank classifications.  Countries that have 





credit or level of access.  Complete data descriptions are found in Table 4.1, and 
complete data in Appendix A. 
 
4.4.1. Dependent Variable 
My dependent variable, private credit to GDP ratio (private credit), is the total 
amount of credit relative to the level of GDP in the country.  Being one of the most 
widely used variables as a proxy for financial development, understanding the underlying 
elements of this variable is of utmost importance.  I use an average of the total amount of 
credit lent for the time period 2007–2011, averaging over a 5-year period as given in 
Djankov, Mcliesh, and Schleifer (2007).  This variable refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, 
and trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. This 
amount is then divided by domestic GDP.  Private credit estimates range between a low 
of 4.55% of GDP for Chad to a staggering 215% in Ireland with an average of 52.6% for 
the entire sample.  Just over half (67/120) of the countries in the sample had private credit 
ratios between 25% and 125% of GDP.  Falling outside this range, only 14 had private 
credit ratios above 125% and 38 countries had private credit ratios of less than 25%.  As 
is common in the literature, the logarithm of private credit will be used. 
 
4.4.2. Access Variables 
Previously, researchers had to rely on other proxies of access, which were subject 
to the same type of criticisms associated with the use of financial development proxies.  





branch, and number of accounts relative to population.  Of these, the best to emerge was 
the number of accounts; yet it too proved to be a flawed proxy.  This is attributed to the 
fact that some individuals may have more than one account and some accounts can be 
held by foreigners.  These levels can differ between countries and can contribute to some 
unobserved variation.  However, the use of these variables was all that was available until 
recently.  New estimates on access were provided by Honohan (2006), but a complete 
cross-country survey of access was not conducted until the release of the World Bank 
Global Financial Inclusion (FINDEX) database.  This ambitious undertaking collected 
survey data from 158 countries and should allow for a better tracking of indicators in the 
future.  Within the FINDEX dataset, it is made clear that access refers to the supply of 
services, while use is the demand for services.  I have used the term access throughout to 
refer to both the supply and demand for financial services.  The data on total access are 
from 2011.  Survey collection was performed by Gallup, Inc, including more than 
150,000 adults across the world.  Their sampling methodology is randomly selected 
representative samples that reportedly cover 97% of the world’s population over the age 
of 15. The complete sampling methodology can be found in Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 
(2012).   
  I measure access to credit in two ways.  The first is by using the traditional 
method of measuring the number of people with an account as a percentage of the 
population.  The second, and most important for this research, is the inequality of access 
based on a computation of my own with data sourced from the FINDEX database.  This 
is a constructed variable measuring the differences of access across income groups with 





4.4.2.1. Total Access 
 The main variable (access) represents the percentage of the adult population over 
the age of 15 with an account at a formal financial institution.  A formal institution is 
defined as a bank, credit union, cooperative, post office, or microfinance institution.  
Having an account in one of these institutions is a stepping stone to more sophisticated 
financial products; it cannot be expected that someone will be able to secure a loan from 
a bank before having opened an account.  According to the theory described above, 
increasing the level of access should increase the level of private credit through the 
mobilization of capital.  This relationship is displayed in Figure 4.1.  On the vertical axis 
is the logarithm of private credit and the horizontal shows the logarithm of access from 
low to high.   
 As the literature on total access to credit is vast, the inclusion of the total access 
variable does not have a great contribution to the literature.  The main impact of the use 
of this variable is derived from the new survey data to confirm the impact of including a 
larger percentage of the population.  Theory says that increasing the level of access 
should lead to higher levels of credit in the economy, yet there is a possibility of 
endogeneity since it is possible that higher levels of credit in an economy will enable 
more to be actively involved in the financial sector.  While causality most likely runs 
from access to credit, the current data availability does not allow for convincing causal 
empirical estimates.  The aim of including this access variable is to show a definitive 







4.4.2.2 Unequal Access 
Where the total level of access is an emerging focus of research, the main 
contribution of this paper lies in the formulation of another measure of financial 
inclusiveness—the equality of access according to income.  Within the new FINDEX 
database, access is broken into income classifications that allow for the construction of an 
inequality of access index.  In order to test the hypothesis of whether the distribution of 
access matters, I am using two variables from the FINDEX database and transforming 
them into a measure of unequal access.  These two variables are upp.60, which is the 
percentage of people with incomes in the top 60% with an account at a formal financial 
institution, whereas low.40 is the percentage of people with incomes in the bottom 40% 
with a formal financial account.  I have then transformed these variables into a 
percentage difference, as defined below. 
 
Ineq.Access = (upp.60 – low.40)     /    [(upp.60 + low.40) / 2]  (4.1)  
 
 If identical absolute differences exist between two countries, say 30% for the 
upper group and 20% for the lower in one country versus 50% to 40% in another country, 
they would have different ineq.access values.  While the two countries will have a 20% 
disparity between groups, the first country would have much higher inequality: 0.40 
compared to 0.22.  This variable is not a perfect metric of the equality of access; a better 
method would be to compute an inequality metric using a Lorenz curve like a GINI 
coefficient.  At this time, however, the dataset does not have individual incomes and does 





difference between the wealthier and poorer income groups.  Where this variable differs 
from the total access variable is that even as total access is lower in poor countries, the 
level of unequal access does not depend on total access.  Some countries can have 
sophisticated financial systems that are inclusive of the wealthy but neglect the poor, 
whereas others can have rudimentary financial markets that include similar percentages 
of the population across classes.  What are important are the policies and underlying 
characteristics of the financial systems and whether they are inclusive or exclusive.  The 
relationship between private credit and unequal access is displayed in Figure 4.2; the 
logarithm of private credit is on the vertical axis with the inequality of access plotted 
along the horizontal axis.  With higher levels of inequality being further to the right on 
the horizontal axis, there is a definite negative relationship between private credit and 
unequal access. 
 This is a direct test of whether distribution of access to financial services is 
important in the determination of private credit.  There are three possible outcomes for 
this variable: i) it will be insignificant and indicate that the distribution does not matter, 
ii) it will be significant and positive showing that higher levels of access inequality lead 
to higher private credit and that it is primarily supply driven, or iii) it will be significant 
and negative, indicating that distribution is important and that increased inequality will 
lead to lower credit.  Outcome (iii) will result in support of my hypothesis. 
 
4.4.3. Control Variables 
Djankov, Mcliesh, and Schleifer (2007) present empirical evidence as to the 





determined by the two complementary channels: information sharing and creditor rights.  
These channels of influence must be controlled for in my regressions because the level of 
financial development can influence the level of access to financial services.  The basic 
model structure and data layout in this essay follow the model selection of Djankov, 
Mcliesh, and Schleifer. 
 Information asymmetries can result in adverse selection and credit rationing 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981); thus, increasing the flow of information can result in more 
efficient financial systems.  Besides physically inspecting a prospective borrower’s 
project, the most effective (and lowest cost) means of determining credit worthiness is 
through credit rating agencies.  A public registry is a government sponsored credit, 
whereas a private bureau is a for-profit agency providing credit rating services for a fee.  
A public registry is a database of prospective borrowers’ credit standing compiled by a 
public agency and distributed to financial institutions.  A private bureau is a private for- 
or nonprofit firm that maintains a database as to the standing of borrowers in the financial 
system.  Their primary role is to facilitate the transfer of information between lending 
institutions.  Data on public registry and private bureau are collected from Djankov, 
Mcliesh, and Schleifer (2007) and are dummy variables equal to one if there is an agency 
and zero if not in 1999. 
Regardless of whether there is a public or private registry of information transfers, the 
overarching idea is that when there is effective sharing of information, credit rationing 
will decline and more funds will be lent.  The variable information sharing is a dummy 
variable equal to one if there exists either a public or private registry and equal to zero if 





individual factors is to determine whether a specific type of information sharing agency is 
important or that just having a registry of some type is the important characteristic.  Of 
the 120 countries in the sample, 97 have a bureau of some sort while only 19 have both a 
private and public registry. 
 The second traditionally associated element behind effective financial 
development is the protections afforded to creditors.  The theory is that when creditors 
have more ability to seize collateral and/or receive a portion of their investment back 
after default, creditors will be more likely to extend credit to potential borrowers.  The 
order of lineup in bankruptcy court and amount of time it takes to settle disputes play a 
considerable role in whether credit is made available.  Theory postulates that creating 
higher creditor rights will result in less credit rationing even in the presence of 
asymmetric information. 
 The index of creditor rights (Cred.Rights) used in this study is the same employed 
by Djankov, Mcliesh, and Schleifer (2007).  This index can take a maximum value of 
four, receiving one point for each of the four elements a country possesses.  One point is 
received for placing secured creditors first in line for the proceeds of a liquidated firm in 
bankruptcy court rather than placing other creditors such as the government or workers 
before secured creditors.  Another point is received if management is removed from a 
company undergoing reorganization.  Requiring creditor consent in order for a company 
to reorganize rather than file for liquidation garners another point.  One of the strongest 
points received is if creditors are able to seize their collateral immediately after the 
bankruptcy petition is approved and not subject to an automatic stay.  Countries without 





countries with all of the above provisions (strong creditor rights) will have a value of 
four.  Others will fall in between. 
If creditors have to seize their collateral they would like to be able to do so as 
quickly as possible.  The longer an asset is tied up with a company or person in 
liquidation, the higher the costs are for the creditor. Therefore, creditors will be more 
likely to lend to borrowers with marginal risks under systems with quick resolution of 
liquidation proceedings.  If potential lenders know they will have to wait a considerable 
amount of time to receive their collateral back, they will be reluctant to provide loans to 
questionable borrowers.  The variable, contract enforcement, is defined as the amount of 
time it takes the court system to resolve a dispute over payment.  Data are computed only 
for debt contracts that are larger than 50% of per capita GDP and come from Djankov, 
Mcliesh, and Schleifer (2007).  Length of time to enforce contracts ranges from a low of 
27 days in Tunisia to 1,439 days in Guatemala with an average of 399 days.  This 
variable has been transformed from calendar days to months (calendar days/30).  It is 
expected that the less time it takes for contracts to be settled, the more credit will be 
provided, which leads to higher levels of private credit.  
 Legal origin is widely used in the finance-growth literature as an element of 
creditor protections.  Data on legal origins come from Djankov, Mcliesh, and Schleifer 
(2007) and are derived from the classifications put forward by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1997).  Included are five basic classifications of legal 
origin: English, French, German, Nordic, and Soviet (in transition).  English legal 
traditions include English common law and the current and former British colonies, 





descendant colonies.  This French classification includes Spain and Portugal and their 
respective colonies.  Germanic legal origins include countries in central Europe and East 
Asia where they were transplanted while the Nordic legal origins is limited to the four 
Scandinavian countries.  The Soviet legal systems refer to the countries in the former 
Soviet Union that have not reverted to the legal systems in place before Soviet control.  
For example, Latvia has German legal origins because they reverted to the legal structure 
they had before Soviet annexation.  Dummy variables are assigned for French, German, 
Nordic, and Soviet legal origins with English origins being the null value.   
 
4.4.4. Market Conditions 
I control for the absolute level of income (GDP.1999) because larger economies 
may have larger credit markets because of the economies of scale in organizing a 
competitive market.  At low levels of income, there may not be enough credit 
opportunities to foster enough competition between banks at the critical level to provide 
efficient financial services.  The expected sign of this variable is positive as higher GDP 
would indicate higher private credit as a share of GDP.  Growth of GDP (GDP.Growth) 
is controlled for because in times of high growth, lending can become more freely 
available and create higher levels of private credit.  Rapid economic expansion may also 
require much higher levels of available credit as there may be a credit boom, which 
would justify an expected positive correlation.  This variable is calculated as the average 
yearly growth rate percentage between 2007 and 2011 and is sourced from the World 





In addition to the level of income within a country, the amount of inequality 
within a country also has implications for the level of credit made available.  At a given 
level of per capita income, higher levels of inequality will result in more unequal access 
as there will be more people below the threshold for having adequate funds to open an 
account when there are barriers to access.  For this reason, I am controlling for inequality 
with the use of a GINI coefficient as calculated from the UNU-WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database, Version 2.0.  The value used is the average of GINI coefficients 
over the time period 2001-2006.  Within the WIDER database, there were occasions 
where multiple estimates are provided for the same country and year due to the collection 
of data from multiple sources.  Each of these estimates is assigned a “quality” rating; in 
the event of multiple values, the estimates with the highest quality are used. 
 
4.5. Model 
The model employed in this paper is a cross-section of 120 countries.  Although 
this procedure can omit important country characteristics, this is the only way to test the 
hypothesis that access is an important determinant of private credit due to the single data 
point for access to credit as described in the above section.  The basic model incorporates 
creditor rights, information sharing, and market factor controls.  To be clear, my primary 
dependent variable is private credit/GDP, not financial development.  The basic model is 
as follows: 
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 The first two sets of models presented in the results section face the same model 
selection as outlined by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), using updated data.  The 
next two models are specified in the same way, but include the added access and 
ineq.access variables to test for the impact of access to finance on private credit.  Each of 
these two sets of models include a set of regressions including income, creditor rights, 
legal origins, and access, as well as a set of regressions swapping legal origins for the 
information sharing variables.  The same model selection was then run for three country 
subsets: all countries, poor only, and rich only.  The distinction between rich and poor is 
from the World Bank Classifications: high and upper-middle income is considered “rich,” 
and low and lower-middle income were “poor.”  These designations were made to see 
whether the differences associated with access persist across income groups. 
 There were a couple models that exhibited heteroskedasticity.  In order to reduce 
bias due to elevated levels of heteroskedasticity, I will control for these factors using a 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (HCSE) model based on White (1980) and 
MacKinnon and White (1985).  This method has shown its ability to control for 
heteroskedasticity within OLS estimations.  However, White’s estimator was developed 
for use with large samples; Long and Ervin (2000) present a new procedure to deal with 
heteroskedasticity in sample sizes under 250.  It is argued that this procedure, known as 
HC3, is optimal as it does not alter the value of the coefficients and presents a consistent 
estimator of standard errors.  These robust standard errors are used in every estimation as 
they do not distort estimates when heteroskedasticity is not present.  
 The third set of models includes the other market factors of income inequality as 





available for all countries in the sample.   The sample was then reduced from 120 to 94 
countries in order to accommodate this variable.  The same subsets of rich/poor 
classifications will be used in all models in order to assess the differences in relative 
incomes.  The remaining variables in these estimations are those that appear to be the 
most important in the earlier models.  This set of models is included to control for 
underlying inequality that may explain much of the variation among access inequality. 
 
4.6. Results 
Within the empirical results, the findings of Djankov, McLiesh, and Schliefer 
(2007) are first replicated with results that differ only slightly from their initial findings.  
These are provided in order to directly compare my results from the inclusion of the 
access variables to the baseline estimations.  The first set of results shown in Tables 4.2 
and 4.3 are reproductions of the cross-sectional results as reported by Djankov et al. The 
differences in results found in my estimations can be attributed to an updated time sample 
(from 1999–2003 to 2007–2011) and a slightly reduced sample size (129 to 120).  The 
sample size reduction is due to nine countries whose data were unavailable in the Global 
FINDEX database. 
Table 4.2 displays the results for testing the effectiveness of creditor rights as 
proxied by the number of months it takes to enforce contracts through the court system, a 
constructed index of creditor rights, and legal origins.  The control variables GDP and 
GDP per capita growth are significant, providing the expected direction of correlation.  
As expected, the measures of creditor rights were also significant, but were not 





sample that included all countries, the creditor rights were highly significant, yet 
diminished when the sample was split.  The only apparent conflicting result was related 
to the Soviet legal origin.  In Djankov, Mcliesh, and Schleifer’s estimations, this was 
statistically significant and negative in the all country and rich country samples; however, 
in my model with the poor countries, Soviet legal origins were significant at the 10% 
level and positive.  On the whole, the results related to creditor rights returned similar 
results in my updated sample. 
 The second set of cross-sectional estimates replaces the legal origins variables 
with the measures of information sharing with results shown in Table 4.3.  All 
specifications in this updated sample remain the same.  The creditor rights variables 
retain similar characteristics from the first set of models to this set.  The information 
sharing variable shows statistical significance at the 1% level in the all country sample, 
but drops to 10% in each of the reduced samples.  The interesting thing to note is that the 
individual components of information sharing, private bureau and public registry, do not 
appear to be large predictors of private credit.  The only case was for private bureau in 
the all country sample.  This was a drastic change from the Djankov, Mcliesh, and 
Schleifer estimations.  My interpretation would be that over time the type of information 
sharing organization begins to matter less and less and that the important element is that 
some form of information sharing exists between creditors.  The other possibility is that 
regardless of whether the information sharing entity is public or private the institutions 
function in a similar manner.   
 While there were differences between my estimates and those initially generated 





creditor rights and information sharing are still large determinants of private credit.  As 
such, we are now able to test the impact of the level of access and inequality of access 
using the same model specifications that provide baseline results.  A further interpretation 
of the results follows.   
The first set of models tests for the impact of access on private credit, controlling 
for market factors, creditor rights, and legal origins, while the second set of models 
replaces legal origins with information sharing and creditor rights.  Both of these sets of 
models are separated by income group.   In addition, there are additional estimates that 
control for the level of inequality, and these are reported in the third set of models.  In 
each of these estimations, I find significant evidence in favor of the hypothesis that 
higher levels of access and lower inequalities of access are indicative of higher levels of 
private credit. 
 The first set of my access estimations are reported in Table 4.4.  The results are 
separated into all countries, rich countries, and poor countries.  Within each of these there 
are two base models: one of which controls for GDP and per capita GDP growth and 
elements of creditor rights, while the other includes these plus legal origins.  The two 
access variables, access and ineq.access, are then estimated individually on these two 
base models.   
 Across all models in this set, both access and ineq.access enter as statistically 
significant.  In the models that include all countries, access generates an average 
coefficient of 0.463, with a one standard deviation change from the mean of access 
generates a 11.1% change in private credit.6  Although we find an economically and 
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statistically significant relationship, the possible endogeneity issue between private credit 
and total access makes it implausible to assert that access causes credit levels to change.   
The interesting thing to note is that when the countries are separated into rich and poor, 
there is a slightly larger effect on the rich countries.  Computing the single standard 
deviation change from the mean has a 10.7% increase in private credit for rich countries 
compared to a 9.4% change for poor countries.  This is somewhat surprising since 
countries typically will have more inclusive financial systems as they move up the 
development ladder.  Within the wealthier countries, reductions in access to financial 
services are a larger impediment to allocations of capital.  
 The second and most important element of this research is the impact the level of 
unequal access to formal financial institutions (ineq.access) has on private credit.  This 
variable enters into every regression significantly with the expected negative coefficient.  
As unequal access rises, the level of credit in the economy falls.  The effect of changes in 
ineq.access has similar impacts on income groups.  In the total sample, a one standard 
deviation increase in ineq.access results in estimates of private credit being only 70.4% 
of what it otherwise would have been7; conversely, a one standard deviation decrease in 
inequality would result in private credit estimates being a remarkable 42.1% higher.  
When separating the sample into income groups, this magnitude of the changes does fall 
somewhat, but remains influential; the one standard deviation decrease in ineq.access 
(reduced inequality) for the rich countries results in a 27.1% increase in the private credit 
                                                                                                                                                                             
mean and standard deviations change between samples, each elasticity is computed with their respective 
values. 
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 This log-linear computation is ,1.MSTM∗U1.VMT	, where 0.4694 represents one standard deviation and -
0.749 being the average of the two ineq.access coefficients in the total sample.  When computing the 
effects of a reduction in inequality of one standard deviation, 0.4694 become -0.4694.  This is the method 





ratio, compared to a 26.3% increase for the poor countries.  The coefficients attached to 
ineq.access in each model exhibit the expected sign and statistical significance, providing 
substantial evidence for the theory that the distribution of access matters; it is not just the 
elite that should be targeted with financial services, but rather everyone in the economy. 
 The absolute level of GDP appears to be an important indicator of private credit 
as it enters significantly into every estimation.  The coefficients between the rich and 
total sample remain relatively constant, increasing in the sample with only poor countries.   
This is expected as the poor countries have a lower GDP.  This shows that the benefits to 
a large economy of mobilizing capital require economies of scale and the ability to have 
competition between financial institutions.  Per capita GDP growth provided surprising 
results as it entered significantly into less than half the models.  Growth was included 
because higher levels of growth are typically associated with increased lending in order 
to fuel the growth.   
 In accordance with the specification as laid forth by Djankov et al. (2007), 
contract enforcement (cont.enforce) was the number of months it took to settle a payment 
claim in the court system while the creditor rights index (cred.rights) is a constructed 
index on the ability of creditors to seize their collateral.  Within these variables, some 
interesting results were found.  In the complete sample with all countries, both variables 
entered into the regressions significantly and with the expected signs.  However, in the 
rich country sample, only cred.rights was significant and cont.enforce was not, while 
neither variable is significant in the poor country sample.  This indicates that in wealthy 
countries, it is not important how long it takes for creditors to receive their collateral 





place.  On the other hand, these creditor protections are not an important indicator for 
poor countries; the number of impediments to finance is wider than just creditor rights.  
This example is one in which it becomes apparent that splitting the samples into rich and 
poor can provide more information than the aggregated model is able to do, showing that 
a one-size-fits-all approach would not be beneficial in this case. 
 The introduction of legal origins as a factor of private credit is another element of 
creditor protections in that the way certain countries initial endowment of legal system 
has persistent carryover to modern times.  The largest differences are normally attributed 
to the English versus French legal systems.  The English common law is supposed to 
provide the most protections to creditors and should drive credit levels higher.  However, 
the only legal origins variable that was statistically significant in either the full or rich 
country sample was Nordic in the fourth model at 5%, and was significant at the 10% 
level in the second model.  In addition to this case French entered significantly into each 
of the poor country samples.  The issue arises that the sign associated with this variable is 
positive and the opposite of what theory would predict; it is possible that this is an artifact 
of being within poor countries.  Nordic legal origins were dropped from the regressions 
because there are not any poor Nordic countries.  The other interesting result is that 
Soviet entered highly significant at the 1% level in a single model; these countries may 
have some relationship with how access is formulated because of the historical nature of 
the Soviet Union. 
 The second set of estimations is similar in structure to the first set; the only 
difference being the removal of legal origins and inserting the information sharing 





not differ much from the results reported in the first set of models, but appear to provide a 
better fit than the first set as identified by the higher R-squared values in every model.  
The two access to finance variables displayed results quite similar to those from the first 
set of models—they are still significant at the 1% level and exhibit the expected sign.  
There are minor differences in the values of the coefficients, but not of great concern.  In 
this table, increasing the level of access by one standard deviation generates an increase 
in private credit of 10.6%.  It is evident that the coefficients between income groups 
differ widely, but when adjusted to the standard deviation changes the magnitude of the 
difference diminishes.  The rich sample has a similar change to the total sample of 10.4%, 
but both the total sample and rich countries are larger than the poor sample impact of 
8.8%.  The impact of ineq.access in this set of models is slightly larger with a one 
standard deviation decrease in inequality equating to a 45.5% increase for the total 
sample, 35.6% for rich countries, and 30.2% for poor countries.  The magnitude of the 
impact of the inequality of access is clearly an influential factor in the level of credit 
available in a given country.  This result holds for countries both rich and poor, indicating 
that this impact is not limited to poor countries. 
 The one interesting change from the first set of models is that GDP becomes 
insignificant in the eighth model.  This occurs under the rich country sample and only 
happens once the public registry and private bureau variables are inserted.  Within these 
estimates, per capita GDP growth retains similar characteristics with some models being 
significant and others not, resulting in the inability to conclusively determine the impact 
of growth.  The creditor rights variables (cred.rights and cont.enforce) exhibit the same 





the reduced samples.  The difference from the first estimations is that in half of the 
models statistical significance drops to the 10% level.  However, the conclusions from 
these variables remains that reducing the time it takes to settle payment contracts in poor 
countries is optimal while strengthening creditor rights in wealthier countries is an 
optimal policy.  The relationship between creditor rights and information sharing is that 
there are always imperfections in the way reforms are implemented; some reforms are 
more effective than others.  As such, some countries may rely on creditor institutions 
while others will rely primarily on information sharing institutions.  The effectiveness of 
the relative policies depends on the underlying characteristics of the countries—poorer 
countries are typically going to have difficulty with both effective legal systems and 
information transfers. 
 The variable information sharing is highly correlated with public registry and 
private bureau in that if either one is present then the information sharing dummy 
variable is assigned a value of one.  Therefore, the model selection does not include both.  
The results show that in the full sample information sharing is an important factor, and 
that this is most likely attributed to the presence of a private bureau as evidenced by their 
statistical significance.  These results carry over to the rich country sample with the 
expected signs but are not so decisive in the poor country sample.  For poor countries, 
these information variables enter significantly in two of the four models; with those 
models it is significant in being the ones that include ineq.access.  Of the information 
sharing variables, it appears as though the most important factor is whether a country has 
an institution that facilitates the transfer of information.  On the question of whether these 





would indicate that a private bureau is more effective in increasing the level of credit in 
the economy.  Determining the best course of action for facilitating this information 
transfer is of importance and unable to be discussed herein. 
 The final set of models was created in order to control for the level of income 
inequality and is shown in Table 4.6.  Higher levels of inequality at a given income level 
could create a higher level of unequal access to financial institutions because of pushing a 
number of people below the threshold necessary for opening an account.  Therefore, it is 
important to control for this factor in order to not overstate the effects of unequal access 
to credit.  The model selection for this last set of models uses the most important 
explanatory variables from the earlier models.  This includes GDP, per capita GDP 
growth, the creditor rights variables, and information sharing.  The GINI coefficient is 
then added to this base model and estimated across the same sample classifications as the 
earlier models.  Because GINI was not available for all countries in the sample, there was 
a reduction in the sample size from 120 to 94 countries.   
Where it was expected that higher levels of GINI would contribute to lower 
private credit, this variable did not enter significantly in any of the models, regardless of 
which sample was used.  This is an interesting result and runs in contrast to what theory 
would suggest.  If the GINI coefficient were to appear significantly it would be most 
expected in the poor countries.  The other variables exhibit their expected statistical 
significance and coefficient in the full sample of countries.  However, in the reduced 
samples for rich and poor, much of this disappears.  This is most evident in the poor 
country sample as the only variables to retain significance are the access variables and 





The dominance of the access variables across models is consistent with the theory 
put forward in this essay that increasing access and decreasing the inequality of access to 
financial institutions reduces the level of credit in an economy.  This is an important 
result in that private credit is often used as a proxy for financial development in studies 
that promote the development of financial services in order to increase growth.  Karlan 
and Morduch (2009) acknowledge that while expanding access to financial services holds 
the promise of greatness, commercial banks have been unable to extend access to the 
poor and low-income households.  Their research seeks to understand the particular 
factors that contribute to increasing access outside of the traditional elements of 
microfinance.  Their conclusions are that the mechanisms through which credit are 
extended matter; the important part is determining the most appropriate lending 
mechanisms.  More research on how to increase not only the level of access but the 
distribution of access across income groups is necessary.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 On the heels of the body of research emerging regarding the impact of finance on 
economic development, a number of theorists have sought to determine exactly which 
types of institutions policy makers should be targeting in the development process. Two 
of the more prominent features possessed by The West are strong creditor protections and 
institutions designed to accommodate an efficient transfer of information.  With a 
dominant proxy for financial development being the private credit/GDP ratio, assessing 
its relationship with specific institutions has a newfound importance.  The legal and 





economy; econometric results have pointed toward policy prescriptions of strengthening 
these institutions.   
 Another set of reforms being implemented are creating inclusive financial 
services for their welfare implications.  Outside of the immediate welfare impacts of 
creating an inclusive financial sector, it also has profound impacts on private credit.  Two 
different measures of inclusiveness were used to evaluate their impacts on private credit 
using the brand new Global Financial Inclusion (FINDEX) database from the World 
Bank.  The first variable is the traditional measure of the percentage of the adult 
population with an account at a formal financial institution.  There is a robust positive 
relationship between access and private credit, measuring positive and statistically 
significant in every estimation.  The result holds when using the complete sample, as well 
as when separating the countries into rich and poor.  Due to the nature of having only a 
single data point for access and the close relationship with private credit, it is empirically 
difficult to definitively address causality.  Therefore, while we are able to theorize that 
increasing access leads to increases in credit, we are only able to conclude that a 
relationship between the variables exists, with the use of the total access variable. 
The second measure of inclusiveness, and the one I argue is most meaningful, is 
the equality of access which was unable to be computed before the emergence of the 
FINDEX data.  The constructed variable measures the difference in access between the 
wealthier and poorer income groups.  It is not clear that there are any endogeneity issues 
between private credit and ineq.access, as the level of credit does not determine 
distribution.  Therefore, we are able to conclude that the distribution of access influences 





estimation, indicating that as an economy has more equal access, the level of credit will 
rise even controlling for a number of other factors. 
The principle perspective to be gained from this research is that it is important to 
bring a larger percentage of people into the financial system.  The secondary 
consideration is that the distribution of access among income groups matter as much as 
the percentage of the population.  The poor face much larger impediments to finance than 
the rich, and as such, will find it more difficult to become engaged in the formal financial 
sector. Some basic policy advice is to remove the impediments to finance; especially 
those that affect the poor more.  Some of these impediments, such as documentation 
requirements and large deposit requirements for opening an account, will not only 
increase the level of access to finance, but will also lend themselves to effective 
functioning business conditions.  If the impediments to finance are burdensome document 
requirements, it can be surmised that there are numerous other hurdles to effectively get a 
business off the ground.  The contributions of this research were to craft a new measure 
of financial inclusiveness and empirically show that inclusiveness has a large impact on 
the main proxy for financial development—private credit to GDP ratio. 
Decreasing the inequality of access, as a measure of inclusiveness, involves not 
putting the poor subservient to the interests of the elite and involving more of the poor in 
the financial sector.  If the advice of developing financial markets—as advocated in the 
majority of research on its relationship with growth—is accurate, this essay provides a 
compelling argument that decreasing the inequality of access to finance should lead to 
higher levels of private credit.  The exact institutional structure of reforms is a current 





within microfinance that influence participants’ access to financial services.  These 
reforms, however, should first reduce the inequalities of access before attempting other 
reforms—such as opening a stock market—that purely target the elite.  Some specific 
reforms include an expansion of microfinance institutions and increasing the availability 
of mobile banking institutions.  Further research should target identifying the specific 
types of reforms that reduce the level of inequality, along with the proper methods for 
implementing those reforms.  
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Table 4.1: Data Descriptions 
Variable Description (Source, year) 
Private 
Credit 
Refers to financial resources provided to the private sector, such as through 
loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits, and other 
accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment.  Reported as a 
percentage of GDP.  (World Bank World Development Indicators, Average 
of 2007-2011) 
Access Percent of population with account at formal financial institution.   
(World Bank Financial Inclusion Database, 2011) 
Ineq.Access Inequality of access measure computed by author as the percent difference 
between Bot.40 and Upp.60.     (upp.60 – low.40)     /    [(upp.60 + low.40) / 
2] 
(Authors calculations, 2011) 
Low.40 Percent with account at formal financial institution, income in lower 40%  
(World Bank Financial Inclusion Database, 2011) 
Upp.60 Percent with account at formal financial institution, income in upper 60%  
(World Bank Financial Inclusion Database, 2011) 
GDP.2007 Absolute GDP, current US$ 
(World Bank World Development Indicators, 2007) 
GDP.Growth Average annual growth rate from 2007 to 2011, annual % 
(World Bank World Development Indicators, Average from 2007 to 2011) 
Creditor 
Rights 
An index aggregating creditor rights. This index ranges between 0 and 4, 
with higher values indicating more rights for creditors.  
(Djankov, McLeish, and Schleifer (2007),1999) 
Information 
Sharing 
If either a public or private bureau operate in the country this variable is 




If a public registry is in operation in a country, this variable is assigned a 
one, zero otherwise.  A public registry is defined as a database owned by 
public authorities. 
(Djankov, McLeish, and Schleifer (2007),1999) 
Private 
Bureau 
If a private credit bureau operates in the country, this variable receives a 
value of one, zero otherwise.  A private credit bureau is defined as a 
commercial or non-profit firm that maintains a database of firms and 
individuals, facilitating information transfers between banks and other 
financial institutions.  (Djankov, McLeish, and Schleifer (2007),1999) 
Contract 
Enforcement 
The average amount of time it takes to resolve a payment dispute through 
courts.  Only includes disputes worth 50 percent of the country’s GDP.  
Computed as number of calendar days divided by 30. 
(Djankov, McLeish, and Schleifer (2007),2003) 
Legal Origin Dummy variables indentifying the legal origin of each country.  The five 
origins are: English, French, German, Nordic, and Soviet.  (La Porta et al. 
(1997) and CIA Factbook 2003; compiled by Djankov et. al (2007)) 
GINI An index of income inequality ranging from perfect equality at zero to 
perfect inequality at one.  (UNU-WIDER Income Inequality Database V2.0, 

























































Figure 4.1: Private Credit ~ Access 





Table 4.2: Private Credit/GDP Regressions 
  Dependent Variable: Private Credit/GDP (average 2005-2009) 
Independent  Variables All Countries Rich Countries Poor Countries 
GDP.07 0.264 0.256 0.178 0.177 0.233 0.264 
0.028*** 0.028*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.059*** 
Percap Growth -2.943 -2.535 -6.053 -5.003 2.141 1.678 
1.115** 1.172* 1.341*** 1.51** 1.900 1.984 
Contract Enforcement -0.017 -0.018 -0.013 -0.011 -0.022 -0.027 
0.0068* 0.0071* 0.008 0.008 0.011' 0.012* 
Creditor Rights 0.209 0.202 0.204 0.197 0.124 0.141 
0.047*** 0.051*** 0.060** 0.066** 0.076 0.081' 
French   0.127   -0.134   0.388 
  0.142   0.177   0.209' 
German   0.328   -0.059   0.120 
  0.184'   0.190   0.710 
Nordic   0.686   0.375   (dropped) 
  0.360'   0.326     
Soviet   0.115   -0.392   0.549 
  0.222   0.306   0.304' 
Constant -2.784 -2.753 -0.325 -0.299 -2.43 -3.38 
0.723*** 0.743*** 1.192 1.243 1.212' 1.381* 
Obs 120 120 64 64 56 56 
R-sq 0.6040 0.6237 0.5500 0.5800 0.4133 0.4674 
Note: Standard Errors below coefficients 
Significance codes: ***=significant at 0.1%, **=significant at 1%, *=significant at 5%, '=significant at 10% 
 
 
Table 4.3: Private Credit/GDP Regressions with Information Sharing 
  Dependent Variable: Private Credit/GDP (average 2005-2009) 
Independent  Variables All Countries Rich Countries Poor Countries 
GDP.07 0.244 0.232 0.161 0.148 0.214 0.216 
0.28*** 0.031*** 0.043*** 0.045** 0.053*** 0.055*** 
Percap Growth -2.516 -2.716 -5.54 -6.035 2.145 2.052 
1.090* 1.108* 1.350*** 1.317*** 1.86 1.909 
Contract Enforcement -0.019 -0.018 -0.014 -0.01 -0.024 -0.023 
0.0067** 0.0069* 0.0076' 0.008 0.011* 0.011* 
Creditor Rights 0.224 0.207 0.191 0.196 0.169 0.151 
0.046*** .047*** 0.060** 0.059** 0.078* 0.080' 
Information Sharing 0.407   0.352   0.347   
0.139**   0.200'   0.193'   
Public Registry   0.126   -0.051   0.242 
  0.115   0.136   0.182 
Private Bureau   0.301   0.266   0.29 
  0.130*   0.143'   0.233 
Constant -2.657 -2.098 -0.185 0.307 -2.275 -2.237 
0.702*** 0.771** 1.174 1.202 1.189' 1.233' 
Obs 120 120 64 64 56 56 
R-sq 0.6315 0.6231 0.5727 0.5810 0.4488 0.4459 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.6: Regressions with GINI Coefficient 
Independent  Variables Dependent Variable: Private Credit/GDP (average 2005-2009) 
  All Countries Rich Countries Poor Countries 
Access 0.425   0.580 
 
0.334   
 
0.081***   0.218* 
 
0.130*   
Ineq.Access   -0.800 
 





0.317*   0.222** 
GDP.07 0.125 0.150 0.102 0.107 0.157 0.181 
 
0.033*** 0.031*** 0.044* 0.045* 0.057* 0.051** 
Percap Growth -0.995 -0.768 -3.385 -3.826 2.175 3.139 
 
1.025 1.045 1.637* 1.629* 2.019 1.760' 
Contract Enforcement -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.006 -0.013 
 
0.006' 0.006* 0.007' 0.007' 0.013 0.012 
Creditor Rights -0.012 0.152 0.126 0.105 0.114 0.147 
 
0.006' 0.049** 0.064' 0.068 0.088 0.082' 
Information Sharing 0.309 0.414 0.229 0.451 0.236 0.235 
 
0.138* 0.137** 0.208 0.212* 0.206 0.192 
GINI -0.009 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.004 0.001 0.019 
 
0.006 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.012 
Constant -0.767 0.166 -0.951 1.528 -1.935 -1.718 
 
0.776 0.838 1.339 1.223 1.444 1.346 
Obs 94 94 52 52 42 42 
R-sq 0.7089 0.7014 0.6785 0.6648 0.5646 0.6206 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses 










 Each of the three essays of this dissertation examines how financial markets fit 
within the structure of a growing economy.  The first essay, “Stock Markets and Growth: 
A Re-Evaluation,” hypothesizes that the simple act of opening a stock market will not 
cause a permanent positive shock to economic growth rates.  While there are certainly 
circumstances where the opening of a stock market will increase growth, it is not a policy 
that should be advocated in broad strokes.  It is most likely that individual characteristics 
determine how effective a stock market will be in stimulating growth.  The second essay, 
“Schumpeterian Innovation and Equity Issuance,” evaluates one such case where firms 
use stock markets by positing that radically innovative firms in the earlier stages of the 
Schumpeterian innovation life cycle will be more likely to raise funds through the stock 
market relative to firms in more mature industries.  Extending the result, it is possible that 
countries without a large amount of innovative activity will not be able to effectively 
leverage a stock market.  As an element of financial development, stock markets and 
banks play different roles.  The third essay, “Private Credit and Unequal Access,” 
hypothesizes that an unequal distribution of access to formal financial markets will result 





of this work is that until an inclusive financial sector has been developed, stock markets 
will be less effective. 
 “Stock Markets” hypothesizes that the opening of a stock market will not lead to a 
subsequent increase in the rate of economic growth.  This runs contrary to much of the 
literature on the supposed impact of opening a stock market which posits that an efficient 
stock market is able to facilitate transfers between those with capital to entrepreneurs 
who are looking to expand their business.   However, a number of theorists question 
whether stock markets are able to promote growth in developing countries.  Some of the 
criticisms are that stock markets do not promote stability which can adversely affect an 
already fragile economy, leading to a negative relationship.  The other argument is based 
around the premise that developing countries do not have a need or the ability to use 
stock markets; many of the countries without a stock market do not have legal structures 
to support an effective functioning market or have underlying characteristics that would 
be able to use the market. Whether opening a stock market leads to subsequent growth is 
an important question in light of the number of openings that occurred through the 1990s.   
  “Stock Markets” uses two Bayesian econometric methods, Extreme Bounds 
Analysis (EBA) and Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), to determine the impact opening 
a stock market has on growth.  To determine the impact of opening a stock market, two 
different explanatory variables are used with an additional 30 control variables included 
in the dataset.  The first is a dummy variable equal to one if a stock market exists and 
zero if not.  The second variable is the number of years the market has been open.  Each 
of these variables is formed in this simplistic manner in order to test whether the presence 





a variable is able to take for a given dataset, finding that both the stock market variables 
are fragile and are not able to show that a relationship exists between opening a stock 
market and growth.  Under BMA, the stock market variables fared no better, as posterior 
probabilities of being different from zero were 0.0.  This means that in any of the top 73 
models, neither variable would have been included.  These Bayesian methodologies 
effectively question whether the opening of a stock market will influence growth. 
“Schumpeter” examines one scenario where firms might be more likely to use 
stock market financing by positing that companies in the earlier phases of the 
Schumpeterian innovation life cycle will use more stock market financing relative to 
companies in mature industries.  That firms in innovative industries use more funds from 
the stock market is based around the idea that banks are reluctant to loan funds in high 
risk industries with high potential returns.  Although the firms may have a good risk-
adjusted return, banks will not lend because of their limited return in the form of an 
interest rate, yet can lose their entire investment if the company defaults.  When firms 
move through the Schumpeterian innovation life cycle their risk will diminish as they 
become acceptable for banks; before this time, the firms’ only options are to sell equity in 
order to compensate the investors for the risk.  This theory is placed within, and does not 
conflict with, the three dominant theories of capital structure: market timing, Pecking 
Order, and Trade-Off.  A basic implication is that countries without large amounts of 
innovative activity may not have any use for a stock market.  This would underline the 
results identifying that wealthier countries are market-based financial systems whereas 





 In evaluating whether firms raise more funds through the stock market at the 
beginning of the innovation life cycle, I empirically test whether firms in innovative 
industries will be more likely to use the stock market than firms in mature industries.  
Since more innovation occurs in the earlier phases of the life cycle, it is adequate to say 
that industries that are more innovative are located closer to the beginning of the life 
cycle.  I estimate the relationship between innovation and stock market issuance with a 
probit model over the time period 1970–1992 and a 0/1 dependent variable of firm level 
decisions between stock and bond issuance.  The variable of interest is innovation which 
is proxied by United States patent activity at the industry level which provided a positive 
and strongly statistically significant relationship with stock market issuance.  This result 
provided support for the notion that firms in highly innovative industries at the beginning 
of the innovation life cycle will be more likely to raise funds through the stock market 
than firms in mature industries. 
 The third essay, “Private Credit,” examines the most commonly used proxy of 
financial development, which has a close empirical relationship with growth, to ascertain 
the import elements underlying this proxy.  Much of the evidence on the underlying 
components of the private credit/GDP ratio stresses creditor considerations: information 
sharing between creditors and legal rights for creditors to seize collateral.  I hypothesize 
that the equality of access to formal financial markets positively influences the level of 
credit available in the economy through demand for financial services.  This comes on 
the heels of conflicting evidence supporting the inclusiveness of financial services; some 
theorists contend that inclusive financial sectors will help lift the poor out of poverty, 





able to promote growth or eradicate poverty.  Basic economic theory argues that the 
distribution of finance does not matter and that it is allowing the elite within a society to 
have access to finance that is important.  I have argued that a more equal distribution of 
financial services will lead to more credit availability through greater mobilization of 
capital and demand for financial services. 
 Recent research has shown that information sharing institutions, creditor rights, 
and legal structure all positively influence the private credit/GDP ratio.  In testing the 
impact of inclusive financial systems, “Private Credit” uses identical empirical 
specifications and data as previous studies.  The only differences are an updated time 
period and the inclusion of two access variables.  Previously, the level of access was 
unable to be tested as there lacked reliable cross-country data on how people use 
accounts.  With the release of the World Bank’s Global Financial Indicators Database, 
this is able to be tested for the first time.  One variable on access used is the percentage of 
the adult population with an account at a formal financial institution, which was positive 
and statistically significant in every estimation in accordance with theory.  The second 
variable, and largest contributor to my research, is a variable of my construction on the 
distribution of access among income groups, where a higher value indicates higher 
inequality of access.  This variable was an important indicator in every model with a 
negative, statistically significant result found.  While I was able to replicate previous 
results,  both access variables dominated the other control variables by providing 
substantial evidence that the distribution is important. 
 A number of policy prescriptions in the recent past have promoted the 





developed financial markets can help a country grow.  However, in practice the result has 
not lived up to expectations; many of the empirical studies on financial markets have 
focused on countries in The West, extending the results to applications in developing 
countries.  For this reason, it has become important to evaluate what the ideal institutional 
structure of financial markets looks like rather than promoting widespread development 
of financial markets.  “Stock Markets” found that just opening a stock market is not 
enough to stimulate growth.  While possible that stock markets can influence growth, 
they do not appear to do so broadly and should not be promoted unless other 
considerations are made.   
One such idea as to the purpose of stock markets was evaluated in “Schumpeter” 
where stock markets are more effective for highly innovative industries.  Extending this 
result, it may be the case that countries that import technologies from The West and are 
not actively engaged in radically new technologies may not be able to take advantage of a 
stock market.  Future research will dictate whether the level of innovation within a 
country influences stock market activity and its impacts on growth.  Additionally, as 
empirical evidence points to a relationship, it may be able to synthesize a unifying theory 
of capital structure incorporating the innovation life cycle.  In evaluating whether 
financial markets can impact economic growth, “Private Credit” makes a compelling 
argument in favor of creating an inclusive financial sector first.  One extension of this is 
that only after access has been extended to the economy would opening stock markets 
have an impact.  The opening of a stock market may widen the inequality of access as the 
poor are typically unable to participate in common stock offerings.  The literature on 





and it will be interesting to view how the inclusiveness influences private credit/GDP and 
growth in the future. 
 
